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In this introduction I will outline the research field and topic of the dissertation. The 
method, research question and aim of the research will be presented, and my artistic 
position introduced. My artistic practice is the point of departure for this research 
project. The motivation, desire, need and urgency for the research are anchored 
there. 
The research project Writing Performance – Research on Relations between Texts 
and Performances, conducted at PhDArts, investigates relations between texts and 
performances from the perspective of contemporary visual art, and more specifically 
from my perspective as a visual artist who produces performances. 
The research started off with the very general question: “How can relations between 
texts and performances be thought, understood and described in and through artistic 
practice?” 
Performances are connected to texts on many different levels. Texts surround 
performances and encircle them temporally. Texts are written before and after 
performances, and are related to performances in a productive way: performances 
are conceptualized and produced by way of specific texts. The most common formats 
are scripts and scores. Other texts present, mediate, announce, explain and clarify 
performances. Furthermore, texts enable us to remember, to visualize and create 
images of them, to make them accessible, researchable, teachable and reproducible. 
Texts archive performances, impart them, sell them, change them, rewrite them and 
keep them alive. 
Although the field of research is diverse and widely ramified, one can roughly divide it 
into two areas which both will be addressed in this dissertation: texts before 
performances and texts after performances. Texts before performances include 
paratexts like title, announcement text, name of the author as well as texts like scores 
and scripts which enable, create, or trigger a performance, and play a decisive role 
within the working process. 
Texts after performances, which are often “created” for purposes of maintaining, 
documenting, and archiving, include texts in a narrower sense, like descriptions and 
reports of performances as well as texts in a broader sense like audio-visual 
documentation. Texts written after performances can potentially become texts before 
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a performance again, either in an intertextual sense, or in the concrete case of a re-
creation. 
I conceive of both creating scores, instructions and directions, and of activities like 




My terminology is based on the assumption that both written language (to write, 
writing) and spoken language (to speak, speaking / speech) are two forms in which 
language expresses itself. 
“Text” is a specific form of written language. Whereas writing means to leave traces, 
the characteristic of text is to build a unity that can be read. Text is a trace which can 
be read disconnected from the author. 
I make a distinction between texts in a narrower sense and texts in a broader sense. 
Texts in a narrower sense may refer to texts of verbal language such as words and 
sentences. Texts in a broader sense refer to non-verbal written languages of signs 
and symbols and to (moving) images which may be coded, be idiosyncratic, or 
abstract. According to this definition texts in a broader sense can take on the form of 
photography or video, which in this case will be named as such.  
Texts which are part of performance practices, like notations, scores, scripts and 
instructions are mostly mixtures, including texts in a narrower and in a broader sense. 
In general, texts in a narrower sense may include texts in a broader sense and the 
other way round: a text of verbal language may include images, and likewise an 
image may include verbal language.  
The broader understanding of text resonates with the etymological roots of writing. 
The Greek word scrībō originally meant “to scratch,” and later in Latin “to write, draw, 
or otherwise make lines, letters, figures.”1 To scratch means that a trace is made on 
a surface. The surface is injured and altered by the act of scratching and becomes 
                                                 
1




the carrier of this trace. Depending on the carrier material, the traces last longer or 
shorter, and may alter throughout the course of time. This understanding of writing 
can be applied to the analogue and digital sphere. I consider audio-visual media as 
texts in a broader sense, because they are capable of keeping traces of 
performances as well. Besides the production of texts, the presentation of them may 
take place in an analogue or in a digital form as well, and be presented in a screen-
based or projected form.  
To analyze the difference between verbal and non-verbal forms of language 
(between texts in a narrower and in a broader sense) in depth is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation.  
With the term “performance” an act or action is designated which is bodily executed 
by one or more people within a specific time frame. Performances in visual art can 
include elements of other disciplines, such as sound, movement, acting. They are 
mostly shown live, in front of an audience, and can likewise be received after the 
enactment through an audio-visual recording or reports. In performance, speaking 
and writing are potentially interwoven.  
This dissertation relies on a notion of performance in visual art coined by the art 
historian and curator Felicitas Thun-Hohenstein, according to whom performance 
within the field of visual art is an original achievement of this field.2 Following Thun-
Hohenstein the performative gesture in visual art can be identified with the production 
of spaces. This understanding of performance does not oppose collaboration or 
multidisciplinary practices. It means to consider the specific conditions of producing 




The main claim of this dissertation is that performance in contemporary visual art can 
be understood in and through the relations it has to texts (in a narrower and in a 
broader sense). This claim is based on my experience as an artist engaging with 
                                                 
2
 Thun-Hohenstein, Felicitas, Performanz und ihre räumlichen Bedingungen. Perspektiven einer 
Kunstgeschichte. Wien: Böhlau, 2012. 
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performance practices, as well as from my research into contemporary and historical 
performances. 
Rather than understanding performance as a form of art that is confined to a live-act, 
and as live-act only, I believe that performance in the field of visual art comes into 
being precisely within the tension between its written and its time-based aspects. In 
other words, I consider the fact that performance is dependent on texts, that is to say 
on textualisations before and after its enactment, as the potential of performance in 
the visual art. It is my conviction that artists in contemporary performance practices 
deal exactly with this potential. 
With this dissertation I try to provide a perspective through which one can look at 
performance in visual art. This thesis does not raise my claim to be universally 
applicable, and valid for all existing performances. There might be performances 
which do not, or hardly have/produce texts around them. 
 
Research Question, Discursive Framework 
The main research question which accompanies the endeavour to analyse the 
relations between texts and performances is whether or not it is possible to think of 
relations between texts and performances as non-hierarchical. If yes, how and under 
which circumstances is this possible? Can one find at least one relation which can be 
thought of as non-hierarchical, and what can be said about it? This question will be 
answered at the end of this dissertation. 
This research, an investigation into the relationships between text and performance 
in visual art, takes place within the discursive framework of post-structuralist thinking 
in the broadest sense. This means that it builds upon theories of the power of 
language, its ability not only to represent, but also to generate realities, to add to, and 
to alter them. The “realities” I look at here are performances within the context of 
contemporary visual art. In this dissertation not language at large, but specifically 
written language will be taken into account. 
 
 
Aim of the Research 
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The aim of this research is to acquire a deeper understanding of the relations 
between texts and performances in visual art in general, and specifically in and 
through my artistic practice. 
Firstly, different categories of texts connected to performances, their various 
functions and importance will be identified and described. Subsequently, I will discuss 
the implications of these observations for an understanding of performance in terms 
of a contemporary practice that can be comprehended in and through texts (in a 
narrower and a broader sense). 
Regarding relationships between texts and performances, the following questions 
arise: What is the significance of writing down a concept – a mental vision or 
imagination of a performance – in relation to the materialization, realization and 
implementation of it? What status do the concept and its written form have in relation 
to the enactment, in other words, in relation to the performance of the performance? 
Under which circumstances can a text not only inspire or influence a performance, 
but be understood as a performance as such, already before its enactment? What 
role do the interpretation and the subjectivity of the performers have in the 
enactment? To what extent and how do written notations contribute to the 
reproducibility of performances? To what extent can a text which triggers a 
performance be seen as an independent artistic work beyond the performance? Is 
the authorship in performance to be understood as specific, because the body of the 
author (potentially) is involved in the work, and not only in the working process? 
These questions arise out of my artistic practice and are rooted there. The aim is to 




My artistic practice includes performances and installations, in which sculptural and 
visual elements come together with spoken, sung, printed, or projected text. For the 
realization of commissioned work and/or the contribution to exhibitions the context is 
often taken as point of departure. I am interested in the structures provided by the 
context, such as the title or topic of the exhibition and the architectural structures, the 
setting which enables the presentation of artistic work. 
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I was trained as a visual artist at the Academy of Fine Arts Vienna from 2003 to 2009. 
I studied Performative Art – Sculpture with Monica Bonvicini and (Post)Conceptual 
Art Practices with Marina Gržinić at the department of Fine Arts. In 2006 I was an 
exchange student at the University of Fine Arts Hamburg and additionally a guest 
student in the Performance Studies master course Conceptual Choreography led by 
deufert&plischke at the University of Hamburg for one semester. After I finished my 
studies in art I took courses in Philosophy and Literary Studies at the University of 
Vienna for two years. 
Studying choreography fundamentally changed my view on and my practice of 
performance. It opened my eyes to the possibility of involving other people and 
instructing them to perform according to my (or shared) ideas. Before that, I 
performed in front of video cameras or in public space. Based on this experience and 
without questioning I assumed there is a specific connection between the idea and 
the body of the artist who carries it out this idea. This connection between idea and 
body creates the value or impact of performance art. 
Since one's own bodily presence is such a crucial aspect in many a performance, 
and since instructing people is so different from that, especially in regard to the 
relation between concept and outcome, I wondered how one can conceptualize the 
specific potential of putting something into language for someone else to perform it. 
The desire to understand this “language” (put) between these two positions and to 
reflect on it was the most profound motivation for this research. 
The performance practice I developed after studying choreography can be described 
as a “collaboration-based performance practice” within the field of visual art. This 
means that the creation of performances involves other performers instead of (or 
besides) myself, the artist. It includes collaborating with musicians, dancers, 
performers, non-professionals and audience members who perform within the 
situation of the performance. Mostly, I do not perform myself. Rather, the texts that I 
write and on which the performance is based (like scores, scripts) mark my own 
position within these performances. This position I try to reflect upon in this 
dissertation. 
For collaborations to happen the concept or idea has to be communicated to the 
performers. This usually happens before the performance in a preliminary meeting or 
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in rehearsals. Theoretically the concept or idea can be conveyed to the performers in 
oral or in written form. In practice however, the oral communication of tasks and 
written materials in the form of scores or rules often complement each other. The 
research interest pursued in this dissertation is in any event confined to the role of 
written material, to texts and its relations to performances, and oral communication is 
not taken into consideration. Text has it very own and distinguished potential that I 
am interested in. 
The second motivation for this research comes from the need to give performances, 
which are often shown only once or twice in the field of visual art, a life after the 
enactment(s). Performances are often part of the opening of an exhibition or 
otherwise of a special occasion during an exhibition. To give a performance an 
afterlife in another form enables it to be shown throughout the whole length of the 
exhibition period for example, or to be re-shown in other exhibitions, in publications 
and online. 
Considerations of how to exhibit and disseminate a performance already play a role 
in the conception of a work. This means that future presentations of the performance 
reach into its production process. During this process a performance may temporarily 
take on, or already exists in, textual formats like sketches and descriptions of the 
concept. So, its enactment or staging is connected with these texts from the 
beginning. In this dissertation both texts which precede and texts which follow a 
staging will be at stake. 
Besides supporting the creation, texts can serve the purpose of re-creation and re-
showing. Written material “survives” the act/time of a performance, and can 
potentially be performed again. This is particularly relevant in the context of 
collaboration-based performance practice. 
Scores may enable the performance to be done again by the same performers, for 
example in other places, but also by other performers (potentially creating a different 
outcome through a different reading of the text). The subjectivity and the skills of the 
performers influence their reading and interpretation of the text. The fact that text can 
be read independent from the person who wrote it can be understood as the very 




In performance practices (including collaboration-based ones), apart from the 
technique and subjectivity invested by those involved (artist and/or performers), it is 
the (present or mediated) body, which in its socially incarnated materiality shapes the 
performance and its meaning. If it is not the body of the artist, it is bodies selected by 
the artist. This is where the questions of reproducibility as well as of the 
interchangeability of the performers challenge the medium of performance itself. 
In this dissertation, I try to show the relevance of the many different relations between 
texts and performances from different perspectives, ranging from performance theory 
through social implications of performativity to political dimensions of collaboration. I 
am aware that I am not able to treat each of these implications exhaustively; this is 
not my aim, each would be a dissertation in itself. 
 
Research in and through Artistic Practice 
In the case of this research project, artistic research means to shed light on a specific 
aspect of my own artistic practice by means of reading, writing, reflecting, speaking 
and performing presentations. This reflection is supported by 1. theoretical research 
that enhances the understanding of this practice within a discursive framework (which 
is built at the same time), 2. feedback from my supervising team, consisting of 
Janneke Wesseling, Frans de Ruiter and Felicitas Thun-Hohenstein, 3. feedback 
from my colleagues in the PhDArts program who were regularly informed about the 
progress of the research through presentations. The feedback increased a critical 
self-understanding and thus influenced the further development of the research. The 
result is an increased awareness of my artistic position and practice in relation to the 
discourses engaged with. Within the course of the research, reflecting, writing, and 
the production of research-related work mutually influenced each other. 
Writing about one’s practice involves three aspects: 1. describing this practice, 2. 
identifying discourses that touch upon one’s interests and 3. critically reflecting (on) 
these discourses and the practice. The first means developing a vocabulary that 
allows for communicating about one’s practice in a comprehensible way, the second 
means engaging with terms and discourses that enhance the understanding of it, and 




The PhDArts program at Leiden University which I attended for four years is focussed 
on “research in and through artistic practice.” It means that knowledge is gained from 
research processes executed in artistic practice in and through these processes. At 
the beginning, I asked myself whether or not the knowledge that is produced in is the 
same as the knowledge produced through artistic practice? It was not clear to me if I 
had to do two different projects – a practical one and a theoretical one – and where 
they would come together in the end: in writing or in a final artistic project? 
The preposition “in” suggests that the knowledge production happens inside a certain 
area or realm, which in this case is the artistic practice, and that the knowledge 
produced can be located or found within this area. The preposition “through” 
suggests that in artistic practice a process is hosted that enables or generates 
something different than itself, as if this were a transitory place. The artistic practice 
in this case becomes a condition – in the sense of a cause or the reason – for 
knowledge that itself is located or made visible elsewhere. In both cases, the artistic 
practice itself remains clearly distinguished from the knowledge, but at the same time 
is not untouched by its production process. 
My experience with the PhDArts program has been that both aspects of “in” and 
“through” are interrelated during the whole research process, and that they are both 
needed in order to present the research at the end of this process. 
The outcome of the research is this dissertation as well as an artistic project 
presented in the form of an exhibition. Although, or because, these two forms work 
quite differently in regard to reception as well as concerning my own position, they 
complement each other in the end. This can be understood as a paradox of this type 
of research. The research does not take place either in writing practice or in the 
artistic practice, but rather in their connectedness and interrelatedness. 
The knowledge produced by this research process can be described as what the 
American philosopher of science Donna Haraway calls “situated knowledge.” This 
concerns a form of knowledge that takes into account its own situatedness in specific 
contexts, without therefore withdrawing its claim for objectivity or, in other words, its 
claim for contributing to academia. Haraway writes: “So, not so perversely, objectivity 
turns out to be about particular and specific embodiment and definitely not about the 
false vision promising transcendence of all limits and responsibility. The moral is 
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simple: only partial perspective promises objective vision”.3 The situated form of 
knowledge gains its legitimacy from the partial perspective connected with one’s own 
experience and body. 
 
Method 
“Neither in philosophy nor in art it is about proof or opinion. It is about positing, 
about assertion. Assertion differs from proof or opinion in so far as it must 
manage without certainty. Assertion philosophy transgresses the modalities of 
conventional thought, such as reflection, reason, critique and argument. It is 
about uncertainly touching a reality as a subject and giving this touch a form, 
language.”4 (Marcus Steinweg) 
I assert here that one can understand performance within its textual relations. This 
understanding was developed in my artistic practice and was the starting point for my 
PhD-research. Through the research, this understanding has developed further and 
gained new forms and insights. 
On a general level, the method employed is an engagement with discourses and 
working with and through terminology and a specific set of terms. The most important 
terms I consider and work with are text, performance, writing, recording and intention. 
In this context the difference between an art-theoretical perspective and the 
perspective of an artist on her/his practice is that in the case of the artist the practice 
is not only described with terms, but additionally understood through them. This 
means that the theory has an impact on the practice, and there is a mutual influence 
of theoretical and practical work. 
More precisely the method comprises bringing the questions that come out of my 
artistic practice into theoretical fields, and into dialogue with them. This includes 
reviewing various approaches from continental philosophy, literary studies, and art 
theory in order to shed light on my research questions from different perspectives. 
The aim is to show where in theory and philosophy my questions already exist and to 
bring these theories in dialogue with my perspective. 
                                                 
3
 Haraway, Donna, “Situated Knowledges. The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of 
Partial Perspective,” in: Feminist Studies, Vol. 14, 1988, pp. 575-599, here: p. 583. 
4
 Steinweg, Marcus, Behauptungsphilosophie, Berlin: Merve Verlag, 2006, p.7, translated by LN. 
14 
 
The selection of theories with which I engaged myself emerged from the context of 
academia as well as form personal preferences. I try to fulfill academic standards in 
the sense of not neglecting who said something relevant about the topic already. At 
the same time the selection has a personal dimension, because I am the person who 
defines the relevance and who tries to find her own way through these theories. 
I therefore reproduce passages from primary and secondary literature that I consider 
relevant in the context of this dissertation but try to interpret these texts as little as 
possible. Rather, I say afterwards what these texts mean for me, from my perspective 
as an artist, and translate their meaning into the context of the research. 
 
Content of the Chapters 
In the first chapter entitled “Performances and Texts”, the research is contextualized. 
A brief insight is given into the role texts and notations play in the performing arts and 
in visual art. I will then introduce the most important positions in relation to 
performance theory. Furthermore I will argue for a paratextual understanding of 
performance which takes the live-act as well as its (potential) textualizations into 
consideration. Against this backdrop, light will be shed on performance as live-art. 
The chapter is concluded with a view on contemporary performance documentation.  
In the second chapter entitled “Performances in and through Texts”, a dialogue 
between my experience of working with texts related to performances, and 
considerations of and theories about the characteristics of writing and texts by Émile 
Benveniste, Sigmund Freud and Jacques Derrida among others will take place. 
The third chapter, entitled “Translations from and into Performances”, is primarily 
dedicated to the notion of “translation.” Translation from and into performances will 
be approached by means of the theory of translation developed by Walter Benjamin. 
Furthermore, the theory of musical reproduction developed by Theodor Adorno will 




Guide for the Reader 
The following dissertation is divided into three chapters. Each of them has several 
subchapters.  
For referencing literature “op. cit.,” “Ibid.” and “Cf.” are used. “Op. cit." refers to 
literature which was already mentioned before, “Ibid.” refers directly to the previously 
footnote, and “Cf.” means “see” and is used for indirect quotes.  
In this dissertation, different texts, theories, and voices are speaking. For the main 
body of the text (except for headings) a standard formatting of font Arial, size 12 
points and a line spacing of 1,5 lines is used. For texts that differ from this main body 
and that were written before the writing of this dissertation other fonts, sizes and line 
spacing are used in order to mark them as artistic quotes.  
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1 Chapter: Performances and Texts 
In this chapter, the research is contextualized. It is divided into five subchapters.  
In “1.1 Mapping the Field” a brief insight is given into the role texts and notations play 
in the performing arts and in visual art.  
In “1.2 Performance Art and Theory” the most important positions in performance 
theory are introduced. Performance has been defined either in opposition to and 
disconnected from texts and textualization in the form of documentation, or, on the 
contrary, via these texts.  
In “1.3 Towards a Paratextual Understanding of Performance” I will argue for a 
paratextual understanding of performance which takes the live-act as well as its 
(potential) textualizations into consideration without thinking of them as mutually 
exclusive.  
Against this backdrop, in “1.4 Performance as Live-Art/Act,” I will approach the notion 
of performance as live-art.  
In “1.5 Concepts and Practices of Performance Documentation” I will present Philip 
Auslander’s argument that performance documentation already has a history and 
conclude this chapter with my view on contemporary performance documentation.  
 
1.1 Mapping the Field 
In all disciplines of performing arts, namely theater, music and dance/choreography, 
texts and/or notations play a role in relation to performances. In the following the role 
of texts and/or notations in each of these disciplines is mentioned briefly and 
thereafter I turn to visual art. There will not be an exhaustive overview of discourses 
by artists and theorists in these fields provided here, but some of the theories will be 
referred to in the course of this dissertation.  
Since ancient times, theater plays have been based on written scripts that contain the 
texts to be spoken or sung by the actors and the chorus. In addition, there may be 
instructions included in these scripts that describe how the text should be recited, that 
suggest other actions that should be performed, and/or what the setting of the play or 
of a scene is. 
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Musical notation has also existed since ancient times. In the western world, there 
developed a classic notational system of formalized language, which is still widely 
used. However, it must be noted that there are different notation systems in other 
cultures, and there have always been individual notation systems in use and 
developed by composers. Notations in music are a multifaceted phenomenon in 
which all aspects of musical practice are implied: rehearsing, composing, creating 
artistic work, documenting, performing, archiving. 
Choreographic notation has existed since the Middle Ages.5 Contrary to music, 
dance never managed to build a unified system that covers different styles and 
movements. The most advanced systems of movement notation are the Labanotation 
(by Rudolf von Laban) and the Eshkol-Wachmann system (by Noa Eshkol and 
Abraham Wachmann), both developed in the 20th century. 
In general, one can say that notations in the fields of theater, dance, and music all 
share three major functions: (1) building a memory aid (which, in music and dance, is 
connected to codifying and representing movement or sound); (2) supporting the 
process of creation of a work; and (3) being an artwork in themselves.  
Digital technologies add to traditional forms of writing. The most frequently used 
methods for capturing performances nowadays (either during the process of creation 
or during the live-act) are digital technologies. In choreography, besides video 
recording – which has become a standard tool for supporting the working process – 
advanced techniques like movement-capturing programs are in use.6 In music, 
software programs are used for creating compositions. These digital “forms of writing” 
are used instead of, or in addition to, traditional forms of notation. 
In visual art, no formalized notational system as in music or dance exists. From the 
very beginning, performance in visual art has included elements, methods and 
techniques from the disciplines of music, dance and theater. This is the case for 
performances as well as for their notations. Like in music and dance, in visual art, 
                                                 
5 
Cf. Jeschke, Claudia, Tanzschriften. Ihre Geschichte und Methode. Die illustrierte Darstellung eines 
Phänomens von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart. Bad Reichenhall: Comes, 1983. 
6
 One of the earliest examples of a computer program assisting an artist to choreograph a piece is 
LifeForms, a computer choreographic software tool developed at Simon Fraser University in the 
computer graphics research lab. Merce Cunningham used it to choreograph the dance Trackers, 
which premiered in 1991. Cf. Schiphorst, Thecla, A Case Study of Merce Cunningham’s Use of the 




notations for performances may contain descriptive, symbolic and depictive 
elements. Mostly, they are developed individually by the artists to serve their specific 
needs in relation to developing, communicating or preserving their work. 
Since the early 1960s, notations for performances in the visual art field have been 
referred to as “scores.” In the exhibition catalogue Happening & Fluxus by Harald 
Szeemann, such performance scores are defined as “written notations, symbols and 
arrangements for the performance of a ‘happening.’”7 
In both Fluxus and Happenings, performance played a major role. The performances 
of Happenings were influenced by theater practices. These so called “happenings” 
took place in gallery spaces or in public space. Fluxus was more strongly influenced 
by music and Fluxus performances were called “concerts” or “events.” Artists of that 
generation, such as Yoko Ono, George Brecht, John Cage, La Monte Young, Allan 
Kaprow, and Alison Knowles, among others, are well known for using scores as an 
experimental tool for creating performances, and for exhibiting and publishing them. 
Especially in Fluxus, writing scores were part of experimenting with art forms and 
trespassing the classical genres. These scores were often circulated in the form of 
artist-made books and publications. An exemplary publication is Notations8 by John 
Cage in 1969. 
In recent years, the terms “score” and “script” regained attention in visual art. In the 
following, I will briefly name three examples that appear interesting to me within this 
context, because they methodically point to the potential of writing. 
In 2007, the French curator Mathieu Copeland curated A Choreographed Exhibition 
at the Kunsthalle Sankt Gallen in Switzerland. The exhibition was based on scores 
that were performed by performers throughout the whole duration of the exhibition. In 
the exhibition space no objects were present, but only the performers and the 
audience. Copeland understood this “performance” as a form of exhibiting these 
scores. In 2013, Copeland published a book that reflected on this project and 
organized a festival based on a similar principle. The festival, just like the book, is 
entitled Choreographing Exhibitions and took place at the Centre d’Art Contemporain 
de la Ferme du Buisson in Paris. 
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Another example of a project by a curator working with the idea of the score is the 
project Draft Score for an Exhibition by the French curator and art critic Pierre Bal-
Blanc. It is a 20-minute lecture that was first performed in 2010 for a jury of 
professionals as part of his application to curate the 7th Berlin Biennale. The score 
was conceived to be performed by its author or by a third party. In 2014, the work 
was published as a booklet.9 
An example from the United States is Clifford Owens’s solo exhibition Anthology at 
the Museum of Modern Art in New York in 2012. For this occasion, the artist collected 
performance scores from African-American artists. He exhibited and performed the 
scores himself in order to show that “African-American performance art has been 
under-recognized and that its history remains largely unwritten.”10 
In the Stedelijk Museum in Amsterdam, the third part of the performance series Stage 
It! was entitled SCRIPTED. It was intended to “elaborate on the position of the script 
– or some other variable term – as a key ‘object’ in historical and contemporary visual 
art performance.”11 It took place in 2014 and encompassed performances as well as 
lectures on the role of script in visual art. 
In 2011, I examined in and by means of the artistic publication THE PRESENT 
AUTHOR. Who Speaks in Performance? how performances can be depicted, 
(re)presented, produced, or altered by written notations, scores, scripts and texts, 
and investigated the role of authorship in this context.  
 
1.2 Performance Art and Theory 
At the end of the 1970s, the American-based art historian RoseLee Goldberg stated 
in her book Performance. Live-art 1909 to the Present that performance had become 
a medium in its own right. However, Goldberg believes that “artists have always 
turned to live performance as one means among many of expressing their ideas.”12 
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Regarding the construction of a history of this quite recently acknowledged medium, 
Goldberg remarks, “the history of performance, like a history of theater, can only be 
constructed from scripts, texts, photographs and descriptions from onlookers.”13 
In 1996 the American feminist scholar Peggy Phelan formulated a perspective on 
performance that became very influential for performance theory. She wrote, “… 
performance’s only life is in the present. Performance cannot be saved, recorded, 
documented … once it does so, it becomes something other than performance. 
Performance … becomes itself through disappearance.”14 
According to this understanding, performance is ephemeral by nature. With this 
statement Phelan takes a critical stance towards performance documentation. In her 
opinion the potential of performance is the capacity to leave nothing behind, to not 
save anything that can be reproduced and circulate as an object on the market. 
Performance, according to Phelan, is something that fades in the memory of the 
audience into the invisible and unconscious realm, where it eludes all regulation and 
control. She writes, “Performance in a strict ontological sense is non-reproductive. … 
Performance clogs the smooth machinery of reproductive representation necessary 
to the circulation of capital.”15 
At the end of the 1990s, when the historicization of performance art and performance 
practices began, the American art historian, art critic and curator Amelia Jones 
offered another perspective. She wrote in her text “‘Presence’ in Absentia. 
Experiencing Performance as Documentation”16 that one can no longer maintain the 
belief that only a person who was present at a performance can write about it. Jones 
herself was born in 1961, so she had not experienced the early performances by 
artists like Carolee Schneemann, Valie Export, Yoko Ono, Adrian Piper, Gina Parne 
and Marina Abramović when she became involved in writing about performance in 
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the 1990s. Against the premise that one had to be there to get the story right, Jones 
argued that the problems raised by her “absence” are logistical, not ethical or 
hermeneutic.17 
Her premise is that there is no possibility of an unmediated relationship to cultural 
products and events, not even to those that fall under the category of “Body Art.” The 
specificity of the knowledge produced by the experience of a live performance should 
not be privileged over the knowledge that is generated by the documentary traces of 
the event.18 With this argumentation, Jones created the basis for the research, 
teaching and historiography of performance art and for an understanding that the live 
moment is also accessible through other forms of knowledge than that of the 
immediate experience. 
The American performance scholar Philip Auslander formulates an interesting 
paradox in this context: performance, which is understood as live-art, and thus is 
limited to the live-act, ought to stay ephemeral, meaning it may not leave any trace. 
Yet, in order to circulate as artwork, to reach a discursive status and recognition, 
documentation of the performed work is necessary.19 
Phelan’s position could be summarized as: performance is only accessible live; it 
goes directly to the memory; and recording destroys the essence of performance. 
Jones’ position could be summarized as: performances can and should be recorded 
in order to make them accessible to future generations, research and historiography. 
Performance theory since the 1990s finds itself in the tension between those two 
positions. Various arguments were developed around these two poles, which I will 
not follow in detail here. 
Rather, I would like to draw attention to practices committing themselves to 
documenting, archiving, recording and transcribing performances. Besides historians, 
artists and curators participate in the research, interpretation and analysis of archival 
and documentary material, and in the processing, visualization, mediation and 
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exhibition of performance history. In the following, I would like to give some examples 
from the German-speaking area, including exhibitions and conferences I have 
attended myself. 
In Vienna, the artists Carola Dertnig and Stefanie Seibold researched the local 
history of performance and displayed the outcomes of that research in the exhibitions 
Let’s Twist Again. If You Can't Think It, Dance It at the Kunsthalle Exnergasse in 
2002, and Mothers of Invention. Where is Performance Coming From? at Museum 
Moderner Kunst Stiftung Ludwig Wien (mumok, Vienna) in 2003. In these exhibitions, 
Dertnig and Seibold established lines of connection between the generation of artists 
who engaged in performances in the 1970s and 1980s and the younger generation. 
Historical records as well as contemporary artistic works were shown together in 
order to contextualize the history of performance art in the here and now. In 2006, 
the book Let’s Twist Again was published, delineating a part of the research in the 
form of interviews, again spanning multiple generations of artists. 
A further example is archiv performativ20, a research project initiated by the Swiss 
artist Pascale Grau in 2010 and executed together with the theoreticians Irene Müller 
and Margarit von Büren over the course of several years. The project is devoted to 
the archiving and transmission of performance art, “directing particular attention to 
the relationship between documentation and transcription.”21 For the presentation of 
the project, a temporary model archive was established in 2011. In the same year the 
conference Recollecting the Act. Zur Tradierung von Performancekunst was 
organized and hosted in Basel. Another project in Switzerland is the Performance 
Chronik Basel, in which the artists and theoreticians Muda Mathis, Sabine Gebhardt 
Fink and Margarit von Büren, working in a collaborative network, researched local 
performance history and illustrated it in various forms such as presentations, a 
website and a publication.22 This project focuses on critical approaches of writing 
history, and uses oral history, live interviews and collaborative, interdisciplinary 
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mapping as methods. The transcripts of interviews are made available on a 
website.23 
The German web journal MAP – Media | Archive | Performance24 is solely dedicated 
to (medial) transcriptions of live performances, and the connected topics of 
performance recording, documentation and mediatization. Theoreticians as well as 
artists are invited to write texts reflecting on this topic. 
The practices of research, historicization, documentation, exhibition, publication and 
displaying past performances shift the focus from the fundamental question of 
whether or not performances should be documented to the practical examination of 
how to deal with performance documentation in a reflective and critical way. They 
touch upon what Jones calls “logistical problems.”25 For Jones, “the logistical 
problems are many: obtaining the documentation that is available; getting 
photographs to study and reproduce without blowing one’s tiny bank account.”26 
The logistical problem for Jones as an historian is how to obtain documentary 
material of performances she did not experience. For artists producing performances 
the logistical problem also exists, namely: How to make a performance accessible 
and how to disseminate it after the live-act? This includes finding an appropriate way 
of conveying a performance in the form of documentation in order to get it from the 
place and time where it happens to other times and places. There exists no recipe for 
this “appropriate way”; rather, a certain form has to make sense for a particular 
performance and must be suitable for its concept and content. The logistical problem 
for artists does not (only) arise after a performance, but is already present during the 
working process. 
 
1.3 Towards a Paratextual Understanding of Performance 
I follow the work of the art historian and curator Barbara Clausen according to whom, 
“engaging with performance art … is to be understood as the ongoing process of a 
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contingent reciprocity between event, mediatization and reception.”27 Clausen’s 
approach enables one to think of the live-act together with the texts and 
textualizations of performances this research is dedicated to. 
Based on that I will suggest a paratextual perspective on performance. The term 
“paratextuality” comes from literary theory and was coined by the French literary 
theorist Gérard Genette in the 1980s. Paratextuality is a particular type of 
intertextuality that focuses on written texts in the narrow sense – namely, written 
elements that accompany a text and in doing so make it into a book. 
The greek para, which is used as a prefix here, means besides, towards, beyond. So, 
paratexts are texts that enclose a book in order to make it perceptible as such. In 
Genette’s words, “text is rarely presented in an unadorned state, unreinforced and 
unaccompanied by a certain number of verbal or other productions, such as an 
author’s name, a title, a preface, illustrations.”28 He continues:  
“… in any case they surround it and extend it, precisely in order to present it, 
in the usual sense of this verb but also in the strongest sense: to make 
present, to ensure the text’s presence in the world, its ‘reception’ and 
consumption in the form (nowadays, at least) of a book.”29 
Applying this to performance in a similar vein means that the performance (in the 
sense of enactment or staging) becomes a performance through the paratexts 
surrounding and presenting it. Also for performances the title, as well as the name of 
the artist and/or the names of performers, play a crucial role. In addition, printed 
matter, such as announcements, flyers, brochures and invitations, may be produced 
by the institution, the gallery owner, curator, or artists themselves may give further 
information which contributes to the (reception of the) performance in general. This 
can also be a necessary or constituent part of the performance. 
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Genette differentiates between two sorts of paratexts: peritexts and epitexts. 
Peritexts like the name of the author, the title of the book, the publishing house, the 
edition, the cover (image), possibly the indication of genre, and additions like an 
epigraph, a fore- and afterword, a dedication, or acknowledgements are included in 
the book. Epitexts are texts external to the book. These paratexts exist separately 
from the basis text and are often produced thereafter. To this category belong 
supplementary and accompanying material, as well as published interviews with the 
author, personal letters, diaries, biographical portraits, or advertising text about the 
book/author produced by publishers. 
In the context of performance, paratexts that circulate after the staging of a 
performance enable its reception, which is to be understood as an ongoing process 
as Clausen pointed out. I propose in this context considering performance 
documentation as paratext as well. Editions or the number of copies, in the sense of 
the number of stagings, are also interesting paratexts. 
Performance documentation affects or even determines the reception and the 
knowledge of performances after their enactments or stagings. Even when we have 
witnessed a live performance, the documentation will add to our understanding of it, 
and influences our memory which alters in relation to it.  
The fact that after the staging performances are dependent on texts in a broader and 
narrower sense correlates with the fact that (para)texts survive beyond the moment 
of staging. For artists the awareness of the paratextual nature of performance means 
they have to decide whether to keep to themselves paratexts they have produced 
and (possibly later) publish them, or throw them away in order to prevent them from 
appearing later. First, there are texts by the artist, including scripts, scores, written 
concepts, and visual sketches and drawings, which potentially give information about 
the performance after its staging, and become epitexts when published. Second, 
there are classic paratexts in the form of printed matter like flyers, brochures, 
invitations, announcements. Third, there may be epitexts produced by audience 
members, critics and historians who witnessed the performance. The publication of 




According to a paratextual understanding, the enactment of a performance maintains 
its specificity of existing during a time frame at a specific place and no longer existing 
afterwards. This enactment, however, is mostly connected to texts. It is hard to 
imagine a performance without any paratext. There are situations, for example, in 
public spaces in which performances are not necessarily recognizable, without 
paratexts that enable us to perceive what we see as a performance. If only a single 
word were related to a performance, it might be interpreted as title, artist name, 
score, or all at once and would contribute to our understanding of it. 
The paratextual perspective I suggest provides a specific view on the relation of text 
and performance within the context of performance research on the one hand, and 
on the other hand, it argues for a dynamic understanding of performing, writing and 
documenting as interrelated practices. In the following, I will show what 
consequences the paratextual perspective may have for an understanding of 
performances as live-art/act and for performance documentation. 
 
1.4 Performance as Live-Art/Act 
“Sometimes the making becomes doing 
and 
sometimes the doing become the making”30 (Francis Alÿs) 
Performance is generally understood as live-art – which, as Auslander points out, is a 
paradox.31 In his book Liveness. Performance in a Mediatized Culture Auslander 
opposes the idea that live media like performance and theater belong to another 
realm and are received differently than reproductive media like film for example are. 
He shows that our mediatized culture has formed our perception of live events, that 
the production of live and broadcast events economically go hand in hand 
(Hollywood films, concerts, sports) and are interrelated (big screens at live events’ 
stages).32  
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I am not aiming to question the term “live” as such; for me, it simply means to share a 
time and space with the audience. I want to argue that performance in visual art is 
more than the live-act. In the preceding paragraphs, this argument was elaborated on 
by means of a paratextual perspective, which suggests to regard the live moment of 
a performance and the documentation and other remaining texts in association with 
one another. 
For artists, the choice of a particular medium over another in the documentation of a 
performance always depends on availability, on financial issues, and on artistic 
decisions on how to handle and conceptually deploy different media. Besides text, 
photography meaning literally “writing with light,”33 is the first medium in which 
performances are captured. Film was used for the purpose of performance 
documentation as well, but it has always been a relatively expensive material. In the 
1970s, video became an alternative to film, which offered new technical possibilities. 
It was, on the one hand, used in order to document performances that were executed 
live a limited number of times; and on the other hand, performances were also done 
exclusively for the video (or film) camera. 
Well-known historical examples of performances executed in front of a camera are 
Walking in an Exaggerated Manner around the Perimeter of a Square, 1967-68, and 
Dance or Exercise on the Perimeter of a Square (Square Dance), 1967-68, by Bruce 
Nauman, an American performance and installation artist. Both performances were 
executed without an audience in Nauman’s studio. He created a stage setting in the 
form of markings on the floor and walked along them. In the work Playing A Note on 
the Violin While I Walk Around the Studio, 1967-68, the camera is set centrally in the 
studio in a stationary position, “so that when he walks outside of the camera’s view at 
times, only the sounds of the notes and footsteps are heard. Sound and image are 
out of sync, a situation noticeable only at the end of the film when the sound stops 
but Nauman continues to pace and play.” 34 
With these works, Nauman made the mediatization and documentation of the 
performance itself a subject of debate. Other performances took place in public or 
private spaces and were not directed towards a specific live audience either. Other 
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well-known examples include Following Piece by the American architect, installation 
and performance artist Vito Acconci, and Tehching Hsieh's five One Year 
Performances by the Taiwanese performance artist Tehching Hsieh.  
Acconci’s Following Piece took place each day of October 1969. Acconci followed 
people on the streets until they entered a private space. After each performance of 
the piece he wrote a report about it and sent it to a(nother) member of the art 
community. 
For the first One Year Performance, entitled Cage Piece, 1978-79, Hsieh locked 
himself up in a cage for one year. He did not permit himself to talk, to read or to listen 
to the radio. In the following year, he performed the Time Clock Piece, 1980-81, in 
which he punched a time clock every hour and took a picture of himself. In Outdoor 
Piece, 1981-82, Hsieh spent one year outdoors and was not allowed to enter a 
building or to sleep at a sheltered place like a car or train. In Rope Piece, 1983-84, 
he was connected to the artist Linda Montano with a rope, but they were not allowed 
to touch each other. In the last one-year performance, No Art Piece, 1985-86, Hsieh 
neither made art nor looked at any art pieces. 
Quite a number of the performances that are considered part of performance art 
history today were not live-acts staged in front of an audience, or intended as such. 
Rather, the reception of these works took place afterwards, through documentation in 
newspapers or in art galleries.  
In the following, I will argue that whether a performance or the photographic or video 
documentation of it is regarded as the artwork is a matter of perspective. In other 
words, a performance can also be simply a means to an end for the realization of an 
artwork that includes the body, the embodied subjectivity, emotions, reactions or 
gestures of the artist (or of someone else). 
The American artist Laurel Nakadate, for instance, speaks of performance when she 
describes her work 365 Days: A Catalogue of Tears from 2010. In this work, 
Nakadate cried every day for one year. She took a photo of herself during that action, 
and uploaded the photo as her profile picture on Facebook. From 2011 on, the work 
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can be seen as a photographic series in exhibitions.35 The performance of crying was 
never done for a live audience. 
Another example is the Viennese artist Renate Bertlmann, who did performances in 
the 1970s and 1980s (at De Appel in Amsterdam, at Franklin Furnance in New York, 
and other places). Bertlmann revisits motifs from her performances in her staged 
photographs and vice versa in her work. When I researched her work I found a 
photograph that I had remembered as being a performance document, but in the 
photograph no audience could be seen in the background. This made me wonder, on 
the one hand, if I had remembered rightly; and on the other hand I thought that the 
fact of not seeing an audience in performance documents is not exceptional in itself: 
the photograph could have been taken from a point of view from which one simply 
could not see the audience. However, during my research I found that it was not the 
same photograph, but rather two images that looked quite similar.36 From an 
interview37 conducted with Bertlmann I learned that she considers this work from 
1978 (the same year as the performance) as staged photography. The photograph 
was taken in her studio with a shutter release. The difference between performance 
document and photographic work is not evident to viewers, nor intended by the artist: 
both images have the same title. 
Like Berltmann, artists often understand videos or photographs based on 
performance practices as artworks in themselves, and do not regard them as past 
and lost performances. It therefore depends on the perspective of whether a video or 
photograph of a performance is seen as a document, and thus as secondary to the 
performance, or as an artwork in itself created by the means of a performance. Artists 
often engage in different media practices parallel to one another, or use them in a 
complementary way for creating work. 
Regarded from this perspective, the paradox which performance as live-act has does 
not arise. In my view the live performance and the performance documentation 
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together (as well as the relation between them designed by the artists) constitute the 
specificity of performance in the field of visual art. 
 
1.5 Concepts and Practices of Performance Documentation 
The following will shed light on performance documentation. First, its meaning and 
history are briefly looked into. I follow Auslander’s observation that performance 
documentation already has a history which he shows by means of Michael Kirby’s 
work. In a second step I will present my own view on contemporary performance 
documentation on the basis of this argument. 
In my view, performances in the contemporary art field are not thought of 
independently from their possible documentation any longer. This is the case 
regardless of whether or not documentation is produced on a very general level. On 
the level of individual practices and of specific performances this means that 
decisions around performance documentation, as well as the way the performance 
documentation is designed, have implications and mean something for the 
performances themselves. With this argument I am staying in the paratextual logic 
according to which the performance is constituted by the fact that the staging of the 
performance or the live-act is read together with its paratexts. This means that 
performances are defined partly through its paratexts and through the performances’ 
relations to them. 
Let us take one step back and look at the meaning of performance documentation. 
What is designated by the term “performance documentation” is not simply the 
entirety of captured material and recordings of a performance. Rather, the recorded 
material is selected and processed; in the case of video, this is done through editing, 
cutting and post-production. The finished version, “signed” by the artist or legitimated 
by an institution, is called “the documentation.” So the documentation is not only one 
possible perspective on the performance. It has more authority than others, because 
it is legitimized by the artist and/or institution through the exhibition or publication in 
which it is shown. Its task is to officially and publicly represent the performance. 
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In his lecture “Performing Texts,”38 Auslander states that performance documentation 
is a specific practice and has a discourse with a history that reaches back to the 
beginnings of performance art. He describes this history using the example of the art 
scene in New York from the late 1950s to the beginning of the 1970s, and presents 
Michael Kirby and his documentation work in the framework of Fluxus and 
Happenings as a pivotal figure of this practice. Kirby was professor of drama at New 
York University, publisher of various publications, and chief editor of the journal PAJ 
from 1969 to 1986. In 1965 he published the book Happenings. An Illustrated 
Anthology, which can be seen as the first example of performance documentation, 
according to Auslander. 
Kirby reflects on his own practice of performance documentation in his writings and 
defines it as a “distinct and self-conscious, discursive practice.”39 He explains the 
reasoning behind it is “a concern for tomorrow’s past.”40 According to Auslander, 
Kirby made these documentations not for contemporaries, but rather for future 
audiences, who would have no other access to these performances. These future 
audiences should be able to understand the experience of the live performance 
through the documentation. Kirby formulates the goal even as “to experience the 
performance itself.”41 He wanted to produce “surrogate performances” through his 
documentation. These surrogate performances should give future viewers as much of 
an understanding of the performances as possible and thereby do their duty to the 
historiography, according to Auslander. He quotes Kirby, who writes: “To the extent 
the writer consciously attempts to record rather than to evaluate or interpret, the 
performance will retain its own identity and the reader will respond to the 
documentation in much the same way as he would have responded to the 
performance.”42 
Auslander’s interpretation is that the objectivity proposed by Kirby does not primarily 
stand in opposition to a subjective position, but rather to the performance critique in 
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New York at that time. Kirby’s position that performance documentation ought to 
describe a performance objectively means to not interpret or critique it. Otherwise 
future viewers would not see the performance “itself,” but the artists’ interpretation of 
it. In Kirby’s opinion the performance should be interpreted and evaluated by the 
audience who sees the documentation; this should not to be done ahead by the artist 
who documented it.43 
Today artists hardly feel responsible for the historiography of (other artists’) 
performances. Rather, most performance documentation is arranged and/or created 
by the performance artists themselves, according to their ideas, concepts and needs. 
Potentially, recordings, pictures or reports that capture a performance can be 
produced by the audience that is present (unless it is forbidden, as in most theater 
and dance locations, for example), by people hired by the institution, by the artists or 
people they collaborate with. The following will focus on documentation planned and 
designed by artists themselves.  
The argument here is that performance documentation nowadays means something 
for the performances themselves. The reason is that performance documentation 
already has a history and its own discourse. Artists from today’s generation know 
about performance documentation; they know early performance films and videos 
from YouTube or UbuNet; they see them in exhibitions, and learn about them at art 
universities. So, when (young) artists produce performances nowadays they are 
aware of the issues related to and the meaning of documenting it. 
For artists, this awareness of performance documentation is connected with the 
necessity of having documentation for economic needs, to be able to sell, to present 
one’s own work, to put it online, to send it around to curators, to institutions, to apply 
for residencies and for subsidies, to obtain co-financing, collaborators, production 
partners, and so on. 
On a general level, to decide in favor of or against performance documentation 
means to take a position in the discourse about its definition and understanding. 
Even not documenting is a statement. The best known contemporary example is the 
work of Tino Sehgal, who does not produce any documents of his work, neither is the 
audience allowed to take any pictures. 
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The way in which artists present their performances after their staging(s), the choice 
of media they use, and the extent to which they collaborate with other artists to 
produce documentation are dependent on their own artistic practice. This changes 
the perspective from performance documentation as an objective or ethical practice 
to an understanding and dealing with it that fits the artist’s own practice and individual 
needs. 
An artist who decides against producing any documentation creates the work just for 
the moment and for the audience who is present. To document a performance means 
to acknowledge that a performance can be (re)presented within conditions set by 
other media; that acts and actions do not oppose writing, but that writing, performing 
and documenting may complement each other; and that performance has the 
potential to inscribe itself into other media. 
Documenting a performance, possibly putting it online or publishing photos or 
descriptions in print form means defining the work, at least in part, through 
documentation. Thereby, artists may conceive of the documentation as a further 
stage of the work, as one step in an ongoing process; or documentation can be 
exclusively treated as a necessity for practical and economic reasons of selling, 
exhibiting, making portfolios or presentations, having a website and so on. 
I think the awareness about performance documentation and about its meaning has 
created a “conceptual understanding” among the current generation of artists. By 
“conceptual” I am referring to two things. First, based on the assumption that art 
practices and art theory are connected to one another, one could say artists 
participate in the discourse about performance documentation through their 
practices, they contribute to what can be said and thought about it. Second, it refers 
to the fact that artists decide conceptually, meaning dependent on the performance 
and/or their practice itself, on the form of the documentation. This implies that 
nowadays there are no general rules, ethics, or aesthetics. Rather the context, 
content and other specifics of the individual practice and/or specific performance are 
decisive for the concept of the documentation. Beyond conceptual considerations of 
the work, questions of budget, of technical possibilities and of authorship may 
influence the form of performance documentation. 
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In the following paragraphs, an insight into what kind of choices artists face around 
performance documentation and what impact these choices may have on the 
performance itself will be given. With this, attention should be drawn to the wide 
range of (conceptual) possibilities on the one hand, and on the other hand, to the fact 
that documentation cannot be thought of as being disconnected from the 
performance, because it is part of the performance itself. 
Most of the decisions concerning the recording of a performance are made in 
advance. The artist opts for the medium, photography, video, text or other media, and 
decides whether he or she will operate these media him- or herself, or alternatively, 
collaborate with or hire photographers, filmmakers or video artists. The act of 
recording or photographing often cannot be done by the artist him- or herself, 
because the artist is involved as a performer or is the performer. In collaboration-
based performance, in which the artist does not perform it is technically possible. 
However, in my experience as an artist, one cannot fully concentrate on the task of 
recording or taking pictures like a hired photographer can. A practical reason is that 
for the artist there are always other things to do, which have to do with organizational 
matters and social obligation: the need to take care of the situation and to answer 
questions from the performers, curators, audience, press and others. 
In the space in which the performance takes place one has to decide where to place 
the technology. This affects the performance insofar as the media and/or the people 
running it have their own physical presence in the space. It makes a difference for the 
performance whether the video camera is “sitting” in the first row or whether it is 
“standing” on the stage, next to the performer, for example, and thus becomes part of 
the image. Depending on the performance the artist has to decide on (against or for) 
the presence of the technical equipment during the performance. Not only does each 
medium have its own presence and takes up space, it also produces noises like the 
shutter or the flash of a camera. Photographers who wander around in a small gallery 
space, for example, automatically become “performers” in the sense that they attract 
the attention of the audience. Thus, it makes a difference whether and how many 
photographers are present; whether they are supposed to stand or to sit; whether 
they are allowed to move, to enter the stage/performance area, and so on. 
In the case of a stable camera position, the most decisive point is whether the 
camera is directed towards the audience, and whether or not it can pan there. Being 
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(possibly) in the picture has an impact on the feel and comfort of the audience, and 
thus on its movements and positioning in the space. When a situation and reactions 
to it are recorded the audience acts differently than it would without a camera’s 
presence. The visible presence of a camera changes the situation. Depending on the 
performance this fact might be avoided or deliberately deployed. 
All these decisions are part of artistic processes and are mostly made by the artists 
themselves, or consciously delegated to other people. These decisions influence the 
creation of a performance already during the work process and also its enactment, 




2 Chapter Two: Performances in and through Texts 
In this chapter, a dialogue between my experience of working with texts related to 
performances, and considerations of and theories on the characteristics of writing 
and texts by Émile Benveniste, Sigmund Freud and Jacques Derrida will take place. 
The text will switch back and forth between theoretical considerations to descriptions 
of concrete examples from artistic practice. The authors referred to are selected by 
personal interest. They do not necessarily agree on each other which is sometimes, 
but not always, made an issue. Rather, my approach is to process different 
theoretical perspectives in order to view the issue and all the questions coming with it 
from different angles. 
The significance of texts related to performances can be understood on two levels: 
on the general level of contributing to history and research (touched upon in the 
previous chapter); and on the level of supporting or enabling the creation of 
performances, which will come into focus in this chapter.  
The thesis inherent to this chapter is that text and performance are related and 
interrelated on different levels, both before and after the enactment or staging of a 
performance. I will look at relations which I consider interesting for the topic by 
“zooming” into specific relations in practices and analyze them in detail. In doing so I 
aim for a deeper understanding of theses texts. 
“2.1 Functions of Texts for Performances” provides an overview of texts connected to 
performances and their functions within the process of creation. The aim of this 
overview is to create an awareness of the various roles and meanings texts can take 
on in relation to performances. 
“2.2 (Making a Note in) Writing” is devoted to the characteristics of writing in general 
by looking at its etymology and at Freud’s considerations of writing and memory. 
In “2.3 Texts to Be Performed” the functions of texts within the process of creation will 
be investigated in depth.  
In “2.4 Plato’s Phaedrus and the Critique of Writing” Plato’s text Phaedrus and the 
idea of the secondary status of writing will be presented. 




“2.6 Critique of Writing Performances” addresses the question whether or not it is 
possible to think of relations between texts and performances in a non-hierarchical 
way comes into focus.  
In “2.7 The Potential of Text” will be discussed briefly, following Plato and Derrida. 
“2.8 Theories of Performativity” will turn to the theory of performativity of Austin, and 
Derrida’s critique on it will be presented.  
In “2.9 The Role of Intention” I will consider the role of intention, and subsequently 
the term “différance” by Derrida. 
In “2.10 Différance between Text and Performance” will address Derrida’s notion of 
différance in relation to text and performance. 
 
2.1 Functions of Texts for Performances  
Performances are surrounded by texts. Texts are connected to performances on 
many different levels and have various functions for them: texts conceptualize, 
produce, present, mediate, announce, explain and make performances 
understandable. Texts have the potential to make performances memorable, to 
visualize them, to make them accessible, researchable, teachable and reproducible. 
Texts preserve and archive performances, they interpret, sell, change, rewrite and 
keep them alive. In this subchapter, first, texts that matter in relation to performances 
will be named. Second, the types that are specific to performances and their role in 
the process of creation will be described. 
During the process of creating a performance, texts may serve the artist as 
inspiration, idea, and form finding. Such texts may include literary prose, poetry, 
theory, philosophy and texts in a broader sense, such as photographic images, films 
and paintings. These texts may appear in the final performance in the form of direct 
or indirect quotations, references, or paraphrases. 
Other kinds of texts which play a role during the process of creating performances 
are texts written by the artists themselves. A first text is often written for the purpose 
of communicating the concept to a curator or for a subsidy application. Depending on 
the individual working methods, setting the performance on paper before enacting it 
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or going to a studio to rehearse is more or is less important. Developing a 
performance may include descriptive texts, declarations of intent, written forms of the 
concept accompanied by notes, sketches, drawings, graphics, diagrams, floor plans, 
spatial layouts, storyboards. In these forms written verbal language is often mixed 
with visual elements. 
In the context of producing performances, the function of written notes in combination 
with visualizations is not only to support the process, and to reduce the rehearsing 
time, but also to prevent wrongly imagined or impossible actions. When, for instance, 
one draws a plan showing the placing of performers, in marking their position on a 
floor plan one can immediately see which future positions are possible, which 
directions they can go in, and which directions or steps are not possible from this 
position. The imagination in such cases is not always reliable, as mentally there are 
things possible that are not in practice. Texts in a broader sense have the function to 
correct the imagination in this context. 
The last sort of texts which should be mentioned before approaching the function of 
texts within collaborative performance practice are texts that appear in a direct form 
during performances. Texts in a narrower sense may be read, spoken, sung or 
otherwise vocally interpreted. Texts might also be visually present(ed) as image, 
printed on a display or as projection (subtitles often have this form in theater and 
performance venues), or in paper form (like handouts), or can take on a three-
dimensional form as a sculptural element, as part of the stage design.  
Printed texts distributed to the audience at the entrance (like program booklets) or 
during the performance may have the aim to inform about the performance and might 
be taken home. Likewise, these texts can be part of the performance, providing the 
audience with opportunities for participation: audience members may be invited to 
read aloud a text that has been handed out, to decide on the course of the 
performance on the basis of the written information (for instance, by choosing scenes 
to be seen, or topics to be discussed; by selecting or rating a certain element, action 
or a specific performer; or deciding on the course of the performance or the end of 
the story, etc.); or audience members can, based on texts, participate on the stage or 
in the performance itself, join in the action on the stage or do something on their own.  
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These methods are practiced using written text or likewise spoken language. The 
advantage of written texts is that they account for a greater sense of commitment. A 
written instruction is received as being more neutral and hence is taken more 
seriously than an oral instruction given by a performer, who, after all, plays a certain 
role, and is read as a certain character. In general, texts can play a role in the work 
process, during the performance, or both. 
In the following, I will turn to the functions of texts in collaboration-based performance 
practices. In this context texts are primarily used to communicate the concept or 
tasks to performers, and to structure the course of a performance. 
During rehearsals scores, scripts, manuals, instructions, guidelines, rules, written 
cues and the like may be used in order to develop and/or implement the work with 
performers. In the rehearsing process prepared textual material may transform itself 
and might generate other, different texts which include new ideas, tasks, actions or 
movement material. The rehearsing process may be intended as a (re-)writing 
process, or the intention may be to strictly stay with a score and rehearse different 
ways of interpreting it.  
In the case of working with musicians it is more likely (possible) to stay with a score 
and work on the interpretation, whereas notated actions often have to be adapted to 
the spatial conditions in which the performance takes place. In case of “performative 
structures” like rules, they are likely to be changed during the rehearsals, because 
how these rules work in practice and what dynamic they create among the 
performers has to be tried out and observed. A specific set of rules might work for 
one group of performers, but not for others. In “2.3 Texts to Be Performed” I will 
explain what I mean by “performative structures” in detail. 
In working with performers, text can be used as a structuring device, in order to 
(partly) predetermine what happens during the performance. Conversely, texts can 
be used to deliberately leave open certain aspects. The latter possibility can be 
achieved for example with instructions providing blank spaces that must be “filled 
in”/improvised by performers in the situation of the performance or with rules that 
must be applied or reinterpreted according to the respective situation. This option will 




However, one aspect should be briefly mentioned here: in the practice (of rehearsing 
as well as of performing in front of the audience) patterns permanently tend to arise 
at certain undefined junctures. In other words, even if one tries to keep things open in 
the performance, there is a tendency to repeat things and to draw on the existing 
repertoire, be it musical, vocal or movement-based, or to build such a repertoire in 
the rehearsing/performing process. For example: to repeatedly tell a story in a certain 
way, because this way has proven funnier than others and the audience always 
laughed; or to repeatedly use the same movement material when a certain instruction 
is given, instead of creating a new one in the very moment, because the body 
automatically favors a reaction according to trained habits. Performers tend to 
assume familiar roles, to apply strategies and methods which they are used to and 
feel comfortable with.  
Besides working with a deliberately limited rehearsal time or replacing rehearsals 
with meetings in which one speaks about the performance but does not try things out, 
a good countermeasure is to give instructions that are not familiar to a performer’s 
field of expertise (like dance, acting, or music). This method of “speaking in another 
language” can be deployed as a strategy to bring people to do things in a way or 
manner they otherwise would or could not. Besides mediating between the concept 
and the realization in general, texts provide important and interesting tools to work 
with performers in a multi- and interdisciplinary way or field. 
After the staging of a performance and in connection with it, texts can potentially be 
produced by the artist, performers and audience members who were present. The 
artists themselves may write down various things, noting experiences or 
circumstances that should be considered next time or analyzing how the piece 
“worked.” They may rewrite their announcement texts, explanations and artist 
statements, or even the title. They may give interviews, try to mediate their work; give 
lectures or presentations, update their websites and prepare teaching materials. 
Performers who participated in the performance but were not directly involved in its 
conceptualization may undertake similar written, descriptive, representative and 
reflective activities. 
Furthermore, journalists, critics, curators or historians might write a text. Audience 
members may express their opinions, for example, on the Internet. People may post 
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feedback, press a “like” button on Facebook or describe their experience in private 
blogs. 
These varying statements influence one another, views are exchanged and some 
become part of performance historiography. They can also affect how the artists see 
themselves and their own work. Although artists have a privileged position of 
reception with regard to their work, this does not rule out the possibility that aspects 
attributed to the work externally harbor a certain cognitive potential which might be 
integrated into the artist’s own understanding and future statements about it. 
“External” statements in this sense add to understanding the work in a historical 
context or theoretical framework and thus can be the starting point for new questions 
or for follow-up projects. The research here is confined to texts produced by the 
artists themselves, and texts by art critics; historians and curators will not be further 
analyzed here. 
 
Descriptions, Scripts, Scores, Instructions 
In the following, the meaning of the terms performance description, script, score and 
instruction and their usages in collaboration-based performance practice will be 
briefly outlined. 
The function of descriptive texts is to depict processes or objects by means of 
language as they are or were. This is to say, to find appropriate names and words for 
something perceived. The term “performance description” usually refers to a 
descriptive text, which captures a performance that has happened, although notes 
might be made during it. A description might include the course of actions as well as 
personal and sensual experiences of what was seen, heard, smelled, and so on. 
Performance scripts in performance practices have functions similar to scripts in 
classical theater. Their purpose is to prescribe and maintain text to be spoken or 
sung and actions to be done. The term “performance script” attempts to capture or 
develop something not performed yet. A script might be performed by an artist him- 
or herself or given to other people who further work with or perform it. Besides the 
texts to be spoken or sung, scripts may contain instructions concerning how these 
texts should be spoken or sung and how to use body expressions or gestures in 
these contexts. Furthermore, there can be notifications on additional actions to be 
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carried out. The wording of the instructions in scripts is borrowed from mental 
imaginings, from the author’s visualizations of the performance. 
Likewise, “performance scores” in collaborative performance practices have functions 
similar to those of music scores. They are written before and are part of the creation 
of performances. Once written, a score may be used for several stagings, and by 
various artists/performers. Scores may contain a range of information, like what to 
play or do, how to move, where to go and so on. In contrast to scripts they can, but 
do not necessarily have to, contain text to be spoken. Besides written words, scores 
can contain symbols, codified and abstract signs. Performance scores often have 
aesthetic qualities and/or poetic dimensions. 
“Instructions” can either be used as a means to produce an action/performance or 
they can be artworks in themselves which are exhibited or published (as in the case 
of Fluxus artists like Yoko Ono and George Brecht, a line of tradition which has been 
revitalized by Hans Ulrich Obrist’s project Do It). 
The main function of instructions is that they be carried out, but likewise they can be 
read (out loud). This potential is mentioned because reading or listening to an 
instruction creates in one’s imagination a picture of it being carried out. Carrying an 
instruction out and imagining it being done are two different forms of receiving and 
experiencing it. 
Roughly, there are two different kinds of instructions: those describing actions to be 
done (mostly stand-alone), and those specifying how a text should be recited (mostly 
a part of scripts and scores). The second tells whether a (scripted or improvised) text 
is spoken, screamed, whispered or hummed. It defines qualities like fast or slow, or 
with which emotion it happens. Instructions describing the how may not directly 
appear in the performance. They are interpreted in the performance, through the 
voice, for instance. Scripted text is not supposed to be negotiable, it ought to stay the 
same; but in the context of a performance, it is transformed into another materiality, 
into voice, air and sound waves. In the performance, these texts are transferred from 




2.2 (Making a Note in) Writing 
Émile Benveniste, one of the most important linguists of the 20th century, offers in his 
last lectures, in 1969, a detailed etymology of the word “writing.” He shows that there 
exists no common term for the word “writing.” Every language developed its own 
term: “Homer was unaware of the meaning of gráphō as ‘writing.’ … For Homer, 
gráphō only means ‘scratching,’ ‘scraping,’ ‘cutting flesh’ (e.g. II XVII, 599). Later 
‘scratch a marking into stone.’”44 According to Benveniste, in Homer there is only a 
vague allusion to the existence of writing. This occurs when Homer recounts the tale 
of the hero Bellerophon: the king of Argos sends him to the Lycians, a people in Asia 
Minor, with a “folded” blackboard upon which were engraved ominous symbols of an 
evil message. The Lycian king was to kill him.45 
Subsequently, Benveniste presents a list of meanings which will be reproduced here, 
because one can see that the word “writing” has been closely related to drawing, and 
is partly derived from the same word as “to paint.” 
“– In Latin …: scíbō means ‘scratching,’ ‘scraping.’ 
– In newer German schreiben, but in Gothic meljan (see the German malen): 
‘blacken,’ ‘begrime,’ Greek mélas, ‘to stain with color.’ It is thus about painted 
symbols, not about the engraving, but rather the painting.  
– In Old Norse rita, in Old English writan; meaning: ‘to carve.’  
– In Slavic languages, borrowed from Iranian: pisati, in the sense of ‘writing.’ 
– In ancient Persian, dipi is the word that denotes ‘inscription.’ The word for 
‘writing’ is independent thereof. It is made up of the verb prefix ni and the root 
pis-. Ni denotes the process of ‘setting down’: ‘writing down,’ and pis- the 
process of ‘painting,’ ‘pricking’ (see the technique of tattooing). The root word 
was borrowed from Old Slavic and the verb is etymologically related to the 
Latin pingō, ‘to draw,’ ‘to paint.’”46 
So, on a very general level writing means producing a trace which can be symbolic, 
coded or idiosyncratic. Why though do we need writing anyway, what is its function? 
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According to Sigmund Freud, writing has the function to supplement memory. In his 
text “A Note upon the ‘Mystic Writing Pad’” from 1925 he writes, “If I distrust my 
memory – neurotics, as we know, do so to a remarkable extent, but normal people 
have every reason for doing so as well – I am able to supplement and guarantee its 
working by making a note in writing.”47 
Freud compares our memory with the mystic writing pad of which he notes that it has 
the same qualities as memory. According to him, the interesting phenomenon is that 
as opposed to a sheet a paper, which provides limited space, the pad keeps 
everything ever written on it (which he calls continuous traces). Our memory just like 
this pad is endless in quantity and holds an innumerable amount of information. 
Following Freud, every experience is written into our unconscious and is saved there. 
Put simply, Freud thinks that the unconscious regulates what comes to the surface 
and what does not. Therefore not all of this information is on the surface all of the 
time. In other words, we cannot always remember everything that is saved in the 
memory; and coming back to Freud’s statement we also cannot always trust our 
memory. Memory changes over the course of time, because it is dependent on the 
unconscious, on other memories and perceptions. This is why we use and rely on 
writing. It provides the certainty that the written, the scratched, the trace does not 
change. 
Concerning performance this means that even though we have seen a performance 
and it is theoretically fully inscribed into our memory, because our memory is endless 
in quantity, we might not be able to fully remember it, or parts of it, after a certain 
time. Anticipated by Freud to a certain degree, the fields of brain and memory 
research have later shown that memory alters over the course of time. So the 
memory of a performance seen yesterday will not be the same in ten years anymore; 
it changes. 
Therefore to produce a trace in the form of writing is usually interpreted as a fixing, as 
opposed to the ephemeral process of a performance. Even though this shares a 
comprehensible differentiation, it does not hold as a dichotomy when looked at 
closer. In fact, fixing means three different things here: (1) the duration or durability of 
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a medium; (2) the fixing of information; and (3) a non-processuality. Concerning the 
first, one could imagine writing in a medium in which the trace does not remain for 
longer than a performance might last, for example by writing into water or sand. The 
second, the fixing of content is certainly dependent on the possibility of being read, 
which applies to performance and text likewise. Concerning the third, it is obvious 
that a text and performance likewise change in our memory. One could say in 
memory both become processes.  
Anyway, I want to keep in mind the characteristic Freud attributes to writing: what in 
English is translated as “making a note in writing” is in the German text designated by 
the word Aufzeichnung, which embraces drawn as well as written notes – in other 
words “text-based” and visual records. What is at stake here is the potential of writing 
to produce records.  
This very general aspect of writing – its ability to record – provides the setting for the 
following analysis. A closer look will be taken at different forms of texts that are 
dedicated to be performed, in order to see what role this function of recording plays in 
which kind of texts. 
 
2.3 Texts to Be Performed 
Let us look of an example for an instruction that aims at triggering an 
action/performance in order to see what it can archive in relation to the performance. 
I imagine a scene in which someone drinks a cup of coffee during a presentation and 
at a specific moment spills coffee on their computer. In order to instruct a performer 
to do this action, I write down, “Drink a cup of coffee during the presentation and spill 
coffee on your computer.” 
It is not too difficult for a text to set a simple action like this with written language. 
However, when the aim is to describe one’s own visual imagining of the situation 
more closely, or to define it in detail, for instance, what the spilling should look like, it 
gets more complex. Taking approaches from dance, this could involve saying 
something about the quality of movement, e.g. of the mouth’s movement in the 
moment of spilling. In approaches inspired by theater practices or film direction this 
could mean mentioning a cause of why the coffee is spilled, e.g. the loss of 
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consciousness or of facial muscle control, or an emotion that should be expressed by 
spilling it, such as anger. 
In order to specify the instruction one can add timing and write: “Drink a cup of coffee 
during the presentation. Spill coffee on your computer after ten minutes.” or: “… after 
the second paragraph.” Or one could specify the action through statements of place 
and write: “Drink a cup of coffee during the presentation. After the second paragraph, 
take the computer and go with it to the window. Once you have opened it, spill coffee 
on your computer.” Or: “Drink a cup of coffee during the presentation. After ten 
minutes take the computer off the table, go two steps backwards and spill coffee on 
the computer.” Questions of placement are tricky though if one does not know the 
room in which the performance will take place. Two steps backwards might already 
be the end of the room; something might be standing there or the room might have 
no windows.  
Nevertheless, through precise statements of time and positions in space, the timing 
and placing in/of a performance can be determined. Specifications like “ten minutes” 
or “after the second paragraph” do not give leeway for interpretation, they mean 
something concrete and specific. If there is just one window in the room the same 
goes for “open the window.” The wording “two steps backwards” does not directly 
contain any leeway in terms of what it means, but depending on the performers’ 
physical condition, body size and way of execution, the result can vary. 
 
Making Performances Reproducible 
It should be mentioned that every text or notation system in general (in music, theater 
and visual art) can only record certain aspects or parts of a performance. The 
performance itself is always also based on the unwritten (tacit) knowledge and 
conventions the writer and performers share or have. Any attempt to notate every 
detail of a performance necessarily fails in fulfilling this function because it would 
become endless and unreadable.  
Still, there is the desire to determine and maintain performances using notations, 
which likewise concerns past or future performances. Descriptive text as a tool to 
capture (aspects of) past performances has already been mentioned: similar to 
photography capturing optical phenomena, or an audio recording capturing sound, 
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text can record the course of actions and other information. In the case of future 
performances, text can be used for this function as well. In this case, it represents the 
authors’ imagined performance. The author can use text to describe the performance 
from his or her mind and to communicably capture a certain vision of it. In their most 
consequential form such notations can be conceived as a record of the author’s 
thought. 
Texts with the function to represent and make reproducible a performance hope to 
achieve or produce a specific result, rather than produce a variety of individual 
performances, by giving specific time and place statements, clear definitions and 
concrete naming. This reduces the possibilities of how the text can be read. By the 
same token of avoiding interpretation this reduces the responsibility of the acting 
performers in relation to the outcome. Determining the performance by describing it 
in detail means directing the performer towards the authors’ intended way of acting or 
performing. Avoiding abstraction, generalities and categories further contributes to 
leaving as little room for interpretation as possible. 
“Have a drink during the presentation” offers the performer a choice, whereas giving 
the instruction “Have coffee in this green doted pottery cup” predetermines the drink 
and the cup. So it is suitable for reproducing the specific action repeated with the 
same cup. The accomplishment of detailed scripted actions demands a strong 
subordination to the text; the subjectivity of the performer plays a minor role.  
Although, a record of the imagination differs from the record of something seen or 
experienced, this difference is not evident in texts related to performances 
themselves. Texts have the potential to record information and do not mind whether 
the information is imagined or perceived. The possibility to determine aspects of 
performances is owed to the ability of writing to represent information. 
 
Creating Openness through Language 
“To write is to produce a mark that will constitute a kind of machine that is in 
turn productive, that my future disappearance in principle will not prevent from 
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functioning and from yielding, and yielding itself to, reading and rewriting.” 48 
(Jacques Derrida) 
Yet it is also possible to use language to deliberately create an openness in 
instructions that has to be interpreted or decided upon in the actual situation of the 
performance. Here, the interpretation and the subjectivity of the performers come into 
play.  
An example for an instructional statement which has to be interpreted concerning a 
time specification is: “Drink a cup of coffee during the presentation. After some time 
spill coffee on your computer.” The “after some time” expression requires a decision 
of how long “some time” means for the performer (or is) within the situation of the 
performance. (This kind of decision making by performers is also referred to as 
improvisation in performance practices.) In other words, the fact of not giving a 
concrete time specification creates some leeway for the performance.  
Another example would be to say: “Drink a cup of coffee during the presentation. Spill 
coffee on your computer at a strategically opportune moment.” Here, the performer 
can interpret him- or herself what “a strategically opportune moment” means in the 
context of the respective performance. However, this is not necessarily improvised 
during the performance, the performer can also decide on her or his interpretation 
beforehand, and may plan and create a specific situation to happen. 
Openness can also be constructed in regard to the action itself – for example, by 
saying, “Drink a cup of coffee during the presentation. After the second paragraph, 
do something unexpected.” Here, the performer can fully interpret the action, 
because “something unexpected” abstracts from a concrete action. “Something 
unexpected,” is not even necessarily an action, it can also be waiting or saying 
nothing in a situation in which speech is expected, for instance.  
Unlike the previous examples, in which there was more emphasis on determining the 
action and creating openness regarding specific aspects, in this case the “action” can 
be largely interpreted. Thus the same instruction carried out by different performers 
may lead to radically different outcomes.  
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Besides abstraction, the use of umbrella terms increases the choices performers 
have towards the execution of an action: for instance, in writing “Have a warm drink 
during the presentation,” instead of stating that it must be coffee. 
The German choreographers deufert&plischke, who I studied with as a guest student 
in the MA Performance Studies program at the University of Hamburg in 2006, taught 
scores in conceptual choreography as “open arrangements” that are opposed to 
movement descriptions.  
This definition of a score as an open arrangement interested me, partly because in 
the beginning I did not quite understand how to produce such a score. How can I as 
an artist not have a picture in mind of what will happen during a performance? How to 
not control the outcome and still take responsibility for the work? I began to search 
for this openness in (my) practice. The two most general aspects of constructing 
openness I found in language are the use of the just mentioned umbrella terms and 
abstraction.  
However, there is another way of creating openness, which I found later, and which I 
call a “performative structure.” By “performative structure” I mean a rule or a set of 
rules that, like a productive force or an engine, generates a performance. They can 
be designed like open or modular systems, just like the rules of a game that are 
temporarily valid laws necessarily producing a variety of individual outcomes. In the 
same way that the rules in chess only prescribe the possible moves and produce an 
infinite number of different chess matches rather than defining a specific match, 
these rules in performances do not determine the whole course of a performance, but 
just provide the structure in which it can happen.  
Such a performative structure can, for example, be built on the construction “if …, 
then …” It may sound like this: “whenever … happens, you do…” This simple rule 
provides a structure for the course of a performance without determining it. It is very 
useful and thus often applied in performance work with unpredictable parameters, 
like unrehearsed performances, performative installations, or for an interaction with 
the audience. 
Assume that the idea is that five performers walk around in an exhibition space and 
speak from time to time. In order to make a precise timing and spacing possible, one 
has to have a floor plan with exact measurements, and more importantly spend a 
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long time rehearsing in the space itself.49 A rule like “Whenever a visitor looks at you, 
you start to sing,” enables the performance to function without a long rehearsal time. 
Since this rule counts for all of the five performers, there might be needed a second 
rule that prevents them from singing at the same time, for the same audience 
member, or in too close proximity to one another. To avoid this, one can add another 
rule like, “If you hear the singing of another performer, you turn and walk in the 
opposite direction.” Or “If you see one of your colleagues you go there and join 
him/her singing,” and so on. These rules do not determine when and where the 
performers sing, but they give the performance a structure. 
To sum up, one can understand that the aim of a movement description is to capture 
and represent an already existing movement and make it reproducible, whereas 
openly designed scores aim to produce something that did not exist before and is not 
yet defined. To give the same movement description to different dancers, the 
resulting movement in principle should be more or less similar to the one intended by 
its author; whereas an open score should produce a non-predictable or not 
predetermined outcome, which will vary significantly from performer to performer. 
Working with openly designed scores and performative structures not only involves 
the subjectivity of the performers, but creates a central place for it in the 
performance.  
Looking back at the general characteristics of text, one could conclude that, besides 
the function to record, texts related to performances have the ability to be interpreted 
in and through performances. I will call this characteristic “the interpretative function” 




                                                 
49
 In the field of visual art, it is rare for artists to have the opportunity for a long rehearsal time within 
the exhibition space, because this is not part of institutions’ time and space management/calculations. 
Prior to the opening of an exhibition, the set-up in the exhibition space takes place during the day. To 
work before that, in the morning or later in the evening, is mostly a problem with opening hours and 
insurance issues.  
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2.4 Plato’s Phaedrus and the Critique of Writing 
In this section, the text Phaedrus by Plato will be introduced and the passages that 
are decisive for the so called “critique of writing” will be reproduced. Thereafter, 
different readings of Phaedrus will be presented. This text lastingly shaped the idea 
that text is a record of speech and thus secondary to it, from which a hierarchy 
between them results. This way of thinking about text still impacts western philosophy 
and culture, and so I make a connection to the secondariness ascribed to 
performance documentation. 
Phaedrus is among Plato’s earliest writings. In this dialogue, two figures appear: 
Socrates, Plato’s former teacher, and Phaedrus, a citizen of Athens, from Socrates’ 
circle of friends. They meet on the street and Socrates lets Phaedrus convince him to 
go for a walk outside the city gates. Socrates does not usually leave the city, as he 
believes that trees and rivers can teach him nothing, as opposed to people in the city. 
The bait that leads to Socrates taking a walk after all is a speech by Lysias, a well-
known logographer at the time. Lysias gave this speech the day before, which 
Socrates had not heard. Phaedrus promises to reprise the speech as best he can if 
Socrates accompanies him on the walk. It soon becomes apparent, however, that 
Phaedrus has a copy of the speech under his coat. As Phaedrus and Socrates settle 
down under a large, beautiful plane tree, Phaedrus reads the speech to Socrates.  
In his speech, Lysias makes a case for engaging with a lover who is not in love. 
Socrates is not convinced by the quality of the speech and holds an impromptu 
speech on the same point. He covers his head while he gives this speech, so as to 
not be distracted by shame while looking at Phaedrus. Afterwards, Socrates gives 
another speech arguing the opposite case, the reason being that he fears revenge 
from the god Eros, who he believed he insulted in his first speech. The second 
speech represents a counter-speech, which is meant to recant the first speech. This 
one is given with his head no longer covered. The speech is very long and excessive. 
It is about the immortality of the soul and various divine inebriations, one of which 
deals with amorousness and Eros. After Socrates has finished, Phaedrus admires 
the beautiful speech. 
A discussion develops among them about what makes a speech beautiful, and about 
the difference between good or bad writing. One question is if the one who speaks 
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beautifully has to know the truth about what is being spoken. Examples are, mostly, 
speeches in court or in front of the Assembly, i.e. political speeches. It is said that 
through the art of speech (rhetoric), wrong things can be presented as true and right 
things as untrue. The listeners and especially those who don’t know can thus be 
deceived. (Different aspects of rhetoric, and good and beautiful speeches are further 
discussed, but these will not be elaborated upon here.) 
After the discussion about rhetoric, Socrates wants to investigate the qualities of 
writing. He says that the question is one of the aptness and ineptness of writing, what 
features make writing good, what inept.50 He tells the following story, 
“Well, this is what I've heard. Among the ancient gods of Naucratis51 in Egypt 
there was one to whom the bird called the ibis is sacred. The name of that 
divinity was Theuth,52 and it was he who first discovered number and 
calculation, geometry and astronomy, as well as the games of checkers and 
dice, and, above all else, writing. 
Now the king of all Egypt at that time was Thamus,53 who lived in the great city 
in the upper region that the Greeks call Egyptian Thebes; Thamus they call 
Ammon.54 Theuth came to exhibit his art to him and urged him to disseminate 
them to all the Egyptians. Thamus asked him about the usefulness of each art, 
and while Theuth was explaining it, Thamus praised him for whatever he 
thought was right in his explanations and criticized him for whatever he 
thought was wrong. 
The story goes that Thamus said much to Theuth, both for and against each 
art, which it would take too long to repeat. But when they came to writing, 
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Theuth said: ‘0 King, here is something that, once learned, will make the 
Egyptians wiser and will improve their memory; I have discovered a potion for 
memory and for wisdom.’55 Thamus, however, replied: ‘0 most expert Theuth, 
one man can give birth to the elements of an art, but only another can judge 
how they can benefit or harm those who will use them. And now, since you are 
the father of writing, your affection for it has made you describe its effects as 
the opposite of what they really are. In fact, it will introduce forgetfulness into 
the soul of those who learn it: they will not practice using their memory 
because they will put their trust in writing, which is external and depends on 
signs that belong to others, instead of trying to remember from the inside, 
completely on their own. You have not discovered a potion for remembering, 
but for reminding; you provide your students with the appearance of wisdom, 
not with its reality. Your invention will enable them to hear many things without 
being properly taught, and they will imagine that they have come to know 
much while for the most part they will know nothing. And they will be difficult to 
get along with, since they will merely appear to be wise instead of really being 
so.’”56 
This story is a myth that Plato himself invented for the sake of writing this text, it does 
not exist in mythology. Socrates in the text Phaedrus adds to it, 
“Well, then, those who think they can leave written instructions for an art, as 
well as those who accept them, thinking that writing can yield results that are 
dear or certain, must be quite naive and truly ignorant of Ammon’s prophetic 
judgment: otherwise, how could they possibly think that words that have been 
written down can do more than remind those who already know what the 
writing is about? 
PHAEDRUS: Quite right. 
 
SOCRATES: You know, Phaedrus, writing shares a strange feature with 
painting. The offsprings of painting stand there as if they are alive, but if 
anyone asks them anything, they remain most solemnly silent. The same is 
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true of written words. You’d think they were speaking as if they had some 
understanding, but if you question anything that has been said because you 
want to learn more, it continues to signify just that very same thing forever. 
When it has once been written down, every discourse roams about 
everywhere, reaching indiscriminately those with understanding no less than 
those who have no business with it, and it doesn’t know to whom it should 
speak and to whom it should not. And when it is faulted and attacked unfairly, 
it always needs its father’s support; alone, it can neither defend itself nor come 
to its own support.”57 
Besides the quoted passage that presents the critique of writing, in Phaedrus, 
various themes are present. It deals with the relationship between language and 
insight, language and communication, the role of rhetoric in political life and the 
mythological versus a philosophical world view.  
Besides these canonically repeated aspects, I would like to remark that not only 
writing, rhetoric and speech, but likewise the body and sexuality build the main 
threads of the texture of which Pheadrus is made. The text is on the level of narration 
as well as on the level of content not without the erotic. On the level of narration, it is 
the (homo)erotic setting of intellectual middle-aged men following handsome young 
men in order to lie down in the midday heat under the shadow of a tree, of which the 
translator Kurt Hildebrandt notes in the German Reclam edition that this plane tree is 
a chaste tree: “a tree similar to a willow whose fruits were used to reduce the sex 
drive.”58 On the content level they both exchange speeches about love and sex. Due 
to a lack of deep knowledge in ancient Greek culture I am not able to analyze these 
aspects and the symbolic language of Phaedrus. For now, I can just stay with this 
passing remark that the discourse (or the critique) of writing is not disconnected from 
the body and sexuality in the scene Plato’s provides for us readers.  
The critique on writing can be summed up as follows: Thamus, the god of gods, 
depreciates writing by calling it a potion not for remembering, but for reminding. 
Writing is a potion (or “pharmakon” as Derrida calls it) which is useless and external 
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to the body. It weakens the ability to remember and supplements what Plato calls the 
“living speech”; it is not alive itself. 
 
2.5 Readings of Phaedrus 
In the following, different readings of Phaedrus that are considered relevant to the 
context of this research will be presented. I will first look at the deconstructive reading 
of Phaedrus by the French philosopher Jacques Derrida, followed by an account of 
the perspective on this text of the German classical philologist of Kurt Sier, and finally 
Benveniste’s view of the text. Thereafter, the discussion will be applied to 
performance documentation. 
According to Derrida the secondariness of writing is one of the fundaments of 
western philosophy. In the text “Plato’s Pharmacy” written in 1968 and published as a 
chapter of his book Dissemination he points out that the hierarchy between writing 
and speech can be described as being analogous to “The hierarchical opposition 
between son and father, subject and king, death and life, writing and speech” which 
“naturally completes its system with that between night and day, West and East, 
moon, and sun.”59 
Let us accompany Derrida reading Plato for a bit. We are at the beginning of 
Phaedrus, when Derrida writes, “Operating through seduction, the pharmakon makes 
one stray from one’s general, natural, habitual paths and laws. Here, it takes 
Socrates out of his proper place and off his customary track.”60 The walk leads 
Socrates and Phaedrus along the river Ilisos where Socrates remembers a myth that 
purports that this is the place where Boreas is supposed to have kidnapped the virgin 
Oreithyia while she was playing with pharmakeia.  
Derrida uses the word pharmakon in order to describe an ordered polysemy he sees 
in Plato’s dialogue: On the one hand, it can be translated as remedy, on the other as 
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poison, drug or magic potion.61 In Friedrich Schleiermacher’s 1817 German 
translation, which is still used today and upon which Léon Robin’s French translation 
is based, and which Derrida works with, pharmakon is translated as potion, to be 
understood in the sense of remedy, and thus not containing the negative and 
threatening connotations, according to Derrida. 
Derrida writes, “Writing (or, if you will, the pharmakon) is thus presented to the King. 
Presented: like a kind of present”62 which Theuth, a half-god, presents to the king of 
the gods. This present, following Derrida, is an artefactum, an artificial creation of 
uncertain value, for it is the king who can give it value. However, the god-king does 
not accept the present; he depreciates it by pointing out not only its uselessness but 
its menace and its mischief.63 According to Derrida, the “god-the-king-that-speaks” is 
acting like a father by whom the pharmakon is rejected, belittled, abandoned, 
disparaged.”64 Further he writes, “Logos is a son, then, a son that would be 
destroyed in his very presence without the present attendance of his father. His 
father who answers. His father who speaks for him and answers for him.”65 Without 
the father, the son “would be nothing but, in fact, writing.”66  
This misery of writing needing a father like the way Socrates formulated it, is 
ambiguous, according to Derrida: it is the distress of the orphan, who has at the 
same time achieved emancipation from the father, and is self-sufficient. The desire 
for orphanhood could be read as subversion with the aim of patricide.67 So Derrida 
asks: “Isn’t this pharmakon then a criminal thing, a poisoned present?”68 About the 
status of the orphan, he writes: 
“The status of this orphan… coincides with that of a graphein which, being 
nobody’s son at the instant it reaches inscription, scarcely remains a son at all 
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and no longer recognizes its origins, whether legally or morally. In contrast to 
writing, living logos is alive in that it has a living father”69. 
In this context logos means “spoken discussion”; Plato calls it “living speech.” Derrida 
deals with the father theme at length, but I will leave it at that and focus on a second 
theme, which is pivotal for the so-called critique of writing, namely the secondariness 
of writing. We will stay with Derrida’s text, which again will be cited at singular points. 
Derrida interprets Theuth, the god of writing, as a subordinate character: he is of 
secondary importance, because, when he presented his tekhnē and pharmakon to 
the “king, father, and god,” he let it drop, and Theuth did not respond.70 He was not 
able to defend his invention, but subordinated himself, and the value of writing, to the 
verdict of the king. Derrida associates Theuth with Hermes, the messenger of the 
gods who also bears the role of an intermediary.71 He characterizes Theuth with the 
following words: “Language, of which he is depositary and secretary, can thus only 
represent, so as to transmit the message, an already formed divine thought, a fixed 
design. The message itself is not, but only represents, the absolutely creative 
moment. It is a second and secondary word.”72 But as a god of secondary language, 
Theuth is also the god of linguistic difference (between the spoken and the written) 
who can “become the god of the creative word only by metonymic substitution, by 
historical displacement, and sometimes by violent subversion.”73 A metonymic 
substitution means the replacement of an actual expression through another, which 
corresponds to the first. Derrida writes: 
“One day while Ra was in the sky, he said: ‘Bring me Thoth,’ and Thoth was 
straightway brought to him. The Majesty of this god said to Thoth: ‘Be in the 
sky in my place, while I shine over the blessed of the lower regions ... You are 
in my place, my replacement, and you will be called thus: Thoth, he who 
replaces Ra.’”74 
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Thoth becomes his father Ra’s substitute during his absence in the night. In this very 
moment the hierarchy is turned upside down and Thoth is placed in the position of 
the god of the gods, his father (Ra). The god of language thus becomes Ra’s (the 
sun god) substitute, in his absence and necessary disappearance. Like the moon is 
the supplement for the sun, writing is the supplement of speech which can subvert 
the hierarchy. At this point, Derrida delves further into Egyptian mythology. I only 
want to note here that the god of language is naturally also the god of death. 
Likewise the pharmakon, writing, was accused of substituting the breathless sign for 
the living voice. 
Sier provides insights to this text from another perspective. He writes that, on the 
face of it, the critique of writing acts on the assumption that some people insult Lysias 
as a “logographer,” because they take issue with the written pre-formulation of his 
speeches which in the written form can even be given by others. At the end of 
Phaedrus, however, the use of writing as a medium of communication remains 
unobjectionable as long as the author is aware of the limitations of the medium, and 
does not wrongly believe it is able to communicate information and insights with 
clarity and security.75  
Accordingly, following Sier – and I fully align myself with this point – Plato’s critique of 
writing is not a critique of writtenness as such but rather a critique of an unreflective 
attitude towards written texts, and expectations that even oral logoi cannot offer per 
se.76 
Another insight is offered by Benveniste’s perspective, who summarizes the so-called 
critique of writing as follows: 
“In Phaedrus (27Sc-276b), Plato depreciates writing in favor of speech. What 
makes writing (gráphē) bad is that it equals drawing (gráphō means both 
‘writing’ and ‘drawing’). What comes from drawing appears alive to us 
(zōgraphía). Were one to ask these images, however, they would veil 
themselves in solemn silence. It would be the same case with written words 
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(lógoi). They could not defend themselves, if one were to go from one to the 
next; they could only signify (sēmainein), but would have left the world of living 
relations.”77 
Benveniste infers that the close, characteristic relation that language and writing have 
was not recognized immediately.78 Our current culture has a close relationship to 
writing, “We live in a culture of the book, the read, the written book, a culture of 
writing and reading. Our life is constantly, on all levels, shaped by writing.”79 Further, 
he concludes, “This creates an ever closer, ultimately internal coherence between 
writing and language itself, between speaking and even thinking, which cannot be 
separated from its real or imaginary textualization.”80 Benveniste advocates 
recognizing an entanglement of language and writing, which reaches far into our 
ideas about spoken language and shapes it from the inside. 
To understand where Plato’s idea that writing supplements and even threatens 
comes from, one has to consider the context in which the text was written. The 
dialogue Phaedrus dates back to 365 BC.81 At that time a transition from a primarily 
oral culture to a written culture, as we know it today, was taking place in the Ancient 
Greece. Writing in general (in fact different writing types) existed long before Plato’s 
lifetime, but it was precisely during his lifetime that writing became central to culture 
and tradition, which is also to say for the cultural deliverance of knowledge and 
authority. Plato’s examination of the value of writing must be understood against this 
backdrop of great cultural change, and the politics involved in it. 
Derrida notes another aspect which plays a role here: “The structure and history of 
phonetic writing have of course played a decisive role in the determination of writing 
as the doubling of a sign, the sign of a sign.”82 This means that the use of phonetic 
writing, as we know it and with which we are familiar, allows for an empirical 
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conclusion that claims that the spoken word preceded its transcription or recording 
(Aufzeichnung). 
Benveniste, however, believes this argument evades the question of the relationship 
between writing and language. His thesis is that the relationship between the modern 
language as we know it83 and writing is not a general relationship, but rather a 
special one. 
From Benveniste’s perspective, the problem of secondariness as a philosophical 
problem does not pose itself, since it is not necessarily a given. Spoken language is 
not primary and transcribed through writing, but rather, reality can be equally 
expressed in language (oral) or in writing (text). So Benveniste also opposes “its 
traditional meaning as a (secondary) graphic system of signs,”84 but uses another 
vocabulary for expressing it than Derrida.85  
 
2.6 Critique of Writing Performances 
The premise here is that the critique of writing initiated by the interpretation of Plato’s 
text has coined also the understanding of performance documentation as being 
secondary to performance, analogous to the hierarchy between writing and speech. 
The following will outline what the critique of writing means for performance. 
Texts written after performances or documentations thereof are considered 
secondary to the live-act. This means two things: It means that these textualizations 
are chronologically in second place and thus subordinated in the sense of being less 
original. The textualization follows the performance, so it comes, chronologically 
speaking, second. That is clear and would not be a qualifier in itself. It would not be a 
problem, were it not connected to a second aspect that Derrida also pointed out in 
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regard to writing, namely that this “second” has not a self-sufficient position: it is 
always dependent on, and stays connected to the first, because it is derived from it. 
In the context of performance this problem is called the referentiality of performance 
documentation, which means that the documentation always references the (original) 
performance. Whereas the performance is an “autonomous” (self-sufficient) medium 
in itself, and an original form of artistic expression, the documentation does not lose 
this reference, and stays dependent on it. Derrida explained this hierarchical relation 
with the son and father metaphor: the father can live without the son, the son needs 
the father in order to come into existence. The chronological first is viewed as more 
original and thus having more value than the second, which does not only follow but 
has no identity in itself. Applying Derrida’s wording performance would be in the 
position of the father, the sun, life, origin, speech which writing/performance 
documentation, just like Thoth, replaces and substitutes. Thoth has no identity 
himself; the very act of identity is to distinguish himself from the other, which he 
imitates, which he becomes the sign of and representative for.86 
In the context of performance theory Jones suggested dealing with this hierarchy in 
understanding performance documentation as a supplement in the Derridean 
sense.87 Turning the hierarchy upside down would mean saying: documentation is 
not dependent on performance, but performance is dependent on documentation. 
When taking this idea strictly the problem arises that a performance that is not 
documented is not a performance. So Jones argues that both are necessary. 
Let’s go back to Socrates who in Plato’s dialog criticizes the idea that writing merely 
records spoken language. What is the problem with that anyway? For Plato, the 
problem is that the transmission of the truth depends upon the speaker 
understanding it. The text itself understands nothing and can thus not adequately 
reproduce the truth. When asked, the text always says the same thing.  
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Derrida analyses this problem with the following words, “While the phonic signifier 
would remain in animate proximity, in the living presence of mnēmē or pychē, the 
graphic signifier, which reproduces it or imitates it, goes one degree further away”.88 
The further the signifier (e.g. writing, painting, performance documentation) distances 
itself from the presence of the living spirit and the being of things in general, it equally 
distances itself from truth, that is to say it further sinks into the hierarchy of classical 
philosophy, which Derrida questions.  
Applying Plato’s logic to the performance context would mean that the bodily 
presence of the artist during a performance in front of the audience enables this act 
(due to the living spirit). From this perspective a text given to someone else in order 
to be performed would be already a “fatherless” text (disconnected to the intention of 
the one who speaks through it). But one can pose the question: to what extent does 
the performer of the text become its new father or mother? I will come back later to 
the role of intention in texts and performances. 
Another crucial point in the context of Phaedrus is that the text knows nothing itself, 
thus it is a pure bearer, messenger. The first problem about this is that it needs the 
living presence of its author/father in order to explain itself and defend itself against 
misunderstandings from readers. The second problem connected to this 
fatherlessness, according to Plato, is that the text does not know to whom it should 
speak to and to whom not. It circulates uncontrollably and possibly lands in the wrong 
hands. Both points are well comprehended. Translated to the art context this points 
to at least two things: first, to the difference of whether an artist is present or not once 
an artwork is received. The presence of an artist in performance that involves him- or 
herself is self-evident and applies to many, even, most performances in visual art. 
However, one could argue that this does not guarantee that the artist, after the 
performance, is present in order to answer questions about it. The second point is 
that the reading of texts defies the control of their authors. This is certainly true, and 
can also be understood as the potential of texts (which will be talked about in the 
next section).  
Another point that could be read into this as problematic (referring back to Phelan) is 
that the documentation – written notes, transcriptions, recordings (Aufzeichnungen) – 
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threatens the live performance because they are identified with reproduction, 
whereas performance is not. So, reproduction seems to threaten the uniqueness of 
performances. It fixes it, and thus it is not uncontrollable anymore.  
Here, with the German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer, the question could be 
posed as to what extent the fixing of meaning is a characteristic of writing only. In the 
1990s, against the backdrop of the new interest in writtenness and orality, Gadamer 
wrote that, we are “invited to inquire into the common basis that underlies the orality 
of speech and writing. One will ask: Is something like an urge for fixing not always 
contained in the use of words? Words have their meaning.”89 
According to Gadamer, both written and oral forms of communication are attempts at 
a fixing of meaning. This means that regarding the production of meaning there is no 
difference between written and spoken texts. Certainly performances do not 
necessarily (only) contain words, but to analyze the difference between the verbal 
and non-verbal form is beyond the scope of this work. 
The American performance and theater theorist Rebecca Schneider, according to 
whom the performance of a text (theatrical script) can be understood likewise as a 
record of that text, writes: 
“… the villainy that can occur between setting something down and taking it up 
again is not necessarily delimited to performance. The afterlife of a written 
word, set down and yet changing hands, jumping from body to body, eye to 
mouth, as text is interjected into text, is not entirely dissimilar to the 
promiscuous tracks of actorly acts.”90 
Aligning oneself with Gadamer and Schneider one can conclude that this recording 
aspect not only inhabits texts, but likewise performances. Besides that, speaking 
from my experience of artistic practice, the aim to fix information about a certain 
performance differs from the attempt to fix its meaning. Whereas the first is an 
intentional act and possible, the second is neither possible nor desirable.  
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In my view, the meaning of performances in collaborative performance practices is 
decisively shaped by using the interpretative function of writing and not fixing all 
aspects; even though writing potentially has this function as well. The interpretative 
function is connected to the potential of texts, namely the game; it means creating 
space for the subjectivity of the performers and the eventfulness of the performance 
itself.  
 
2.7 The Potential of Text 
Although Phaedrus was within the history of philosophy mainly received as a critique 
of writing and Derrida’s reading of it as a critique of the critique of writing, there is a 
positive potential discovered by Plato already and which was perceived by Derrida 
and performed by his reading-writing. I am interested in this potential of text, because 
it affects my practice of collaboration-based performance practices.  
Plato formulated this potential of writing with the following words: “When he writes, 
it’s likely he will sow gardens of letters for the sake of amusing himself, storing up 
reminders for himself ‘when he reaches forgetful old age’ and for everyone who 
wants to follow in his footsteps, and will enjoy seeing them sweetly blooming.”91 
“He” refers here to anyone, and no one specific is meant. What is called “amusing” 
here in English is in the German translation das Spiel, “game.” Derrida refers to it by 
the Greek paidia, in English “game.” The game is the positive potential of texts that 
Plato names. This means that the reader can play with texts in a specific way that he 
or she cannot play with speech. Derrida takes up the idea of play as the essential 
feature of texts when he writes, 
“A text is not a text unless it hides from the first comer, from the first glance, 
the law of its composition and the rules of its game. A text remains, moreover, 
forever imperceptible. Its law and its rules are not, however, harbored in the 
inaccessibility of a secret; it is simply that they can never be booked, in the 
present, into anything that could rigorously be called a perception.”92 
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To name the game as the essential feature of texts means to stress the role of being 
read. In Derrida’s sense this reading is a form of writing. “Reading is not passive. It 
must ‘produce a significant structure.’ Without doubt, it already does this by not 
duplicating the text, but rather creating its own text.”93 
With his way of reading of Phaedrus, Derrida opposes its history. He writes, 
“Only a blind or grossly insensitive reading could indeed have spread the 
rumor that Plato was simply condemning the writer's activity. Nothing here is of 
a single piece and the Phaedrus also, in its own writing, plays at saving writing 
– which also means causing it to be lost – as the best, the noblest game. As 
for the stunning hand Plato has thus dealt himself, we will be able to follow its 
incidence and its payoff later on.”94 
With “nothing here is of a single piece” Derrida means that a text is not a one-
dimensional piece, but that a text creates a web (French: toile) which can be 
understood in play with its structure, which is to say, through the activities of reading 
and re-writing. The reader (author) through his/her reading weaves a supplementary 
thread that adds to the web, which is simultaneously restored and given to read by 
this act. Derrida writes: “If reading and writing are one, as is easily thought these 
days, if reading is writing, this oneness designates neither undifferentiated 
(con)fusion nor identity at perfect rest; the is that couples reading with writing must rip 
apart.”95 
In other words text does not exist without a reader giving meaning to it. In active 
reading, the reader does not reproduce it, but always has to make a “cut” in order to 
produce meaning from the text, to give attention to some aspects and to leave out 
others. This means that the reader (author) is violent to the text in any event. The 
potential of this violent “play” is owed to the inner logic (the structure) of text.  
Although the general potential of text and the intention of an author/artist are two 
different things, I dare to say they are not completely unconnected. The openness 
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that texts in collaboration-based performance practices are aiming for is enabled 
through (amongst other things) this potential.  
To recapitulate: in his Phaedrus, Plato criticizes writing for not being alive. In his 
view, writing, as a recording of speech, is secondary to it. In “Plato’s Pharmacy”, 
Derrida reads Plato’s Phaedrus in a deconstructive manner and reverses these 
hierarchies between text and speech. Gadamer offers yet another perspective, 
according to which not only text, but also a performance of text aims to fixate 
meaning. In my view, one has to differentiate between the aim of fixating in the sense 
of preserving information or to fixate meaning in a more general sense. In 
performance practices, the aim to fixate information is connected to the recording 
function of texts. It is crucial for performance texts such as scores, scripts and 
instructions. Schneider offers a perspective from which performance likewise has this 
aspect of recording. In my view, and now switching back to texts again, the potential 
of texts in collaboration-based performance practices lies in their function to be 
interpreted. 
 
2.8 Theories of Performativity: Austin and Derrida 
In this section the key points of the notion of performativity, as coined by the British 
language philosopher Austin who in the 1950s, gave language a new function – 
acting – will be summed up. He states that speech not only describes, but under 
certain conditions literally acts within social reality. Furthermore, Derrida’s lecture 
“Signature Event Context” will be looked at; this was held in 1971 at a conference on 
the topic of communication in Montreal and draws into question some points of 
Austin’s theory as well as coins the terms “dissemination” and “iterability.” The latter 
will be made productive for performances in the art context. 
Austin developed the theory of the performativity of language96 in his lecture series 
titled How to Do Things with Words,97 which was given at Harvard University in 1955. 
In the first lecture his considerations involve written and spoken utterances. At the 
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very beginning then, he considers texts for his analyzes, but he does not pursue this 
way and soon excludes written utterances and focuses on oral utterances only.  
In that first lecture Austin states that philosophers until now have been satisfied by 
describing reality through declarative sentences, which are considered to be either 
true or false. In other words, Austin accuses philosophers of reducing their analysis 
of speech to its truth value. The exceptions – as Austin acknowledges – are 
philosophers who in recent years have begun to concern themselves with the fact 
that there are also sentences that are syntactically absurd, and therefore 
meaningless.  
Austin calls attention to the fact that for grammarians questions, exclamatory 
sentences, imperatives, optative sentences and concessive clauses exist alongside 
declarative sentences, which means that the declarative sentence is merely one 
among many other types of sentences.  
In order to classify utterances that have not found a place in traditional schemata, 
Austin suggests the category “performative sentences,” “performative utterances,” or 
in short “a performative.” He explains: “The name is derived, of course, from 
‘perform,’ the usual verb with the noun ‘action’: it indicates that the issuing of the 
utterance is the performing of an action – it is not normally thought of just saying 
something.”98 
These utterances are not merely descriptive, but they are acts when performed in the 
first person singular present indicative active. He gives examples such as the words 
“I do” within the marriage ceremony, the “I bet … ” in gambling or “I name …” as it is 
used in the christening of a ship. 
In the course of this analyses Austin recognizes that this new category gives rise to a 
problem, namely that there are no utterances that are pure speech in a strict sense. 
Utterances are always accompanied by gestures, facial expressions and other 
physical elements that belong to the conventions of the context in which the 
utterance is performed. 
In his second lecture, Austin examines the prerequisites for the success of 
performative utterances and possible reasons why they might fail. He calls the cases 
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in which the prerequisites are not met “infelicities” or “unhappy utterances” and 
begins to classify them. He creates three groups of infelicities: A, B, Γ, each of which 
has subdivisions. A and B are misfires: the act is purported, but void. In the case of 
the third category Γ is abused: the act is professed, but hollow.99 
According to Austin, performative utterances spoken by an actor on stage and/or in 
soliloquy are also hollow or void, and therefore belong to the group of infelicitous 
acts. “Language in such circumstances is in special ways – intelligibly – used not 
seriously, but in ways parasitic upon its normal use-ways which fall under the 
doctrine of the etiolations of language,” 100 according to Austin. He further writes: “Our 
performative utterances, felicitous or not, are to be understood as issued in ordinary 
circumstances.”101 To sum up, Austin calls acts done by speech within a framework 
of social conventions “performative utterances” or “performatives.” Such speech-acts 
cannot be true or false like constative utterances can, but they can succeed or fail, as 
Austin says. 
In his text “Signature Event Context,” Derrida attests to linguistics and communication 
sciences the general premise that context constricts the polysemy of so-called 
natural languages and that utterances are thus reduced to a meaning. The fact that 
the polysemy of words, terms and sentences is reduced by the context means that 
we know how a linguistic remark is meant because it is said in a specific situation. 
Derrida doubts this and attempts to show “why a context is never absolutely 
determinable, or rather in what way its determination is never certain or saturated,”102 
neither in oral, nor in written communication. 
Besides this, Derrida looks at Austin’s speech act theory and critiques it for focusing 
only on oral statements and excludes written material, such as texts, from the 
category of speech acts. Furthermore he reproaches Austin for focusing on ordinary 
language and excluding speech acts, which in Austin’s opinion deviate from this daily 
type of usage and which he calls parasitic. Derrida also disagrees with the possibility 
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of failure of speech acts, stating that it is the structure of every utterance to possibly 
fail; otherwise it cannot succeed. Following Derrida's understanding, failure is the 
necessary precondition of every speech act. Succeeding and failing cannot be 
separated from each other.  
Derrida mainly criticizes Austin’s theory of performativity because he recognizes the 
classical hierarchy between the written and the spoken word in it, which he sees as 
an essential feature of western philosophy (and thus metaphysics).  
The argumentation in “Signature Event Context” unfolds as follows: from the 
structural unsaturation of the context, Derrida concludes the necessity of generalizing 
and displacing the classical notion of writing. In order to dissolve the hierarchy 
between the written and spoken word, he first looks at the core attributes of the 
weaker part (writing) to subsequently show that these attributes also match the 
stronger part (spoken language), and thus can be regarded as prerequisite for both. 
As soon as these core attributes are a prerequisite for both, they cannot be thought 
of hierarchically any longer; both, writing and speech, are forms of the generalized 
term of writing. 
Following the classical philosophical notion of writing, the absence of the receiver is 
characteristic of writing. Derrida adds the absence of the sender. The latter leaves 
behind a sign that survives beyond the present actuality of intention (in French: 
vouloir-dire) and the individual’s life. However, according to Derrida, this absence is 
not only specific for writing: sign language and spoken language also presuppose a 
structural absence. Every sign has to potentially function in the absence of a sender 
and a receiver, he argues. He further emphasizes that every sign has the power to 
break with the context of the origin in which it first appeared and to be read in other 
contexts. 
Derrida describes the characteristics of writing with his own terms “iteration” and 
“dissemination.” The fact that writing structurally does not provide a tool of limiting the 
proliferation of meaning produced by its context he calls “dissemination.” 
Dissemination is opposed to polysemy in Derrida’s view. It does not mean that a 
word has more than one meaning, but that the production of meaning created by the 




“Every sign … spoken or written … can be cited … thereby it can break with 
every given context, and engender infinitely new contexts in an absolutely 
nonsaturable fashion. This does not suppose that the mark is valid outside its 
context, but on the contrary that there are only contexts without any center of 
absolute anchoring.”103 
Another characteristic of writing introduced by Derrida is “iterability.” Iterability means 
that every sign must be repeatable; it must be citable and it thereby creates a double 
of itself. Iterability is not (only) the repetition of the same; it is a repetition which has a 
difference at its core; each time a sign is cited this inner difference is activated. 
These characteristics apply in the art context to both text and performance. Iterability 
means here that a performance is different each time it is performed. Each staging is 
a repetition and yet it is different at the same time. Let’s say a performance was 
performed on three consecutive days. Empirically this means that it was different 
each day – for example, the voice of the performer was louder, the performers made 
a specific movement or played a tone faster, the technician forgot to close the curtain 
after the first scene, so they had to do this or that in another way. However, Derrida’s 
iteration also means something else. It means that a difference occurs in relation to 
the meaning of something, which does not necessarily change the empirical 
condition. Otherwise why should it apply to texts? The fact that a performance is 
slightly different each time it is performed does not necessarily mean that a difference 
occurred in terms of meaning. These are two different things. It rather corresponds to 
the fact that a text and a performance are likewise different each time they are 
read/seen. 
According to the notion of iterability, neither text nor performance can be fixed as to 
its meaning. For performance, iterability means that the present body like every other 
sign breaks away from itself in the moment of its emergence (by citing itself), and 
creates a double that transcends the moment of the performance. It means that the 
possibility of performance documentation and its repetition precedes the performance 
itself. 
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2.9 The Role of Intention 
John R. Searle, one of the most important proponents of analytical philosophy, who 
was a pupil of Austin, felt attacked by “Signature Even Context.” He wrote a reply, 
which together with the English translation of Derrida’s text was published in the 
journal Glyph in 1977. Searle’s defense paper was in parts polemic, which led to a 
likewise polemical answer from Derrida a few months later, under the title “Limited 
Inc a b c.” 
As for the debate between Derrida and Searle, the focus here will only be on the role 
of intention – I will not go further than that, and consequently this can involve a 
certain reduction of some of their points. This debate will be looked into because this 
research inevitably leads to the question of intention: What role does intention in 
writing a text to be performed by someone else mean in relation to the one who 
performs it, and to the outcome?  
Derrida writes about the role of intention in Austin’s theory: 
“Austin’s analyses permanently demand a value of context, and even of an 
exhaustively determinable context, whether de jure or teleological … One of 
[the] essential elements – and not one among others – classically remains 
consciousness, the conscious presence of the intention of the speaking subject 
for the totality of this locutory act.”104 
In classical philosophy since Descartes, intention has been confined to the mind and 
unconnected to usage and context. The meaning of an assertion is determined by 
the intention of the mind. When Derrida critiques intentional consciousness he most 
likely has the work of his teacher, the phenomenologist Eduard Husserl, in mind.  
For Austin’s theory, the intention of the speaker does not actually play a central role. 
On the contrary, the intention of the speaker is not decisive for the failure or success 
of a speech act. For Austin, the meaning of a word is its usage in language, not the 
intention of the speaker. The usage is dependent on the context which itself is 
defined by conventions. Conventions make possible the speech act. It does not 
matter what the intention of the speaker was, or how the utterance was actually 
meant, or even if it was honest or not. Austin writes: 
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“… we shall call in general those infelicities … which are such that the act for 
performing of which, and are such in the performing of which, the verbal formula 
in question is designed, is not achieved, by the name MISFIRE: and on the 
other hand we may christen those infelicities where the act is achieved 
ABUSES.”105 
For example, “I promise to meet you tomorrow at 4.00 p.m. in a café near Amsterdam 
Central Station to tell you about my new research project” is an achieved speech act 
in the sense of Austin. The act of promising is achieved because the conventions of 
the promise are fulfilled: saying a time that is appropriate for a meeting, naming an 
existing place that is known to both parties, and that is reachable for both parties, 
and stating a reason for the meeting that is plausible, and so on. It does not matter if 
I ever intended to come or not. According to Austin’s terms, the given example 
belongs to the category of infelicities, but is still an achieved speech act. 
For Austin, it is not the intention of the speaker but the context that is decisive. The 
meaning of a word or utterance is its usage in language, and this usage is 
determined by the conventions of the context in which it is uttered. Concerning the 
role of the context Derrida has indeed another position. The question that remains 
open in Austin’s theory is: whether meaning is created by the conventions of the 
context. If this is the case: How has this convention (and the resulting context) 
produced itself (as meaning and pre-condition for it to appear)? 
For Searle, the intention of the speaker plays the same role in spoken and written 
communication. What fundamentally differs from Derrida’s view is again the role of 
the context of the utterance. For Searle, intention is not behind language, but is 
realized through it. Intention is in language, language is not used in order to express 
intention. This would be the “outer relation” of intentional meaning theory which 
Derrida actually critiques. Searle writes: “To the extent that the author says what he 
means the text is the expression of his intentions.”106 For him, the meaning is the 
intention of meaning: “understanding the utterance consists in recognizing the 
illocutionary intentions of the author … realized by the words uttered.” In Searle’s 
theory, the convention used should guarantee that the intention of the author may be 
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read by others. The author “just” has to use the conventions in the right way. 
Misunderstandings that occur are either accidental or owed to empirical 
circumstances, whereas in Derrida’s theory, they are constitutive of communication 
and the use of writing and signs in general. 
To conclude: Derrida’s concept of signs creating new contexts which in turn influence 
the meaning of the sign gives reception and interpretation a value in themselves, and 
thus can be made productive for understating artistic practice, especially in 
collaboration-based performance practice in which texts are performed by people 
other than the author of the texts.  
Following my definition, the intention of the author is the part of the concept of an 
artwork that can be put into language. Thus it may contribute to the understanding of 
an artwork. However, firstly, this is not necessary for reading it, and secondly, it does 
not at all guarantee understanding.  
In my view, meaning is neither produced exclusively in writing a text (to be 
performed) nor exclusively in its performance. The meaning is produced in and 
through their mutual relation. In collaboration-based performance practices this very 
fact is made productive through writing texts with the purpose of not being performed 
by the author, but by performers.  
In my experience, the interpretation (function) of texts can make visible aspects or 
produce meaning the author did not intend. This means that the reading of texts, and 
the reception of artworks in general, potentially creates new works. (This aspect will 
be re-addressed in the next chapter.) Each text/artwork may be made productive 




2.10 Différance between Text and Performance 
In the last section of this chapter another term by Derrida will be introduced which 
also touches upon the relation between texts and performances: “différance.”  
Différance must be understood in reference to the differentiality of linguistic signs as 
developed by the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure.107 Derrida radicalizes and 
generalizes Saussure’s idea that the meaning of signs is constituted through their 
differentiation from other signs. In the case of différance it is about a differentiation in 
the sense of a production of meaning that spatializes/temporalizes itself. 
The difference between the French word différence (as it is written according to 
proper grammar) and the neologism différance with an “a” is not audible in the 
spoken language, it is only noticeable in the written form. This is also where the term 
“space” enters: it is the space that the sign claims for itself in order to become visible. 
The temporal aspect is called “suspension” in Derrida's jargon. This means, firstly, 
that the production of meaning, which always includes a shift in meanings as well, is 
a process (for example, the process of reading); and, secondly, in the case of signs, 
it is about a reference (to a reference) to a presence, which thereby is suspended. 
Because one cannot hear the difference, but only read it, it inverts the traditional 
hierarchy in philosophy between the spoken and the written word. 
Différance questions identities which can be substituted in thought through signs. 
Western logic is based on the “Principle of Contradiction” and the “Law of the 
Excluded Middle.” The first means A and Not-A cannot be valid at the same time, and 
the second means either A or Not-A has to be valid – there is no third possibility. 
These laws both postulate the absolute identity of things.  
For Derrida, différance is, “the joyous affirmation of the play of the world and of the 
innocence of becoming, the affirmation of a world of signs without fault, without truth, 
and without origin which is offered to an active interpretation.”108 As he writes, the 
                                                 
107
 Cf. Posselt, Gerald, “Kommentar zu Derrida, Jacques (1988): ‘Signatur Ereignis Kontext’” in: 
Derrida, Jacques, Randgänge der Philosophie. First Edition, Wien: Passagen. pp. 291-314,” in: 
produktive differenzen - forum für differenz- und genderforschung, 
http://differenzen.univie.ac.at/bibliografie_literatursuche.php?sp=11 
108
 Derrida, Jacques, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” in: id., 
Writing and Difference. Translated by Alan Bass. London/New York: Routledge, 1978. pp. 351-370, 
here: p. 369. 
75 
 
game “is always [a] play of absence and presence, but if it is to be thought radically, 
play must be conceived of before the alternative of presence and absence.”109 
 
The following performance script of mine was written and performed in 2010. It is 
submitted here in order to illustrate the différance that occurs between text 
(re)presenting a performance and performance (re)presenting a text. 
 
Winner’s Performance – An Appropriation 
[Performance to be done by three female speakers: the author, a performer and an 
audience member. Props: one small and one larger plinth. Performer – standing 
beside the larger plinth, it stands upright and is empty.] 
PERFORMER: This performance includes quotes and reworked text fragments by: 
Carl Andre, René Descartes, Marcel Duchamp, Oscar Wilde, Paul Cézanne, Gustave 
Flaubert, Douglas Huebler, Vincent Huidobro, Michelangelo, Kazimir Malevich, Franz 
Liszt, Peter Roehr, Sol LeWitt, Richard Serra, Roland Barthes, and Charles 
Baudelaire. 
[Author – standing on the small plinth] 
AUTHOR: Questions and answers 
1. Who is an artist? 
A. An artist is one who says she is an artist 
B. An artist is one who has a diploma from an art academy 
C. An artist is one who makes art 
D. An artist is one who makes money from art 
E. An artist is none of these things, some of these things, all of these things 
2. What is art? 
A. Art is what an artist says is art 





B. Art is what a critic says is art 
C. Art is what an artist makes 
D. Art is what makes money for the artist 
E. Art is none of these things, some of these things, all of these things 
3. What is quality in art? 
A. Quality in art is a fiction of the artist 
B. Quality in art is a fiction of the critic 
C. Quality in art is the cost of making art 
D. Quality in art is the selling price of art 
E. Quality in art is none of these things, some of these things, all of these things 
4. What is the relationship between politics and art? 
A. Art is a political weapon 
B. Art has nothing to do with politics 
C. Art serves the state and political parties 
D. Art serves the revolution 
E. The relationship between politics and art is none of these things, some of these 
things, all of these things 
5. Why do I do this? 
A. I do this because art is my life's work 
B. I do this because art is my commercial business 
C. I do this because art will die if I stop 
D. I do this because art will continue unchanged if I stop 
E. I do this because of none of these things, some of these things, all of these things 
[Placing the big plinth on its side and the small one on top of it: winners’ rostrum –all 
three step up.] 
77 
 
PERFORMER: The speakers are: 
AUTHOR: The author 
AUDIENCE: An audience member 
PERFORMER: The performer 
[All embrace while standing, building one body.] 
AUTHOR: To reveal art and conceal the artist is art’s aim. 
AUDIENCE: Man should not be present. 
PERFORMER: Let us always remember that depersonalization is a sign of strength 
... We must be mirrors which reflect the truth outside ourselves. 
[End of standing embrace.] 
AUTHOR: We don’t emphasize enough that the work of art is independent of the 
artist. The work of art lives by itself, and the artist who happened to make it is like an 
irresponsible medium. 
PERFORMER: What you are saying is that the artist is the picture’s way of getting 
itself painted. To make this claim is quite legitimate and reasonable, but it also 
implies that the work of art exists in a certain sense before it is there on stage or on 
canvas. 
AUTHOR: Yes, it has to be pulled out … It’s a kind of race between the artist and the 
work of art. 
PERFORMER: In art we are interested more in the creative force of the artist than 
that of the viewer, and besides, the former implies the latter to a greater degree than 
vice versa. 
AUDIENCE: I not only see, but I also watch. 
I not only listen, but I also interpret. 
I not only think, but I also recognize. 
AUTHOR: I feel identical with what I do. In performances I realize in an unrestricted 
manner everything that is important for me. I believe I am free. 
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AUDIENCE: Through me and with me; without me is without you, too. 
PERFORMER: The artist’s will is secondary to the process he initiates from idea to 
completion. His willfulness may only be ego. 
AUDIENCE: The artist’s will may only be ego. 
PERFORMER: The production process is at best mechanical and should not be 
tampered with. It should run its own course. 
To work with a plan that is pre-set is one way of avoiding subjectivity. After that, the 
fewer decisions made in the course of completing the work, the better. This 
eliminates the arbitrary, the capricious, and the subjective as much as possible. 
AUDIENCE: This eliminates the subjectivity of the artist as much as possible. 
PERFORMER: What the work of art looks like isn’t too important. It can look like 
anything. No matter what form it may finally have, it must begin with an idea. Once 
given physical reality by the artist, the work is open to the perception of all, including 
the artist. The work of art can only be perceived after it is completed. 
AUDIENCE: This performance can only be perceived after it is completed. After it is 
completed, it is open to the perception of all, including the artist. 
PERFORMER: The artist may not necessarily understand his own art. His perception 
is neither better nor worse than that of others. An artist may perceive the art of others 
better than his own. 
A work of art may be understood as a conductor from the artist’s mind to the viewer’s. 
But it may never reach the viewer, or it may never leave the artist’s mind. 
AUDIENCE: This performance may never reach the viewer. 
PERFORMER: When an artist learns his craft too well he makes slick art. 
AUDIENCE: An artist should never learn his craft too well. 
PERFORMER: These sentences comment on art, but are not art. 
AUTHOR: I don’t make art; I am engaged in an activity; if someone wants to call it 
art, that’s his business, but it’s not up to me to decide that. That’s all figured out later. 
AUDIENCE: Through me and with me; without me is without you, too. 
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AUTHOR: The world is full of objects, more or less interesting; I do not wish to add 
any more. I prefer simply to state the existence of things in terms of time and/or 
space. More specifically, my work concerns itself with things whose interrelationship 
is beyond direct perceptual experience. Because the work is beyond direct 
perceptual experience, awareness of the work depends on a system of 
documentation. This documentation takes the form of photographs, maps, drawings, 
and descriptive language. 
AUDIENCE: The world is full of objects, more or less interesting; the artist does not 
wish to add any more. The documentation takes the form of photographs, maps, 
drawings, and descriptive language. 
PERFORMER: Through me and with me; without me is without you, too. 
[All embrace while standing, building one body.] 
AUTHOR: The hand guided by the intellect can really achieve something. 
AUDIENCE: The artist who wants to develop art beyond its painting and performing 
possibilities is forced to rely on theory and logic. 
PERFORMER: Today more than ever, it is necessary that the artist also be an 
intelligent person and know a lot of things outside her own field. 
AUDIENCE: All that is beautiful and noble is the result of reason and calculation. 
[End of standing embrace.] 
AUTHOR: I think, therefore I am. 
PERFORMER: I think, therefore I am confused. 
AUDIENCE: I don’t understand. 
AUTHOR: We acknowledge that: Art is universal. 
The work of art should be entirely conceived and formed by the mind before it is 
produced. Technique should be mechanical. Absolute clarity should be strived for. 
PERFORMER: It is the objective of the artist who is concerned with conceptual art to 
make his work mentally interesting to the spectator, and therefore usually he would 
want it to be emotionally dry. There is no reason to suppose, however, that the 
conceptual artist is out to bore the viewer. 
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[All step down from the plinth and continue speaking.] 
AUDIENCE: An artistic work is a fetish object and this fetish desires me. It chooses 
me, by a whole disposition of invisible screens, selective battles: vocabulary, 
references, readability, etc.; and, lost in the midst of a text there is always the other, 
the author. As institution, the author is dead: her civil status, her biographical person 
have disappeared. But in the text I desire the author: I need her figure as she needs 
mine. 
PERFORMER: On the stage of the text, no footlights: there is not, behind the text, 
someone active (the author) and out front someone passive (the spectator); there is 
not a subject and an object. 
AUTHOR: The pleasure of the text is that moment when my body pursues its own 
ideas – for my body does not have the same ideas I do. 
AUDIENCE: I not only see, but I also watch. I not only watch, but I also desire. 
[Both plinths are carried into the audience space and placed among the spectators; 
the cast step up onto them while speaking.] 
AUTHOR, PERFORMER, AUDIENCE: Contemporary Authors’ Manifesto. They are 
choreographers, journalists, curators, designers, painters, architects, perhaps 
scientists. Through their works they position themselves in the social sphere and 
shape it in the process. 
In order to secure the financial means needed to fulfill their yearnings and 
aspirations, they employ a variety of skills. They work on topics and projects; they 
work on requests, for applications, for advised positions; they work alone, in groups, 
with formal and informal managers; they give instructions and ask for advice. They 
fulfill strict guidelines and open-ended assignments; they seek and shape their own 
fields of work and activity; they work under time pressure or without any visible 
output. They work for institutions, for colleagues, and for themselves. They put 
varying degrees of knowledge, experience, and subjectivity into their work; they 
identify sometimes more, sometimes less with what they say. 
The contemporary authors don’t write; they speak! They speak through different 
media; through their works and within them; their photographs, their paintings and 
writings, their movements on stage, a monument they erect, a school or city library 
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they design: they all speak. And the authors know that these things will be heard by 
society. However, they don’t try to say something that means the same thing to all 
people all of the time; they know that their readers each find different meanings in 
their works, that they are used differently and that approaches to their works are 
determined, in large part, independently from them. They try to accomplish their work 
as best they can within a given framework. 
The authors don’t believe in their autonomy. They are aware of their construct, of 
their dependence upon being seen and their yearning for recognition. They know that 
their artistic speaking is traced back to their persons and that the listeners always 
want to understand where the speaking is coming from. And that therefore their 
persons will be always put into relation to their works. They actively shape this 
relation! Because they know that it is their work on this relationship that constitutes 
their authorship. The authors don’t hide; they speak loudly and clearly. The 
contemporary authors are present. 
[Exeunt, scripts left behind on the plinths.]110 
 
Winner's Performance is based on this script, which is held in the hands of the 
speakers during the performance. After the performance, the script was published in 
the artist book If Analyses Could Be Poems ... Works between Text and 
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Performance111 where it can be read as you just read it here. The only difference is 
that in the book the text is shown in the form of a scan of the script as it was used. 
Since the script was held in the hands of the performers, the viewers of the 
performance knew that this script already existed before the performance, which 
means that it can be considered primary in reference to the performance. 
Furthermore, in the first paragraph of the script it is made clear that the script 
consists primarily of previously existing text material from other authors. That means 
that the script is a text that not only refers to other texts, but it also quotes from them. 
From this one can conclude that the text is not a transcript of an oral speech/gesture. 
The fact that the script is a text which can be read independently of the performance 
is demonstrated at the end of the performance again. The performers leave the 
scripts on the plinths and leave the gallery so that the audience can read the text 
after the performance, look something up in the text and compare the written words 
with what they remember of the text heard during the performance. 
The performance consists of reading the script aloud, combined with a simple 
choreography in the space, which is communicated via instructions that can also be 
read in the script. Through the oral recitation of the written text, through the bodily 
presence of the performers and through the new contextualization, various shifts in 
meaning arise. Thus in “Why do I do this?” the word “this” takes on a reference to the 
space-time of the performance, which obviously differs from the original intention of 
the author being quoted. The word “I” is appropriated by the performer as well; during 
the performance it refers to her. The original author means his own art production by 
the word “this”; in the performance it becomes an indicator of the performance itself. 
Another example is the assertion “Man should not be present.” The statement, which 
was meant in the original text categorically and metaphorically, takes on an ironic and 
humorous meaning in the performance. It is ironic because a person is obviously 
present, who through his presence foils the statement, and it is humorous because 
the metaphoric statement appears to be taken literally. These changes of meaning 
can be associated with the différance of Derrida. They are not in the script or in the 
performance, but they occur between them: they occur during the performance, 
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because of the (present) text, and in the script, because of the (imagined) 
performance. 
In general différance is a movement in which the production of meaning takes place: 
the movement between reading and writing. The Derridean game of deconstruction is 
a conscious fertilization of this movement in this performance script. The notion of 
translation, which will be elaborated on in the following chapter in order to describe a 
specific relation between text and performance, necessarily exhibits certain aspects 




3  Chapter Three: Translation from and into Performances 
This chapter is dedicated to the issue of “Translation from and into Performances.” 
The aim is to find out whether or not translation can be used as a term to designate a 
non-hierarchical relation between text and performance.  
The chapter is divided into seven subchapters. “3.1 Translation” is dedicated to the 
notion of translation approached from the point of view of the German philosopher, 
translator and literary critic Walter Benjamin. In order to apply his theory of translation 
to the research subject of translation from and into performances, the theory of 
musical reproduction from the German philosopher, sociologist and music 
theoretician Theodor Adorno will additionally be consulted. Benjamin and Adorno, 
despite philosophical disagreements, were connected in a lifelong relationship.  
In “3.2 Possibilities of an Impossible Status” I will briefly address the hierarchy 
between text and performance regarding chronology.  
In “3.3 Fragments of Translation as Collaboration” I will very briefly take Benjamin’s 
theory of translation in the context of collaboration into account. Even though 
fragmentary, I believe that this section on translation and collaboration is important 
for the articulation of my position.  
In “3.4 Reading, Understanding and Interpreting Scores” I turn to the role of 
understanding and interpreting texts for performances and the role this 
understanding plays in the performance of the text.  
In “3.5 Translation Revisited” I address Adorno’s ideas on translation in relation to 
musical reproduction and I will compare Adorno’s notion of “objectivity” to Benjamin’s 
“pure language.”  
In “3.6 Afterwardsness” and in “3.7 The Force of Law” I will consider the terms 
“afterwardsness” and “force of law” by Derrida.  
I am aware that Derrida and Benjamin take different perspectives on the meaning of 
language, text, and translation. I consult both of them, because they teach me 
varying aspects of an understanding of these notions. I will refer to Benjamin’s 
“sphere of pure language” and apply it in a speculative way for my own purpose. I 
approach Benjamin in a poetical sense. In reading his texts, my thoughts are carried 
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to the places and things he talks about. This poetical approach enters this chapter 
from time to time.  
 
3.1 Translation 
In semiotics, translation is a mode of interpretation that modifies and rewrites a text. 
A distinction is made between “inner language translation” (innersprachliche 
Übersetzung), “translation between languages” (zwischensprachliche Übersetzung) 
and “inter-semiotic transfer” (intersemiotische Übertragung).112 In the first case, inner 
language translation, one stays within the same language, but translates a text into 
other words; an example for this kind of translation is a paraphrase. In the second 
case, translation between languages, one translates from one language to another 
language. In the third case, inter semiotic transfer, one translates from one semiotic 
system to another. Examples are translation from a text of written language into 
musical or visual language. When one applies semiotic categories, the translation 
from text into performance and the other way round belongs to the third category.113 
The essay “The Task of the Translator” by Benjamin was written in 1921 and 
published two years later as a self-reflective preface to poems by Charles Baudelaire, 
which Benjamin translated from French to German. In this essay, Benjamin 
establishes a structure based on three terms: the original text, the translation, the 
sphere of pure language. According to Benjamin, both the original (which I will refer 
to as the first text) and the translation (the second text) are connected to the sphere 
of pure language. “Pure language” is an abstract concept which in Benjamin’s 
understanding embraces and reconciles all languages. 
Regarding the first text, Benjamin differentiates between the “intended object” (the 
message) and the “mode of intention” (how things are meant). The mode of intention 
is specific to a certain language, so it cannot be translated. In Benjamin’s view, the 
message is “inessential.” In his opinion, a translation should not be similar to the 
original because then only the message, the content, would be translated. And a 
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translation should not be poetical itself, which means that it should not try to be a 
work of art since this would make the message “inaccurate.” From there, Benjamin 
characterizes an inferior translation as an inaccurate transmission of inessential 
content. 
For Benjamin, a translation is a text in its own right. He liberates it from its likeness to 
the first text, stating that:  
“… no translation would be possible if in its ultimate essence it strove for 
likeness to the original. For in its afterlife – which could not be called that if it 
were not a transformation and a renewal of something living – the original 
undergoes a change. Even words with fixed meaning can undergo a maturing 
process.”114 
The German word that Benjamin uses for “afterlife” is Fortleben. It literally means 
“continuation of life.” It does not suggest that something is over, rather it implies a 
transformation of life. Translations are part of the afterlife of a literary text, meaning 
that a transformation takes place, which, among other things, is owed to the historical 
changes of language. Benjamin writes, 
“And even if one tried to turn an author’s last stroke of the pen into the coup de 
grâce of his work, this still would not save that dead theory of translation. For 
just as the tenor and the significance of the great works of literature undergo a 
complete transformation over the centuries, the mother tongue of the 
translator is transformed as well.”115 
So a translation not only transfers a text into another language, it also actualizes the 
text in terms of the historical changes in language as well as the maturing of 
meaning. A translation adds the differences of languages to the first text, because it 
makes visible the foreignness of languages, which has to do with their 
incompleteness. Translation makes perceptible what is in between languages and 
therefore untranslatable. 
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In order to examine the central characteristics of translation from and into 
performance, I would like to review Adorno’s considerations in Towards a Theory of 
Musical Reproduction. The book with this title was published posthumously, and so 
the theory as such was a group of fragments. In one of them Adorno proposes to: 
“… begin with the question: what is a musical text. No set of performance 
instructions, no fixing of the imagined, but rather the notation of something 
objective, a notation that is necessarily fragmentary, incomplete, in need of 
interpretation to the point of ultimate convergence.”116 
Two assumptions here by Adorno are especially relevant for the translation from and 
into performance: firstly, that those texts which aim to make a staging (in German: 
Aufführung) reproducible necessarily remain fragmentary and in need of 
interpretation; and secondly, that it is not the function of these texts to fix the 
imagined. To fix the imagined would mean that an author writing a text can already 
anticipate the performance – or, in other words, that the text has the ability to fully 
capture or record, and in turn communicate a preconceived performance.  
Authors that intend their texts to be performed take responsibility for their texts, but 
can they also take responsibility for a performance? That will differ. If the author/artist 
who writes a text hires performers and works with them together on the performance 
can directly influence its becoming, then the answer is yes. If the author/artist does 
not work with the performers, but a performance artist decides for her- or himself to 
work with a text, or a musician performs a score by a(nother) composer, the 
performing person assumes responsibility for the performance. Another case is when 
part of the artistic concept is that the performance is only to be based on decisions 
made by the performers, and the author/artist does not influence their work even 
though he/she has selected and hires the performers.  
Since a musical text is not a fixing of the imagined, as Adorno states, authors who 
write texts to be performed (by people other than themselves) cannot fix the text’s 
meaning and determine the outcome even when these authors are involved in the 
working process. The reason is that the texts themselves must be interpreted (in the 
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sense of read) before they can be translated or otherwise worked with by the 
performers. 
The moment of interpretation precedes the staging of a text and belongs to the 
sphere of understanding and reflecting on a text or notation before the actual 
performance. For example, a musician can read the notation and consider different 
interpretations of it before playing it. Or, another option is that the text is interpreted in 
situ: the musician receives the score and plays it without having read it and reflected 
on it beforehand. In this case the interpretation and the translation fall into one action, 
and the interpretation is also closely related to improvisation, the act of performing 
itself. In both cases, the subjectivity of the translator comes into play with/in the 
interpretation. 
Following my own experience of working with performers (including dancers, actors, 
musicians and audience members), the factor of time also has a decisive impact on 
the interpretation (reading) of a score. In practice one can deliberately employ this 
factor and experiment with it, because the same score given to a performer five 
minutes or two weeks before the performance leads to totally different outcomes. An 
in situ interpretation is not better or worse than a well-reflected interpretation; 
improvisation bears its own qualities. Which deployment of time leads to an 
envisaged outcome depends on the work as well as on the skills of the performer. 
The fact that there is always more than one possibility of interpreting and translating 
a text has a subjective and an objective aspect. The subjective aspect comes into 
play with the decisions made by the translator (performer), or likewise when 
improvising in his/her individual style. The objective aspect is owed to culturally and 
historically shifting meanings, which alter modes of reading and translating a text. 
One can say that within the act of translation, these different meanings are produced 
and exhibited at the same time. 
In performance practice when both text and performance are present at the same 
time, or the text is known to the audience, the position of the translator (director, artist 
or performer) towards the text becomes apparent. For instance, if one knows the text 
and/or its stagings (Inszenierungen) by other directors of a classical theater play one 
can “read” the position of the director towards the text. A similar phenomenon occurs 
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in music, when a musician listens to the concert of a score he/she knows well and 
has played him or herself. 
 
3.2 Possibilities of an Impossible Status 
Text and performance can be, and are usually thought of as being hierarchically 
related to each other, as in the sense of being a means-to-an-end relationship. A 
means-to-an-end relationship is hierarchical, because the means is not equal to the 
end. The end is a self-sufficient outcome, which does not need the means in order to 
be read and understood. In this sense it is autonomous. In art, this implies that the 
end is considered to be an artwork and the means is merely considered as the 
working process needed in order to arrive at the work. This is the case when a text 
leads to a performance, and is a helping device for it, but not an artwork in itself.  
In this section, the question is: How is it possible to think of the relation between text 
and performance in a non-hierarchical way, and what would this require? In a non-
hierarchical relation each would stand alone, complete in itself and thus 
independently readable from the other one. This implies that a text as well as a 
performance (related to each other) fully expresses its meaning. 
The German media and communications theoretician Norbert Bolz and the German-
Dutch philosopher Willem van Reijen write about Benjamin’s concept, “The talk about 
the original and the translation suggests that what is called the original is the primary 
work from which the translation is derived. Were this true at the level of the 
presentation, then on the other hand it is true that the original itself is a 
translation.”117 
The reason is that the first text and the translation are both translations (secondary 
texts) in relation to the sphere of pure language. With regard to this sphere, both are 
derived, which at the same time means that “in the intention of pure language, 
original and translation are equally original.”118 Applied to translation from and into 
performance, Benjamin’s argument means that a performance is as primary as the 
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text preceding it, and the other way round. So, using his notion of translation, one 
can think of the first and second texts without any hierarchy concerning their status. 
The American artist John Cage offers another perspective on the problem of how 
texts before performances, such as scores, are thought of prior to their 
performances. In an interview in 1966, he responded to Richard Kostelanetz’s 
question whether someone else performs his role in the concerts or if he has to go on 
all the tours himself: 
“CAGE: I'm not always present. 
KOSTELANETZ: Who is the author of Variations V [1965]? 
CAGE: It is published under my name. 
KOSTELANETZ: Did you conceive all the parts or were they written 
independently? 
CAGE: You haven't seen the score? 
KOSTELANETZ: No. 
CAGE: Well, the score is a posteriori – written after the piece. Do you see the 
implications of this? 
KOSTELANETZ: But then that's not the score. 
CAGE: Nonsense, that changes our idea of what a score is. We always 
thought that it was a priori and that the performance was the performance of a 
score. I switched it completely around so that the score is a report on a 
performance.”119 
With the term “a posteriori score,” Cage questions whether a score necessarily has to 
be written before a performance. This fundamentally changes the understanding and 
extends the functions of a score in relation to the performance(s). Cage’s term a 
posteriori score creates an inversion of the relation, previously thought to be stable, 
between a score and the interpretations derived from it. 
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Applying Cage’s thought means that a text written to be performed must not 
necessarily temporally precede the performance. This also means that the reader 
(and possibly translator) of a written performance does not necessarily have to know 
whether the performance already took place, or was only imagined by its author; thus 
its written form was/is purely projective. 
This thought inspired me when I produced the artistic publication TRANSLATE 
YOURSELF! A Performance Reader for Staging120 in 2009. This publication contains 
a collection of thirty written performances by visual artists, choreographers and 
activists. I invited each artist to write a performance using one page. There were no 
further formal criteria given. The only condition was that the text can be translated 
into a performance. The published performances can simply be read and imagined, 
or performed by everyone who wishes to do so. 
My idea was that the written performances presented in the publication are at the 
same time documents of past and scores for future performances to take place. In 
the book it was not defined, whether or not the performance has already taken place. 
The very general idea that a text written after a performance can potentially become 
a textual basis for a(nother) performance again was put into practice. Furthermore, 
the project gives expression to the ideas that text and performance can enter into a 
reciprocal relationship with one another without a hierarchy between them, and that 
the one can be translated into the other. These are ideas to which I return in this 
dissertation. 
I think, even in the case of a text preceding a performance in a specific chronological 
alignment, one could still argue that there were previous stagings (Aufführungen), 
performances, cultural and historic events, pictures and texts that shaped this text, its 
meaning and possible performances in an intertextual way. This is certainly true on a 
theoretical and very general level, and it provides a way of showing that an artistic 
work is not rooted in itself; it has its origin in other works preceding it, with which it is 
connected and related. But still this does not say anything specific about the relation 
one text has to another one. 
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So if a (first) text does something to a second one, how can a second text be 
considered valuable for the first one? In other words: if the first text has an impact on 
a second one (or on a performance), how is it possible to think this the other way 
round? Adorno states, “The musical work undergoes similar change through being 
heard, renowned, exhausted, to the image under the scrutiny of the countless people 
who have pored over it.”121  
The scrutiny, which in German is Blick (“unter den Blicken der Unzähligen die 
darüber gegangen”122), can be understood as the reception. This means that an 
artistic work undergoes a change because of its reception, because of being viewed, 
heard and read. Reception is more general than interpretation; interpretation is a 
specific form. Adorno’s statement is reminiscent of Benjamin’s comments on the 
transformation of language and the maturing process of literary works over time 
which shapes the translation. The only difference here is that Adorno does not refer 
to another medium in which these changes become visible. 
If one regards artworks, here, performances, as not independent of their reception, 
and more specifically even of their interpretation, it is possible to understand a text 
that was written after a staging (Aufführung) for the purpose of restaging 
(Wiederaufführung, Wiederaufnahme) as an update of the performance via a score, 
as being analogous to Benjamin’s transformation and maturing process of words. 
Production and interpretation of art appear in a reciprocal light here; this provides a 
good basis for a non-hierarchical way of thinking about text and performance 
relations. So, the interpretation can, under certain circumstances, be the actualization 
of a thought that precedes the artistic work. In other words, each translation 
retrospectively inscribes itself as a possible interpretation of the first text into its 
history which is a history of interpretation. 
I conclude from this that in the context of translation from and into performance, not 
only the one who writes a score bears responsibility for the possible outcomes, but 
also the one who receives and performs it. As Adorno writes, the reason is that these 
(musical) texts are in need of being interpreted, and with this interpretation, the 
                                                 
121
 Adorno, op. cit., p. 5. 
122
 Adorno, Theodor, Zu einer Theorie der musikalischen Reproduktion. Aufzeichnungen, ein Entwurf 
und zwei Schemata. Fragment gebliebene Schriften, Vol. 2. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 
2001. p. 14. 
93 
 
translator/performer takes responsibility of his/her interpretation and becomes its 
author. 
So if one thinks of writing and performing not as mutually exclusive positions, but as 
structurally exchangeable positions, one can think of production and interpretation, 
and of writing and translating in non-hierarchical terms. (Even though this stays on a 
theoretical level which not necessarily meets the social and institutional realities in 
which art is produced and shown.) In the words of the contemporary philosopher 
Jacques Rancière: “It requires spectators who play the role of active interpreters, who 
develop their own translation in order to appropriate the ‘story’ and make it their own 
story. An emancipated community is a community of narrators and translators.”123 
How though do performance and text see this problem themselves? Is the community 
of spectators the answer to their equal relationship, or are there still other points open 
to debate?  
I eavesdropped on a conversation between text and performance, in which they negotiated 
their status and discussed the questions that came along with it. I will try to reproduce it as 
well as I can remember. 
Text sees a Performance of himself and is pleased. He sees himself reflected in her, and 
almost feels a bit flattered. He likes her and wants to meet her. Performance doesn’t even 
know he exists, let alone that he is here this evening. After the show, he approaches her. 
When she sees him, she is irritated and doesn’t really know what to make of him. 
TEXT: Hello, Performance! Delighted to meet you. Let me introduce myself: I am the Text. 
 
PERFORMANCE: Um, hello, Text. Yes, well, as you obviously already know: I am the 
Performance. Or, to be more precise, I am a performance. 
 
TEXT: No need to be so humble! You were fabulous. I really recognized myself in you. 
 
PERFORMANCE: What do you mean you recognized yourself? I didn’t even know you, I don’t 
recognize you, and you can’t possibly recognize me. 
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TEXT: I didn’t mean to question your independence. I would never do that. You are absolutely 
unique. 
 
PERFORMANCE: Yes, that’s what I think, too. But I don’t need you to remind me of that. And 
you? Who are you? You saw me and immediately thought you knew me. 
 
TEXT: I just wanted to show my appreciation for the wonderful performance. 
 
PERFORMANCE: Good. But I also want to learn something about you. 
 
TEXT: Yes, well, I am a performance. 
 
PERFORMANCE: Hmm, you too, then? With all due respect, I see a text here before me. 
 
TEXT: That’s right. Well observed. But in principle, I’m actually a performance. 
 
PERFORMANCE: Just now you implied that I was derived from you. And now you admit not 
existing without me. Very funny! By the way, I am also a text. So we no longer need to talk 
about mistaken identities … We could actually get along with each other. 
 
3.3 Fragments of Translation as Collaboration 
In this section translation will be interpreted as collaboration. For this purpose one 
more passage from Benjamin’s “The Task of the Translator,” will be consulted. 
Benjamin writes: 
“Whereas content and language form a certain unity in the original, like a fruit 
and its skin, the language of the translation envelops its content like a royal 
robe with ample folds. For it signifies a more exalted language than its own 
and thus remains unsuited to its content, overpowering and alien. ... For any 
translation of a work originating in a specific stage of linguistic history 
represents, in regard to a specific aspect of its content, translation into all 
other languages. Thus translation, ironically, transplants the original into a 
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more definitive linguistic realm, since it can no longer be displaced by a 
secondary rendering.”124 
It is remarkable that is not poetry or art (in its original form), but the translation that 
inhabits the more definite linguistic realm. Concerning artistic practice, I think that the 
state of a translation in which content and language do not form a unity has a 
potential that directly points to collaboration. The translator here is someone who 
collaborates either with the text of another author or with the author/artist directly. 
The third option is that the collaboration involves the meta-position of a 
choreographer, director or conductor who is in charge of giving their interpretation of 
the text in order to be performed by actors, dancers, or musicians. In this case, the 
author of the text is often not involved in the collaboration.  
The German literary scholar Uwe Steiner writes about Benjamin: “Like the philosophy 
of language in a narrower sense dating back to the middle of the 18th century, 
Benjamin considers language not as a means of communication, but as a constitutive 
condition of thinking.”125 
In the context of collaboration-based performance practice, language has both 
functions: it is a condition of thinking as well as a means for communicating tasks or 
ideas to performers. As a condition of thinking, artistic language, including an 
individual’s personal vocabulary used to describe it, is the condition of developing 
artistic work.  
Whereas in individual art practice a concept can be directly performed by the 
author/artist, in collaborative work communication plays a major part: each working 
step must be communicated beforehand; it may be executed by someone else or 
implemented together. In both cases, there has to be a shared language, which is not 
merely to say there is communication. In interdisciplinary collaborative work, which 
performances often are, and in which, for example, musicians, dancers and visual 
artists communicate with each other in order to realize a work together, each 
discipline has its own (technical) language and terminology. In such working 
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processes, one has to translate the tasks and ideas between the languages or create 
one shared language among the collaborators.  
From an overall societal standpoint, the Italian philosopher Paolo Virno argues that 
work has recently become more and more collaboration-based in general. In his 
view, language has become a more and more important means of production and is 
at the same time one of the common places that serve to give the multitude a shelter 
in times of precarity. Virno writes: 
“… that the communication industry (or rather, the spectacle, or even yet, the 
culture industry) is an industry among others, with its specific techniques, its 
particular procedures, its peculiar profits, etc.; on the other hand, it also plays 
the role of industry of the means of production … However, in a situation in 
which the means of production are not reducible to machines but consist of 
linguistic-cognitive competencies inseparable from living labor, it is legitimate to 
assume that a conspicuous part of the so-called ‘means of production’ consists 
of techniques and communicative procedures.”126 
The fact that contemporary labor invests linguistic-cognitive competencies is highly 
relevant and true for performers understood as laborers in the art field.  
 
3.4 Reading, Understanding and Interpreting Scores 
The following section is dedicated to the question: Can one interpret a score in any 
way one likes or are there right ways of reading it? I do not want to open the whole 
field of hermeneutics here, but I feel the urge to quickly jump into the question of 
understanding and then out of it again.  
In general one can say that the more open a score is, the stronger the question 
arises as to what degree a text has the potential to determine a performance. In other 
words, how much leeway for interpretation does the text offer? 
Although Adorno believes in a polyvalence of musical texts, he would clearly say, no, 
one cannot interpret a score in any way one likes. The interesting point concerning 
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Adorno’s position here is the explanation he gives for it: Adorno thinks that 
polyvalence is not produced through the interpretation, but is found in the texts 
themselves. That is to say, the interpreter reads it out of the texts, not into them. 
Adorno states, “There is such a thing as genuine textual polyvalence, i.e. several 
objectively immanent interpretations, but even the polyvalence is determinate,”127 and 
further he explains, “The subjective component of objectivity is interpretation.”128 
Here Adorno’s perspective starts to become even more interesting, and questions 
such as, “What role does the understanding of a score play in this context?,” and 
“Does one have to be able to recognize, name and list the various possibilities of 
interpretation, in order to subjectively choose one?,” become even more burning. 
Let us first quickly look into what “understanding” means. (In the next section under 
the heading “Translation Revisited” this thought of Adorno will be returned to in 
detail.) Gadamer for whom hermeneutics is the universal phenomenon of 
understanding writes: “The nature of the hermeneutical experience is not that 
something is outside and desires admission. Rather, we are possessed by something 
and precisely by means of it we are opened up for the new, the different, the true.”129 
Following Gadamer, the hermeneutical experience does not mean that something 
outside aims to enter “our” inside. The aim of understanding is not for something 
external, or other, to become internal and one’s own.  
This also means that reading does not necessarily lead to understanding, unlike 
repeated reading which at some point leads to knowing a text, at least a word or 
sentence, by heart. The second happens automatically. One cannot do much for or 
against it. But one cannot actively bring about understanding. In this regard 
understanding differs from knowledge, which can be collected and actively 
appropriated. Knowledge is a form of technē. This technē provides the condition for 
artistic work and understanding, and in the research context, specifically for reading 
and interpreting a script or a score. A musician, for example, must be able to read 
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sheet music, be familiar with certain styles, have technical knowledge about the 
instrument which she or he plays, and so on.  
However, understanding comprises other dimensions as well. It takes place on 
various levels simultaneously: conscious, unconscious, intuitive, rational, subjective 
and personal (or individual). In contrast to knowledge, understanding is something 
that can be actively searched for, but not actively found. Rather, it finds us: it gets us 
when we are brushing our teeth, in our dreams or while joking, and suddenly we 
understand what the artist or the philosopher meant. 
Since understanding always also takes place unconsciously and intuitively, it will 
never be utterly alienable. At least a part remains unnamable. That is to say, one can 
explain the facts, the historical context, the content of a text or an image, but 
understanding something while reading or watching is an experience everyone must 
make for themselves. So, understanding is thus necessarily more than its namable 
parts or aspects of communicable knowledge. What I would like to describe as 
understanding is something that can neither be displayed nor proven, neither 
controlled nor measured. For reading and interpreting scores, understanding in this 
sense as well as aspects of knowledge and technē are needed. 
 
3.5 Translation Revisited 
Adorno, in his theory of musical reproduction, also refers to Benjamin’s theory of 
translation. At one point, he writes: “One can apply what Benjamin remarks 
concerning the relationship between literature and translation, where he develops the 
idea of the ‘original’, to music: ‘… in living on, which would be a meaningless phrase 
if it were not the transformation and renewal of something alive, the original 
changes’”.130 
Adorno quotes Benjamin in order to explain that changes in musical works signify 
more than the fact that the same symbols are interpreted differently at different times. 
Analogous to Benjamin’s considerations concerning the “living on” of literary works, 
Adorno suggests, in regard to musical works and their notation that not only the use 
of symbols changes over time: “In truth, the change undergone by the works goes far 
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beyond this. It affects the music itself through the character of the score’s 
appearance and dissolves the notion of something absolute and timeless that is 
meant by the written notes.”131 
But at another point, Adorno introduces a difference between translation and musical 
reproduction: 
“The fundamental difference between musical reproduction and translation 
from a foreign language, however, lies in the fact that music requires 
interpretation to this day, whereas literature has no need of a translator. An 
untranslated poem loses nothing of its beauty, and it should sooner fear – to 
follow the pun – the traduttore as a traditore than make use of him. A score, 
however, which is radically removed from the possibility of its performance at 
once seems senseless in itself.”132 
Adorno means that music requires interpretation in order to be received, whereas 
literary texts can be received through reading (in the original language).  
The Italian word traduttore means translator, while traditore is traitor. So translation 
thus also implies a danger. However, this danger as an intentional act of the 
translator is not of relevance here. Rather, the following will be dedicated to 
investigating the difference that Adorno introduces between the Benjaminian 
conceptualization of translation and his own theory of musical reproduction. To do so, 
I will first go back to Benjamin, and thereafter work out what these theories have in 
common.  
Undoubtedly, there are an endless amount of differences between music and poetry, 
but still I would like to argue that there is an equal necessity for living on.133 When 
Adorno writes that what Benjamin says about translation is valid for music, he cites 
Benjamin at precisely the point at which Benjamin speaks about the “living on”: 
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Poetry needs translation for the sake of remaining vital. Just as music lives on 
through its performances, literary work survives and is spread through translation. 
According to Benjamin, translation is a form, a proper form. “If translation is a form, 
translatability must be an essential feature of certain works.”134 This, however, does 
not mean that a translation has an effect on an original text once it takes place: “It is 
evident that no translation … can have any significance as regards the original.”135 
According to Benjamin the translation means nothing for the original. So, from the 
perspective of the first text, it is true that translations are not needed, as Adorno 
points out. 
Yet the situation is different when looking from the perspective of the second text. 
Through translations literary works are updated – in Benjamin’s words “actualized.” 
Translation actualizes the original text from the perspective of the other language, 
and in this regard the translation means something for the living on of texts.  
Furthermore, Benjamin sees a functionality of translation that is not found in the 
relation to the first text, but is found in the inner relation between the languages. He 
writes about translations: “In them the life of the original attains its latest, continually 
renewed, and most complete unfolding.”136 Even if this unfolding does not mean 
anything for the first text, because it does not affect it, the translation “ultimately 
serves the purpose of expressing the innermost relationship of languages to our 
answer.”137 Translations cannot “reveal” or “establish” this inner relationship between 
languages, “but it can represent it by realizing it,”138 which means that “languages are 
not strangers to one another, but are, a priori and apart from all historical 
relationships, interrelated in what they want to express.”139 Kinship among languages 
does not consist of the similarity of poems or words, for Benjamin: this 
interrelatedness is a kinship which is supra-historical and based on the fact that “in 
every one of them as a whole, one and the same thing is meant. Yet this one thing is 
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achievable not by any single language, but only by the totality of their intentions 
supplementing one another: the pure language.”140 So whereas individual elements, 
such as words and sentences, are mutually exclusive in different languages, the 
intentions complement one another, according to Benjamin. 
This also concerns the task of the translator: “Just as translation is a form of its own, 
so, too, may the task of the translator be regarded as distinct and clearly 
differentiated from the task of the poet.”141 Following Benjamin, this consists “in 
finding the particular intention toward the target language which produces in that 
language the echo of the original.”142 The intention of the poet is “spontaneous, 
primary, manifest; that of the translator is derivative, ultimate, ideational,”143 he 
writes. The task of the translator is one in which “the languages themselves, 
supplemented and reconciled in their way of meaning, draw together.”144 
In Benjamin’s theory, besides the first text and the translation there is a third element, 
the sphere of pure language, which is located at a superior place. To this place the 
other two, the first text and the translation, are both equally related.  
Hereafter, I will show that this superior place, which builds the sphere of pure 
language in Benjamin’s theory, also exists in Adorno’s considerations on musical 
reproduction. Based on this, I will argue that “Benjamin’s” literary texts need 
translation in regard to their living on just as much as “Adorno’s” musical texts need 
their performances – that is to say, their translation to music. 
I cite Adorno in order to go to this superior place (again): “There is such a thing as 
genuine textual polyvalence, i.e. several objectively immanent interpretations, but 
even the polyvalence is determinate … The subjective component of objectivity is 
interpretation.”145 So, the subjective component, the interpretation, is the manner in 
which the (polyvalent) musical texts are performed, translated to performances. But 
why is this objective?  
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I interpret Adorno’s perspective as follows: interpretation is objective insofar as the 
subjective is included in the objective. This is to say, insofar as the subjective is a 
part of the objective. This is, however, not to be understood in the sense of quantity, 
but rather in the sense of a relationship to the objective that arises in the act of 
interpretation. The interpretation is subjective, but only in relation to the objective; it is 
the subjective part of the objective.  
In other words, the objective, which is contained in musical texts as polyvalence, is 
not tangible in this form, and thus needs the subjective act of interpretation. This is 
crucial for Adorno’s considerations. Musical performances are necessary for the 
objectivity (of musical texts) to appear, and which can only appear as the subjective 
of the objective, i.e. as a part of itself, which at once means the whole; the subjective 
is a part and not a characteristic of the objective. 
The same is true for poems and translations in regard to pure language. Translations 
are necessary forms of the appearance of this “language of languages.” This is the 
place that seems familiar with Benjamin. What Adorno means by “objectivity” 
Benjamin calls the sphere of “pure language.” This is the place to which the first text 
and the translation, and the musical text and the performance are equally related.  
Pure language comprises all possible languages in the same manner as the 
objective comprises the subjective. The subjective is thus dependent on the 
objective. Earlier, it was said that the objective is dependent on the subjective as 
well. The objective does not just exist somewhere, but it needs interpretation to 
emerge.  
When Adorno writes: “A score, however, which is radically removed from the 
possibility of its performance at once seems senseless in itself,”146 he does not 
neglect the fact that one can read scores as well. He, himself, proposes to introduce 
“the mere reading of music as a conceptual extreme.”147 Provided one is 
knowledgeable about notation, one can imagine the music and hear it in one’s inner 
ear without physically playing the notes. But while he considers reading “enough” for 
poems, this does not count for music. This is because Adorno locates the nature of 
music in musical reproduction, that is to say, between the musical text and the 
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performance of the music. A score that is not performed is senseless in regard to its 
nature, which is not found merely in playing, nor in writing/composing music. It 
unfolds itself in the relations between musical texts and performances. 
This also means that neither playing nor writing music stand for themselves, which 
leads to the paradoxical structure of the previously analyzed equality of text and 
performance, of the first and the second text. The paradox exists in the simultaneous 
autonomy (independence) and dependence of both sides on one another. 
Adorno’s need of musical texts – “The necessity of interpretation [which] manifests 
itself as the neediness of musical texts”148 – can be understood as the need of being 
received. Although interpretation is a specific form of reception, one can say that 
each form of art needs to be received. This reception has to “materialize” itself, it has 
to take shape in a form or medium in order to participate in the living on of an artistic 
work. Be it in the form of a translation, a poem or a critique which enters into dialogue 
with the first text – there is no living on without a manifestation of itself.  
From this perspective, the difference is not that musical texts have to be played and 
poems read. Rather, reception is a part of both, and reading is the precondition for 
musical interpretation as well.  
I will summarize what has been said. From my perspective, the general equality of 
translation towards its first text and of the musical performance towards its score 
derives from their connectedness to an undefined place, which both sides equally 
share. Benjamin calls this undefined space “pure language” and Adorno “objectivity.”  
This general equality has a paradoxical structure in itself, which is based on 
autonomy and dependency. Musical texts and performances, as well as poems and 
translations, are autonomous in the sense of being proper forms, as Benjamin calls 
them. This autonomy is owed to the fact that the first, as well as the second 
text/performance, are independently receivable as such: one does not need to know 
the original poem or score in order to read the translation or listen to the concert, 
although reading and listening are different forms of reception.  
The dependency among the two sides emerges in regard to the nature of music, 
which takes place in the relation between musical text and the interpretation of it, as 
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Adorno writes. In my opinion, the same is true for texts and their relation to 
translations, because the nature of language also unfolds in the relationships 
between languages, according to Benjamin. 
Considering this paradoxical structure, texts and performances can be seen as equal, 
and texts after performances can be thought of as potential texts before 
performances. 
Based on this equality, one can think of an equal relationship between texts and 
performances in visual art. This certainly do not hold up for all texts connected to 
performances. The announcement text of a performances is not equal to the artwork 
and independent of the performance itself. But I think this theoretical possibility can 
be considered for texts whose relationship to performances is intrinsic, in other words 
which have the potential t become performances and at the same time can be read 
independently from them.  
In the context of visual art, this living on of performances is given in the form of 
exhibitions, performance documentation, videos circulating on the Internet, and 
through restagings and reenactments. Likewise, the living on of texts to be performed 
is given by performances. 
I would like to come back to the initial question concerning the role of the need to 
understand a text to be performed for the interpretation/translation. Adorno would 
probably say that this understanding is connected to objectivity and Benjamin would 
say it is connected to the sphere of pure language. From my perspective, 
understanding is connected to an undetermined place. This, however, does not mean 
that it is not relevant; on the contrary, since understanding takes place at this 
undetermined place it cannot be pointed out – it can only be pointed to. 
 
3.6 Afterwardsness 
Under chapter three’s heading “Translation from and into Performances,” use was 
made of Benjamin’s theory of translation and Adorno’s theory of musical 
reproduction. Benjamin speaks about translation from one language into another; 
both have the form of text. Adorno speaks about the reproduction of music on the 
basis of musical texts and their performances.  
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In order to understand my own concerns and to write the first part of this chapter, I 
brought together these two theories. Since Adorno’s writing remained in fragments 
and partly repeated itself in the German edition, I worked with the fragments that I 
was intrigued by and did not read the whole book at once. When I went back to 
Adorno’s writings after a while, I read his considerations in regard to the context that I 
had established for myself, namely in connection to Benjamin’s theory of translation. 
Bearing this in mind, I had the feeling they were speaking about similar things at 
some points, which brought me to the idea of searching for a key word that registered 
in all of the passages in which the name “Walter Benjamin” is mentioned. In this way, 
I discovered that Adorno had made the connection to Benjamin’s theory of translation 
himself,149 and my intuition had been correct. 
At that point, I could have gone back to the already written section about translation 
and placed the quote at the spot where Adorno states that one can think of musical 
reproduction as being parallel to Benjamin’s theory of translation. This would have 
had the effect that my own act of (violently) reading them together would be 
legitimized for the reader from the beginning. Not doing this has had another effect, 
one that could be described by the term “afterwardsness.”150 
Afterwardsness means that one event changes (the meaning of) another event that 
happened in the past. It is a logic of time that does not follow chronology. In 
chronology, a first event is the cause of a second event, and has certain effects on it. 
This cause-effect logic of chronology implies a hierarchy of first and second: the first 
can exist without the second, but not the other way round, a point that has already 
been spoken about.  
Afterwardsness enables one to dissolve this hierarchy and is therefore especially 
interesting for performance and all the issues involved in writing it which are haunted 
by the logic of chronology. The term afterwardsness provides a logic of time with 
which to think about the relation of text and performance without the hierarchization 
that “the first” and “the second” implies. It explains the fact that a second event can 
change the meaning of the first one which explains that the performance (of a text) 
can change the meaning of the text itself.  
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For this text here, afterwardsness means that finding the connection between 
Adorno’s considerations and Benjamin’s theory of translation changes the meaning 
of what is written above in section “3.1 Translation.” It also sheds light on the 
previously quoted passage from Adorno: “The musical work undergoes similar 
change through being heard, renowned, exhausted, to the image under the scrutiny 
of the countless people who have pored over it.”151 
 
3.7 The Force of Law 
In the following, Derrida’s notion of “the force of law” will be introduced and applied to 
the research topic. In order to explain some terms around and key points crucial to 
the Derridean force of law I will return again to Benjamin. 
Benjamin’s text “The Task of the Translator” was written in 1921. That same year, he 
wrote the essay “Critique of Violence.”152 The main issue of the latter text is defining 
a critique of violence (Gewalt) in relation to law (Recht) and justice (Gerechtigkeit). 
The German word Gewalt not only means violence and force, but also has the 
connotation of ruling (walten). In German, law is Gesetz, and it is used in the sense 
of law as well as in the sense of right (Recht). The German word for justice 
Gerechtigkeit includes the word Recht. It literally means something like “the realized 
right/law.” 
For Benjamin, Gewalt (violence, force) executed by individuals or by the state in 
order to implement the constitution and enforce the law is unjust. For Benjamin, only 
the messianic force which removes violence itself from history can be just.  
Derrida suggests a quite different analysis of the relationships between law, justice 
and Gewalt. In his essay “Force of Law,”153 he critiques (and deconstructs) 
Benjamin’s view. Derrida interprets justice as a law to be realized, but can never be 
fully realized. It has an aporetic structure. But the aim here is not to analyze the 
differences between Benjamin’s and Derrida’s approach; rather, my interest is in 
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what the law and its force (Kraft) mean for the relation of text and performance in 
general and for translation specifically.  
Derrida considers not only the constitution, but also, in the broadest sense the law “of 
which it is hard to say whether it is a rule of decorum, politeness, the law of the 
strongest [la loi du plus fort], or the equitable law [loi] of democracy.”154 According to 
him, enforcing the law is a necessary Gewalt, and force is necessarily inherent to 
law: it must be enforceable. Derrida writes, “The word ‘enforceability’ … reminds us 
that there is no law that does not imply in itself, a priori, in the analytical structure of 
its concept, the possibility of being enforced, applied by a force.”155 
This force can be “direct or indirect, physical or symbolic, exterior or interior, brutal or 
subtly discursive – even hermeneutic.”156 To apply the law by force means to 
interpret the general rule and apply it to a specific case. This application to a specific 
case necessarily implies the deviation from this general aspect. In turn, to abstract 
from specific cases in order to make it a general law includes a force too. Through its 
application the law itself necessarily gets trespassed. It represents itself in the 
deviation from itself, which is to say in the application. 
Benjamin writes, in order to comprehend the form of translation, “one must go back to 
the original, for the laws governing the translation lie within the original, contained in 
the issue of its translatability.”157 Translatability is the precondition of translation, and 
the law of translatability is the precondition of translatability. The law of translatability 
is in the first text, it does not lie behind or before it (for example, in Benjamin’s sphere 
of pure language). It can be understood as the structure that provides the possibility 
of understanding a text, and is thus the precondition of translation. Through the 
translation this structure can be made visible, likewise through writing in the sense of 
the Derridean game, or in the artistic context through the performance of a text. 
In the context of translation from and into performances, the application of 
translatability as well as the application of the force of law is in the translation itself. 
However, the law of translatability and the force of law is not the same. Whereas the 
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law of translatability is the structure of a text (which Derrida and Plato speak of as 
“game”), the force of law is something more general. It is what is made out of this 
structure. The force of law is the precondition of language in general and of text 
specifically. 
So, the law governing translatability is, to a certain degree, connected to the 
authorship of the writer of the text and to the intention. The force of law in a text (to 
be translated or performed) is not connected to the intention of the writer nor to the 
activity of writing. It is a general characteristic of text that enables it to be read, 
translated and performed and brings with it the authorship of the interpreters. 
According to Derrida, the law gains its force through its application and the 
interpretation trespassing it. In other words, a text as law gains its force through the 
action of being applied. In my field of interest, text gains its force from a performance 
that realizes it, which is its enforcement, application, interpretation and specific case.  
Furthermore, one could say that the force of law is specific to texts that must be 
enforced, applied, performed or otherwise translated to actions, and thus can be 
understood as the movement between text and performance. The force of law is the 
eventful aspect of the relation between text and performance in general, which can 







The first conclusion is that one can roughly differentiate relations between texts and 
performances of extrinsic and of intrinsic nature. Extrinsic relations are external 
relations in which text and performance stay besides each other and come together 
only in the reception, as in the case of most paratexts. Intrinsic relations are inner 
relations of texts and performances; as in the case of scores which reach far into the 
performances themselves. Intertextuality in general as well all the texts that are 
written before a performance with the aim of being performed belong to this category. 




The second conclusion, which I consider to be more important, is that texts have two 
functions in relation to performances: an interpretative function and a recording 
function. 
The interpretative function explains the potential of a text to be read in different ways. 
This potential was emphasized by post-structuralist thinkers like Derrida. 158 It can be 
identified in a broad sense with the Derridean notions of dissemination, iterability, 
différance, force of law and game. These terms all stress the idea that text has a 
meaning which cannot be determined by the author and her or his intention. The 
interpretative function means the potential of being read, and this includes generating 
meaning beyond the intention of the author, that is, it is caused by the subjectivity of 
the performers and/or by the inner logic of a text. The meaning of a text to be 
performed lies in its potential performances and is made visible through them and 
amongst others in collaboration-based performance practices.  
The recording function means the ability to store, fix, represent and maintain 
information about a performance. This function plays a role in communicating the 
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concept, the intention, images and/or thoughts that an artist has of an upcoming 
performance, and potentially enables its reproduction; further, it enables one to 
“record” a received performance or aspects of it in the form of descriptions, reports or 
audio/visual recordings. 
The specific concern of this dissertation has been to answer the question whether it 
is possible to conceive of the relation between text and performance as non-
hierarchical or not. The general conclusion is that a non-hierarchical relation between 
text and performance is practically and theoretically possible. But this is only valid in 
regard to the interpretative function of texts related to performances. In order to 
answer this question it is was necessary to distinguish between the recording 
function and the interpretative function. 
Like literary texts, texts related to performances can have an autonomous status and 
be read as unconnected to the performance it is referring to. This counts for texts that 
have the interpretative function. The fact that a text can be read in itself, and be 
further developed through interpretation (or translation) makes something 
autonomous out of it.  
Texts that have the function of recording (information about) a performance do not 
have an autonomous status. They refer to what they attempt to represent and fix it. 
The recording function makes something secondary out of a text. It cannot be read in 
the sense of being interpreted beyond the scope of the recorded performances. 
For realizing performances, both the recording function, which maintains, and the 
interpretative function, which generates, are necessary, often at the same time. For 
example, the generative rule “Whenever someone looks at you, start to sing,” 
appeared in the performance,159 together with the text to be sung. This text is written 
down in order to be maintained. Besides the fact that for the production of a 
performance texts from both categories are often needed, there are also some cases 
in which both functions appear in one text, and determined elements and open 
elements are combined with each other. 
Moreover, these functions themselves cannot always be clearly separated; there are 
transitions, variations, combinations and gradual differences. Their purpose often lies 
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somewhere in between determining how a performance should look or sound, and 
making this act reproducible on the one hand, and on the other, producing a score or 
a text that is open to interpretation and improvisation, and thus triggering as many 
different performances as possible. However, usually it is possible to say which of the 
functions is more prevalent in a text. 
 
Third Conclusion 
The third and last conclusion is that a categorical division into texts before 
performances and texts after performances does not necessarily make sense. The 
aim of describing a past performance is akin to the aim of determining a future 
performance and/or making it reproducible. Although the purpose of maintaining an 
existing performance differs from generating something that is not imagined and/or 
has not happened yet, writing is neutral in regard to the material it captures. For 
writing it makes no difference whether the material is derived from the physical world 
(the sensible) or from thought or imagination (the intelligible). Therefore it does not 
matter whether or not a performance has already been performed, and likewise 
whether a score is written a priori or a posteriori. This neutrality is not dependent on 
the function; it applies to the recording function and likewise to the interpretative 
function. 
 
In closing, I briefly want to recall the most important connections between these 
conclusions and the literature I have drawn upon. Concerning understanding the role 
of the recording and the interpretative function of texts, Plato and Derrida were the 
most important sources. In Phaidros Plato points out that one cannot rely on the 
recording function of writing, and that writing also has an interpretative function that 
we should be aware of. In “Plato’s Pharmacy,” Derrida deconstructs the recording 
function of writing. He emphatically points to the interpretative function, which he 
describes as being in the form of a “game,” and which he applies in his own text 
through his way of writing. 
For determining the specific characteristics of texts related to performances such as 
scores, instructions and rules, Derrida’s notion of the force of law provided valuable 
insights. One key characteristic of text to be performed is the fact that they define 
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themselves via the praxis of their “applications,” that is to say through their 
performances. The force of law emphasizes the eventful aspect of the relation 
between texts and performances, which also applies to translation.  
Translation was used as a term to designate a non-hierarchical relation between text 
and performance, which is possible, but only in relation to the sphere of what 
Benjamin calls “pure language,” and which I interpret as being an undeterminable 
place. The use of the term translation is possible, but not necessary after all. Rather, 
the places where the equality of texts and performances could be encountered is 
simply reading, understanding and interpreting that is enabled by the non-intentional 
aspect of writing – which is a future place to go from here.  
The last conclusion I would like to draw concerns my artistic position. This research, 
including all the components of: 1. reading theory and engaging into a written 
dialogue with them from the perspective and experience of my artistic practice, as 
well as 2. to realize research-related projects, and to design and implement the final 
artistic project, as well as to give presentations during these processes in the 
PhDArts program and the feedback thereof, has brought me to the conclusion that I 
perform different roles in relation to the text I write. 
 
Epilogue 
TEXT: Yes, I admit that we first had to get to know each other. Or better still: to learn to love 
one another. After all, we could really use each other’s help! Side by side, each as the 
complement of the other. Isn’t that a nice thought? 
 
PERFORMANCE: Well, if that is all our relationship is going to be about ... I, for one, certainly 
imagined love to be something completely different! What do I need a text tugging160 at me 
for when I’m already a text myself? 
 
TEXT: You’re right. Why should I love a performance when I myself am a performance? And if 
I’m so wrapped up in self-love, then who will love you? 
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PERFORMANCE: Admittedly, in the act of performance I am you; you appear in me. However, 
we are not united from the start. You should think about that. 
 
TEXT: Are you talking about a separation? 
 
PERFORMANCE: I just want to say that you were not already me before me. That’s why we 
could only get to know each other before you saw me. Maybe we should go have a drink, and 
you can tell me about you and I can tell you about me. 
 
TEXT: I don’t understand. How am I supposed to recognize you before you exist? And don’t 
tell me that that won’t be a problem for me. 
 
PERFORMANCE: That’s just what I wanted to tell you, and one more thing as well: As long as 
you don’t start thinking for yourself, I will always have existed in your imagination long before 
we met. 
 
TEXT: I don’t want to dream you up for myself. And I don’t want you to appear for me. I wish 
we could agree on a place where you could reveal yourself. I just want to know where I can 
wait for you. 
 
PERFORMANCE: I can tell you the place. It will be the place where you would still have been 
Performance and I would still have been Text. 
 





In art history, performance is categorized as performance art and defined as live-act. 
However, performance is no longer conceived of by artists as live-act only. Rather, 
the art of producing performances, according to artists, also includes considerations 
of their documentation and mediatization. In these contexts a paratextual perspective 
would enable considering documentation practices as part of performance art, which 
would also mean to acknowledge that performance is a practice associated with 
other practices that go beyond the enactment or staging which precedes or follows it. 
I have attempted to show that performances cannot be thought of as independent of 
their documentation anymore, and thus this documentation has implications for the 
performances themselves. The first reason is that performance artists nowadays 
produce or conceptualize documentation themselves. Performance documentation 
therefore enters into performances’ production. Second, it enters the reception of the 
performance, and impacts the interpretation of the situation. 
It is my claim that the potential of performance in visual art lies exactly in this ability to 
divest itself of a stable medial identity. This is  going one step further, because it is to 
say that performance does not only have the practical need, but also the general 
potential to connect itself with other media, such as texts and audiovisual records.  
Performances in visual art cannot be viewed as distinct from the intermedial and 
paratextual issues with which they are connected. They engage, intermingle and 
enter into reciprocal relationships with these issues. So, one should understand 
performances in and through their relations to texts.  
In writing this dissertation and investigating these relations, I carried the questions 
that I had in my artistic practice into various theoretical fields. More specifically, I 
searched where in theory my questions had previously been addressed, and I 
engaged in a dialogue with these points. This process led to my conclusions. 
The conclusion that texts have a recording as well as an interpretative function in 
relations to performances first enhance the understanding of my artistic practice, and 
second I hope they will also contribute to an enhanced understanding of text and 
performance relations in general.  
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After I carried the questions from my artistic practice into various theoretical fields for 
the written part, the idea for the practical project was to carry the insights gained from 
the theoretical work back into artistic practice. Besides “testing” the recording and 
interpretative function, the project engages with the reception of the “living on” of an 
art work. The crucial role of reception and of interpretation in the after- and continued 
life of an art work, which unexpectedly entered the research through reading 
Benjamin and Adorno, is played with and given material form in the project. This I 
consider as the final step in closing the circle of my research, which started from my 
individual artistic practice and – through a dialogue with other fields – has returned to 
that practice, while opening the practice up to a new and broader dimension. The aim 
of the artistic project is not to illustrate the research, but to once again enter unknown 
terrain in order to raise new questions for new research endeavours. 
 
Dutch Summary  
In de kunstgeschiedenis is performance-kunst gecategoriseerd en gedefinieerd als 
live-act. Performance wordt door kunstenaars evenwel niet langer alleen gezien als 
live-act. In plaats daarvan omvat performance-kunst, volgens kunstenaars, ook 
overwegingen over documentatie en mediatisering van de performance. Een 
paratekstueel perspectief op performance-kunst betekent dat documentatie-
strategieën worden gezien als onderdeel van ervan. Deze benadering houdt in dat 
performance een praktijk is die geassocieerd wordt met andere praktijken, die verder 
gaan dan het uitvoeren of ensceneren van de performance.  
In deze dissertatie laat ik zien dat performance niet langer los gezien kan worden van 
de documentatie ervan, en dat deze documentatie gevolgen heeft voor de 
performance zelf. De eerste reden hiervoor is dat hedendaagse performance-
kunstenaars zelf hun documentatie conceptualiseren en produceren. De 
documentatie van de performance krijgt daardoor een plek binnen de productie van 
performances. Ten tweede beïnvloedt de documentatie ook de receptie van de 
performance en beïnvloedt de documentatie de interpretatie. 
Mijn stelling is dat het potentieel van performance in beeldende kunst precies 
gelegen is in dit afstand nemen van een stabiele identiteit. Met dit vermogen tot het 
loslaten van een stabiele identiteit wordt gezegd dat performance niet alleen de 
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praktische behoefte, maar ook het vermogen heeft om zich te verbinden met andere 
media, zoals tekst en audiovisuele documentatie. 
Performances in beeldende kunst kunnen daarom niet los gezien worden van inter-
mediale en paratekstuele kwesties, waarmee ze wederkerige verbanden aangaan en 
waarmee ze zich vermengen. Men dient performances daarom te begrijpen in en 
door hun relaties met tekst. 
In het schrijven van deze dissertatie en in het onderzoek naar de genoemde relaties 
heb ik de vragen die ik in mijn artistieke praktijk stelde in de context van verschillende 
theoretische velden gebracht. Preciezer geformuleerd, ik onderzocht waar in 
verschillende theorieën mijn vragen al eerder waren geadresseerd en ik trad in 
dialoog met de uitkomsten daaarvan. Dit proces heeft geleid to mijn conclusies. 
De conclusie dat tekst zowel een documenterende als interpreterende functie heeft in 
relatie tot performances heeft ten eerste het begrip van het functioneren van mijn 
artistieke praktijk verbreed, en ten tweede hoop ik dat dit ook zal bijdragen aan het 
verbreden van het begrip van de relaties tussen tekst en performance in het 
algemeen. 
Nadat ik, voor het geschreven deel van mijn onderzoek, de vragen vanuit mijn 
artistieke praktijk in de context van de verschillende theoretische velden had 
gebracht, heb ik voor het artistieke deel van het onderzoek de verkregen inzichten 
weer terug geplaatst in het artistieke werk. Naast het “testen” van de 
documenterende en de interpreterende functie, engageert mijn artistieke project zich 
met de receptie van de manier waarop het kunstwerk ‘voortleeft’. De cruciale rol van 
de receptie en de interpretatie van het ‘voortlevende’ kunstwerk werd onderdeel van 
het onderzoek door het lezen van Benjamin en Adorno. In het artistieke deel van het 
project heb ik met deze inzichten gespeeld en ze materiële vorm gegeven. Ik 
beschouw dit als de afsluitende stap in het sluiten van de cirkel van mijn onderzoek, 
dat begon bij mijn individuele artistieke praktijk en dat -doormiddel van een dialoog 
met andere velden- terug is gekomen bij die praktijk en deze praktijk opent naar een 
nieuwe en bredere dimensie. Het doel van het artistieke project was niet om het 
onderzoek te illustreren, maar om opnieuw onontgonnen terrein te betreden, waar 





WRITING: leaving a trace in or on a material. The material which captures the trace 
can be of analog or of digital nature. 
TEXT: written language. It stands for itself. It can be read disconnected from the 
presence of its author and his / her intention. 
PERFORMANCE: a work of visual art, which is realized by people present during a 
certain time frame. 
STAGING:161 the act of presenting a performance in front of an audience. The 
staging and its reception happen simultaneously, although the reception of a 
performance does not necessarily ends when the staging ends. 
MEDIA OF AFTERLIFE: media in which a performance is presented to an audience 
after the enactment, the time frame in which it was realized. 
SCORE: a specific form of written text or notation with the aim of being performed. It 
possibly contains written language, symbols and abstract elements. 
INSTRUCTION: a guideline for acting which is given for the purpose of being 
executed. Its forms range from manual to order. 
RULE: a directive in order to produce regularity in behavior. It is based on agreement 
and only valid in a certain, mostly defined area. 
DESCRIPTION: oral or written statement that attempts to depict processes or objects 
as they are or were. 
NOTATION: written words, symbols or abstract signs which designate objects or 
processes within written form. 
RECORDING: the capturing of visual or audio visual material with the help of 
analogue or digital media. 
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 In German language staging is Aufführung. It can be used for visual art, for music, dance and 
theater performances likewise. 
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Interview with Marga van Mechelen 
The following text is the transcription of a recorded interview with the Dutch art 
historian Marga von Mechelen about her historic view on the relations between 
performance and other media. The interview was conducted in May 2013 at UVA, 
University of Amsterdam. 
Lilo Nein: I read your book Performances, Installations, Video, Projects, 1975 to 
1978, and I have prepared, first, some questions about the relations between 
performances and texts. Let me give you a quick overview before we go into the 
details. My main questions will be these: What role do announcement texts versus 
spontaneity play? The second question concerns publishing and publications; the 
third, audiovisual documentation; and the fourth, the archive. My fifth question 
concerns the relation between performances and exhibitions. Afterwards, I will have 
four general questions, which are more related to the last chapter of your book. On 
the conceptualization of performance, my questions come from my own perspective – 
that is, from the here and now, me as an artist; but of course I am concerned with 
your background as a historian and how different attributes were attached to the term 
“performance” and how apparent they might be. This refers to performance ontology 
and written pieces about performance. This will be my program.  
I will start now with a short statement from my side, so you also know what I am 
doing. I am interested in the relations of live-acts to other media – namely, text and 
documents. For me as an artist working with performance means negotiating those 
relations. Negotiating between different media within the live situation: the body, as I 
also work with performers; space, but also visual media; and types of presentations: 
presentation on the internet, the live presentation again; and finally, publications as 
another kind of format. How can all of this create an entire overview; or, what then is 
the object at the end of performance art? Can there be one, or is this even 
necessary? Is it only the experience? Maybe this is fine, I don’t know. I have the 
feeling that performance artists have always had to deal with other media being 
around and with the relation to them; but my guess is that in the beginning, in the 
early time of performance, this was not deeply reflected upon. I think the reflection 
came during the 1990s, after the period we’ll mostly be speaking about. So, I am kind 
of on the other side, so to speak. I am interested in you as a historian, and I have the 
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feeling that the relations were always there. I will try to develop an understanding that 
is not reduced to the live-act, but rather understanding the performance within those 
many relations. 
I am interested, finally, in talking with you about the historic dimension of those 
relations, especially the performances at De Appel, which you wrote about in your, 
and although I have the feeling that your main concern is performance, you have 
named some different terms in your title; they may form an associative chain that 
links them in some ways. Maybe we could start with that then – with your decision to 
already link performance to other terms, other media, other formats. 
Marga van Mechelen: Yes, it’s quite problematic in a way, in different respects. You 
mention this book, but my latest book also has the subtitle Through Performance and 
Installation Art, but the main title is Art at Large; the title is based on a statement that 
is considering the development in the 70s, especially in this field of new media art. 
You cannot speak any longer of media-based or media-specific art forms; my 
statement – which may seem to be in contrast to the subtitle of this book – but my 
main statement in this book, as well of the articles I published afterwards and in my 
latest book, is that performance and installation art were intertwined right from the 
start. The examples that I give in this book are the examples of two Dutch artists, Ben 
d’Armagnac and Gerrit Dekker, who would not use the concept of performance or 
installation – that is to say, they would not say “this is a performance I am doing” or 
“this is an installation I made.” They used another concept, namely “event.” Of 
course, I know one of the artists quite well, Gerrit Dekker; he’s still alive and I have 
written about him before, but Ben d’Armagnac has been dead now for already a very 
long time. However, it is still very unclear to me why they chose that word, that 
concept. It is a concept that we know from Fluxus, but it is also a concept that 
recently has become more topical as it is a concept of Alain Badiou, the French 
philosopher. Of course, he is quite topical and popular at the moment, in the 
Netherlands especially because a lot of his publications have been translated into 
Dutch and many articles have been written about him. He is a philosopher in his 
seventies, I suppose, but I am not entirely sure. But, anyway, he is quite an old 
philosopher who had already published about the “event” and of “l’événement” 
already in the 60s, I think. So, there is another connection there. 
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LN: I do not know this concept of Badiou; I only know the concept of event in 
Derrida’s sense and also Deleuze’s, and it is always connected with a revolutionary 
aspect or as a singularity that happens at a certain time. Does this count also for 
Badiou? 
MM: Of course, there are different traditions and lines of thought for the event. There 
is a notion of event as it is used in Fluxus, but it is also used in connection to the 
Situationists. We also had in the 60s a group called the Event Structure Research 
Group, and there was also a connection with the French Situationists. Also in 
England there was a connection. From the Netherlands to England, from England to 
France. So, it is a concept of the 60s, the concept of the event. However, they 
applied it to their work, which we would now conceptualize as performance or as 
installation art. It is my point of view that if you really look at those projects – of 
course, this is really my speculation on it – there is always a development in time in a 
certain place, which gives meaning to that certain place, and then at a certain time 
there is a confrontation with a certain public. You can say both are performative in a 
way, but the communication with the certain public is, you could say, more the 
moment of the performance. So, the example I give in this book is that Ben 
d’Armagnac got a commission from the Goethe Institut – the Goethe Institut had a 
building here in Amsterdam, it was not yet the Goethe Institut, but it would become so 
– it was an empty space still. The artist was invited to live and work in that space on 
his own without any public, but he was free to show things that he was doing there to 
the public at a certain moment. So, there was a kind of cage and various things were 
bought into that space, into that cage. He was, in a way, moving from his house and 
the way he had lived in his house, and moving that into that performance space. Of 
course, it wasn’t really a performance space; it was just an empty building. What 
people at that time found so interesting in that person, that artist, Ben d’Armagnac, 
was that his house was a kind of artistic room. He was always reworking his 
surroundings, building his surroundings. 
Of course, there were people at that time who were building their own chairs and 
furniture, but then there were ways that he would build his bed. I think there is maybe 
a photo of it; he made an installation in Germany of three beds that were really very 
simple beds, made of about eight shelves. Four shelves like this, four shelves like 
that, making three boxes like three beds: one for himself and two for his women, as 
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he was living with more than one wife. That was not really so very exceptional in the 
Netherlands at that time; there were more communities around in which men had 
more than one partner. 
LN: The other way around – woman having more than one man – was not so 
common at that time, I guess. 
MM: Yes, this was not so common at that time, but to show that in a way – to make it 
public by showing three very simple beds for one person – it was not a double bed, it 
was three singles beds beside one another. It looked more like a stable you could 
say, more a place for animals than for human beings. Very elementary, you could 
say, very basic. 
LN: So, this was used as a performance rather than as an installation or a sculpture? 
MM: You could see it as a sculpture, or as installation, but in your imagination it 
represents a performance – a performance of a way of living. That was interesting to 
a number of people from the art world at that time, such as Ritsaert ten Cate, and 
Johannes Gachnang, who was the director and curator of the Goethe Institut, and 
they wanted him to bring his way of living from his home place to an artistic 
surrounding and to continue his way of living for moments, such as two weeks, for 
example, in another area. Not really an artistic place but coined as an artistic place 
for a certain moment in time. So, he was again performing and making a kind of 
installation, doing something with the space and bringing things into the space, and 
then at a certain moment the audience, the viewers, the public, were invited to come 
into that space and to watch not only what he was doing but also to become aware of 
the things that he had done so far, and really see the connection between what was 
actually there and his way of living. So, you could of course say that the performance 
artist is an actor, especially because Marina Abramović stressed this even later that 
the performer is an actor in his performance, but what was interesting to people at 
that time – people like Richard de Carter, Johannes Gachnang and a number of 
other people – was that they got the idea that there was another reality other than the 
normal reality of … how does one call that? 
LN: The artificial space of an exhibition? 
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MM: No, I mean more the setting of a normal family situation – there is normally a 
man, a woman, a father, mother, children, et cetera. They have an ordinary house, 
they buy their stuff in IKEA and those kind of stores, but the way of living of Ben 
d’Armagnac and Gerrit Dekker was different from that. It was their reality – you could 
look at it as being a kind of artistic practice, but still is was their reality. Art and life 
intertwined. They came together. So, they bought their reality and their way of living 
to a place where an audience could see it and could watch it. 
LN: And what happened at the opening? Did they perform themselves, did they 
present themselves or did they try to hide [their personal relation to the artwork]? 
MM: I think that is the important issue, because that is the main problem with 
contemporary reception compared to the reception in that time. Someone like Marina 
Abramović stresses today that because there is always a level of representation it is 
not reality – you bring it [one’s reality] to another context, another audience, and in 
that sense you are representing your life and not presenting it. However, part of the 
myth of performance art and its reception at that time was that it was reality – that the 
performance was reality, that the artist was not performing, that you really had 
contact with a living being. 
LN: I would say that both are true – but what did he do at the openings? Did he 
prepare a presentation? 
MM: I saw the installation, but I was not there at a moment when he was. The public 
could go and see what he has actually done without him being present. Let’s take 
another example of Ben d’Armagnac – the box. 
LN: I think you wrote about it. 
MM: Yes, the white box. In the white space of De Appel, people entered the room not 
knowing anything about what would happen in that white space. In relation to scores 
and text, there was a lot of information about Ben d’Armagnac and people knew 
already about what he had done so far and they knew about his Goethe Institut 
performance-installation. They knew about the motifs in his work and they knew 
about his personality, about his personal background and the problems related to 
that personal background. Of course, all that kind of information was there, but that 
was not the score yet – that was not the plan yet. It was a point of reference for the 
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public. So, when they entered the room it was not, I think, clear for anyone there what 
he was going to do; maybe it was not even clear if there was someone inside that 
box. You could, of course, expect that there would only be an object – an installation, 
that box – and not a performance. Of course, you enter nevertheless a performance 
space. 
LN: So, it was not announced at all? 
MM: It was an announced as an “event.” 
LN: Ah, as an event. 
MM: As an event, not as a performance or as an installation; that is such a concept 
that could imply different kind of things. 
LN: That could also imply an environment without acting. 
MM: Yes, of course. 
LN: Were all the performances at De Appel announced as events? 
MM: No, only those of those two artists, as it was their concept. Of course, the 
concept was not solely of those two artists, as it had already been used in different 
contexts, and I am not sure what kind of contexts influenced their conceptualization, 
but they both used the word “event” and not the word “performance,” and of course 
not the word “installation” as it was not really a concept at that time. You had 
concepts of environments, and so it was De Appel described it as an “environment” 
and Gerrit Dekker described it also as an “environment.” So, the title was Event, and 
of course a title like “Event” describes also a type of art form, and in that sense it is 
something different than if you were to say the title is “Love,” “Intercourse,” or 
something else. 
LN: And there was no title of the artwork either? 
MM: There was only the title Event. So, you saw a white box and you knew nothing 
besides the fact that it was a white box. You could come close to it as you weren’t 
prevented from walking around, and then you could see the materials of the box – 
plastic and glass – and maybe you could also see that the glass was painted white. 
You saw the scissors and maybe then you would have the association, as with zips, 
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that this is a box that can be opened, so maybe there is someone inside. Of course, 
there are all types of associations that you could have, and they bring you to the idea 
that a performance will take place there. So, the expectation related to what you 
could actually see, and also to that certain location – the performance space of De 
Appel – make people expect that what will take place will be a certain kind of 
performance. So, after a while, people begin to notice that there is someone inside 
the box – that person was scratching at the glass window and was removing the paint 
– after a while, people could recognize him and see that it is Ben d’Armagnac inside 
the box. Of course, that is not so much of a surprise. The moment you know that 
there is someone inside you know it will be the performance artists, as at that time 
most of the performances were done by the artist themselves. However, at quite a lot 
of performances at that time the people did not know how long the performance 
would take. In the end it took around two hours and people could see more and more 
– he had removed the paint and people could see that he had bandages all along his 
arms, that he had wounded himself, and of course that had a connection to the things 
he had done before – it fitted very well into the biography of this artist. They saw that 
there were thousands of flies in that same box and that there was a kind of liquid and 
that the flies were moving towards the liquid or the wounded arm. You can have a 
kind of imagination as to what kind of liquid that may be, what may be more attractive 
– blood or perhaps honey, something like that. So, then you are making a kind of 
story, a kind of narrative out of it, and at the same time you are experiencing on an 
emotional level a relationship with the artist, who is presenting part of his emotional 
life. That’s the difference with theater, in which the actor plays a role and the content 
is written and made by someone else. You are really made aware of the fact that 
these are elements of the biography that is being bought to public space. 
LN: So, now let’s get back to the title of your book. 
MM: Yes, it is therefore I say that it is very problematic. I choose those titles for 
different reasons. One reason is because we are still talking about performance and 
installation, and we use the concept of installation as a kind of umbrella for things 
that were mentioned in the past – for example, situation art, environments, events, 
different kinds of assemblage, but essentially all kinds of concepts that are related to 
or combine physical objects and certain spaces. Installation has that connection to 
physical objects and spaces. So, I use a concept that has its origins in the late 70s –  
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1978, 1979 – although it was of course used before, but not in the exact same sense; 
I used it now because it is now a familiar concept, and of course I could have used 
the words “assemblage” or “environment” instead of “installation,” but because the 
concept of installation was introduced in the Netherlands in the context of De Appel 
as a new concept I thought it was important to have it in the title. 
LN: And was it also introduced in connection to performance? 
MM: It is described in a way as “Übergang” 
LN: I understand, as “transition.” 
MM: The transition of artists who had been working with performance to a new 
situation, a situation that you could say was the situation of installation art. 
LN: From the 80s to the 90s? 
MM: From 1977 to 1978 or to 1979. Every year De Appel made a program – for 
example, ten events and ten performances; five were subsidized by the local 
government and five by the national government. They were mainly introduced as 
performances, but in 1978 for the first time they used the concept of installation. They 
used it, for example, for a project by Marina Abramović and Ulay, a project – or an 
installation – called Installation One. So, in the title the word “installation” is used for 
the first time. There was also a project by Vito Acconci that used the word 
“installation.” For Marina Abramović and Ulay, who were of course, very influential for 
De Appel, it was introduced as a means of saying goodbye to the medium of 
performance. 
LN: Did they perform live? 
MM: They did performances until 1978 – a lot of performances – but then they 
announced that from their perspective the medium of performance had been 
exhausted. 
LN: But my question is that within the installation did they include performances or 
not? 
MM: Yes, that’s the way I look at it. On the one hand, they said at that moment that 
the medium of performance is for us exhausted – uitgeput, we say in Dutch – so we 
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are going to develop in another direction, and the first sign of this is Installation One. 
A lot of other artists were following them; there were artists from De Appel who did 
performances at De Appel in the mid-70s – the years before – who also started to 
work in a direction that was called “installation art.” However, from my perspective, 
when you look at that work they named “installation art” – and I look at it in the same 
way that I have looked at the examples that I have discussed so far, of Ben 
d’Armagnac and Gerrit Dekker – it is still a combination of performance and 
installation. For example, that project of installation art, Installation One, took place in 
two different spaces of De Appel – the performance space and the exhibition space. 
In the performance space, there was a propeller turning around and around. It was 
very difficult for people to walk around a propeller; you have to take care you don’t 
touch it. So, the propeller, although an object, was a different figure – it was a 
dangerous figure. It was, you could say, a kind of performer – replacing the 
dangerous elements of the performances of Marina and Ulay. In the other space, the 
exhibition space, there was a large projection of a film and that film was recorded in 
that same space – the exhibition space. You could see in that film Marina and Ulay 
sitting in front of each other; Ulay with an erection and naked and Marina also naked. 
So, in that exhibition space, there had been a performance and that performance had 
been recorded; that recording was projected and integrated in that exhibition space. 
It was not just a projection of a film. It was, of course, an installation in itself, and at 
the same time it was part of a more abstract installation together with the propeller in 
the other space. This is one of my propositions or theses within this book – that the 
concept of installation is not the concept of an art form that has to have a physical 
feature as a crucial, elementary feature or as a sign of the art form – rather, 
installation is more a mental concept. In this way I discussed a work of Madelon 
Hooykaas and Elsa Stansfield, Memory Window. They also used different spaces in 
the building of De Appel – the entrance space, the performance space, and the 
exhibition space. They brought something into those spaces, but the installation as a 
whole was a combination of all those physical things and experiences. The work of 
Memory Window is made by the onlooker; the onlooker, the viewer, makes in his 
head a kind of concept, a kind of image out of all those ingredients bought into the 
different spaces by the artists. 
So, for me, the concepts are not really physical art forms, but they have, as I have 
said, an intertwinement, and they also have a more conceptual existence. In the 
127 
 
beginning, De Appel said that “video” is an object, it is a tape, video you can collect, 
you can show it in the museum or whenever you like, but if you look at the way artists 
were working with that medium of video there’s no difference between how they were 
working with video than how performance artists worked with intestines or other 
human organs. The video artists were also working with live situations and with their 
own histories, their own biographies; they were not only making an object, there was 
also a kind of process going on and for that reason they needed a kind of institution 
like De Appel where your process – the way of working – was accepted as the artistic 
practice. So, not the painting or video tape – that’s not the output, that is not the main 
thing – the main thing is, you could say, the conceptual way of working, or the 
scientific way of working, or the personal autobiographical way of working, any way 
the process was the main thing. Also the concept of “project” is more an umbrella 
concept that was introduced by De Appel the moment that they realized that artists 
don’t want De Appel as a building any longer, not the four walls in between 
everything that can take place; artists want to go to a public space, want to go to 
historical spaces, and they don’t want that traditional division any longer between an 
artist and a scientist. They want to do artistic research, which is what we have 
nowadays. “Project” is a kind of pre-figuration of our contemporary concept of artistic 
research. Also, of course, the artists who were doing those kind of projects were 
different from the performance artists of the early and mid-70s, because they were 
more orientated towards science and conceptual things. It also has to do with the 
new generation. 
You can look at all those concepts in different ways, you can look at how they were 
applied, how they became part of a myth. You can look at it also as a development: 
out of performance to installation to projects. You could defend that the name 
“projects” is more fitting to the new generation of the early 80s, but on the other hand, 
you could also defend the idea that the things that took place in the 70s were more 
performance, or that at the end of the 70s the installations were also projects. But as 
a historical concept, projects were introduced later on and installations were 
introduced later than the concept of performance. 
LN: And would you say that they all have things in common that are opposed to the 
old conception of autonomous artworks, such as in sculpture and painting? I ask 
because it seems that there are two ways of thinking and those are connected, but it 
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is maybe not yet clear how [they are connected], as we are still moving on in history. 
But still, they both seem to have performative aspects, including a more open 
concept of authorship, for example. 
MM: Yes, yes, to take an example that is quite illustrative I think: Jackson Pollock. Up 
until that moment when that film was made of his action painting everyone was 
talking about him as a painter and as a maker of paintings. Of course, everyone knew 
that you could see the signals – the symptoms – of an action; the drippings are the 
traces of an action. But the moment that the film was made and all those photos were 
distributed of that filmmaking, and a new generation was integrating that way of 
receiving Pollock, Pollock was no longer a traditional painter. 
LN: Yes, but it depends; I mean, it’s a working process, and every artwork has 
involved the body of the producer as part of its working process. 
MM: For example, when you look at Kurt Schwitters and other Dada artists you could 
say that they were making poems but the [published] poems are the remains of the 
poems spoken in the performances. The main thing was the performance, in which 
they used sounds and words. When you have a book and there are those poems in it 
they are only a remainder of the performance. So, it is the other way around: usually, 
you are interested in scores as the textual thing that forms the basis – the starting 
point – for the performance, and usually you are interested in all the different ways of 
documenting a performance by texts, by video and so on. However, if you take that 
example and you look at it from a traditional perspective, usually a writer writes 
poems – and, of course, everyone knows how good an experience it can be if a poet 
reads his own poems – but still one has the idea that the published poem in the book 
is still the artwork. But if you look at Kurt Schwitters and Tristan Tzara, I would defend 
the idea that if you really want to talk about what really is the artwork – if you want to 
have a moment in time in which to say: “that is the artwork” – I would rather say that it 
is the performance that is the artwork and not the published poem. 
LN: Of course, I as an artist always think: what is the artwork? So I think what the 
artist decides and says is that is the artwork. But you have a broader [historic] view… 
MM: I have a semiotic view, which I think is important to explain a bit. For me it is 
quite a simple way of looking at things. It makes things easier for me, because I can 
say that our perspective on those artworks, or those performances, is what Umberto 
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Ecco calls the “intention of the viewer,” which is for him more important than the 
intention of the author, the artist. From the point of view of the semiotician, there are 
only two things that important: the intention of the opus – the work – and the intention 
of the viewer. There is a supposed intention of the modus operandis, but what kind of 
ingredients does the work have that make signs for the viewer? When I look at an 
artwork, I figure out these kind of signs, I see a number of signs and they are signs 
because I know that there are other people who have the same idea about what is 
significant in the work. What are the signs of the work? The concept of the sign is 
derived from the idea that it can only be a sign if there are at least two people who 
think that this is a sign of something. 
LN: Yes, but you can only look at an artwork when it is presented to you as an 
artwork. So, when we ask now if what Pollock did was a painting or a performance, or 
if what Kurt Schwitters did was a poem or if it was it a theater piece or a performance, 
this is the whole historical dimension. It is why I wanted to talk to you because at 
certain periods certain things are understood as particular things, and the artist needs 
this terms – I need the term, the notion of performance and everything that is 
connected to it historically in order to understand what it is that I do. 
MM: But also the viewer needs that – or at least, you could say that it is implied in the 
way that the viewer looks at a certain thing. As I said to you about the example of 
Ben d’Armagnac, when you enter that performance space at De Appel and you see 
that box there are a number of signs. There are a number of recognizable things that 
are meaningful, but the viewer – and, of course, one viewer is different from the other 
viewer – brings his knowledge, his context, his references with him or her, and that 
influences the way he looks at that piece of work and forms his interpretations of that 
work. As I said, at that time there were a number of people and also a number of 
viewers who were inclined to negate the fact that the artist was representing his life in 
that specific situation. They were more inclined to think that he is showing us his way 
of living and that he has brought his way of living to us. But a young generation who 
was not present during that performance and was not representative of that 
generation but rather a younger generation, who are maybe influenced by what 
Marina Abramović wrote in the 90s about presenting and representing, will have a 
very different interpretation because they will say that it is not a presentation but a 
representation of the artist and his way of living. So, for me, there’s not one truth; it is 
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not that truth of the contemporary viewer in 1975, who looked at those performances 
and installations, is more useful or a better way of looking at it than someone who 
has only read about the performance and made an interpretation of that performance 
only by what he saw in the form of documentation: texts, video, photos, and so on. Of 
course, you will want to end with my last chapter because there all those theories in it 
– I am quite critical of Peggy Phelan, for example. 
From my perspective as a semiotician, there are two things important: the signs of 
the work and the additional knowledge and experience that the viewer brings with 
him, which forms part of a certain context for a certain generation. It informs his way 
of looking and that makes another interpretation of the work than the interpretation of 
someone from an older generation or from another background. So, from the point of 
view of semiotician, the intention of the artist is really less important. Of course, I am 
aware of the fact that all the information I have about the artwork is information that is 
partly given to me by the artist and in different forms – by other works, performances 
or installation, by what he wrote beforehand or afterwards, in the form of a score or a 
report – and all that information is of course important and influences me. That is also 
a semiotic point of view – that all that information is bought to me in a different 
language: the language of a score, the language of an actual performance that I 
watch, the language of a visual recording or the language of a written report. These 
are all different languages and they have all a different relation. You cannot say that 
that there is only one thing – it is a combination in the interaction. 
LN: So the definition of the artist – the fact that I say now that this is performance, or 
a painting, or my life, or whatever – this would be for you one bit of information in a 
net of other information? 
MM: Yes, in my dissertation, I discuss extensively in Chapter Three publications of 
two semioticians, Felix Thürlemann and Jean-Marie Floch, a Swiss art historian and 
a French semiotician, not an art historian. Both of them are semioticians who wrote 
about Kandinsky. Kandinsky is an artist who wrote a lot about his work and there are 
a lot of publications that have some relation to his paintings, but it is interesting to see 
what exactly the word-image relation is in his work. Are those texts a kind of score? 
Or are they a kind of report? And how do they relate exactly to the image structure? 
To the power system of his work? Or the level of abstraction? One semiotician is 
inclined to say that you should not look to the development of his work to really have 
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a good understanding of his abstract work. Of course, you can say he developed 
slowly from figurative work to more abstract work, and you can understand his 
abstract work by looking back to his more figurative work. That’s possible but you 
should not do it, otherwise why should the artist have made those abstract works? 
The abstract work is an intentional decision of the artist. So, you should look at that 
abstract painting as a new way of giving meaning to an artwork, and not try to explain 
it by comparing it to the works he made before. 
LN: So it’s not reducing in meaning, but it’s another relation to meaning? 
MM: Yes, another relation to meaning. The other semiotician has a different 
approach. There’s a nice discussion between the two; I construct a kind of discussion 
between those two points of view and I also give my own opinion about that. That is, I 
think, an interesting case to look at for the question of “what is the artwork and how 
does it relate to other ways of communicating about the work, such as the score, 
video documentation, and so on?”  
LN: I would like to continue by asking about the different texts – we already 
mentioned a few of them – that are around performances. Maybe we can start with 
announcement texts, as I am especially interested in these announcement texts; it 
can be the title, what will happen or is going to happen, or also what it is: is it a 
performance? Is it an event? What are the expectations connected to or arise from 
these titles? Did De Appel – we are speaking now about this time, these early 
performances that happened in the Netherlands – did they also send out or print a 
small description of what will happen? It also has to do with the curatorial concept, 
whether the director, Wies Smals, curated particular performances or invited artists. It 
has to do with what is communicated to the audience. 
MM: There are a few principles that I could prescribe. Of course, those principles 
were always in the background, but the practice was sometimes quite different. I 
think there were two principles that were very important to Wies Smals and also to 
the other members of staff. 
The first principle was that they felt a responsibility towards the audience – to the 
visitors – to inform the visitors and in quite a broad way: to give personal information 
about the artist, to give information about the development of the work of the artist, 
and to give information about the broader artistic and sometimes cultural context of 
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the work of art or the artist himself. She studied art history, she worked within the 
museum, and although it was not really so obvious that the museum presented 
artworks and gave a lot of information about the artwork – it could also just be 
hanging on the wall – for her personally it was quite important to have that role as a 
mediator between the public and the artist, and the artwork. Maybe more the artwork 
than the artist. That was an important principle to her. 
The other principle, which was also one of the reasons why she founded De Appel, 
was that this generation – this type of artist, if you would like to call him – needed a 
different platform than the platforms that were there before. The gallery space was 
not a good platform for the artist, a museum was not a good platform, the theater was 
not a good platform. For a number of reasons – I won’t elaborate upon that – but you 
could imagine that there are reasons why they were not a good platform for this type 
of artist. So, De Appel offered a place within which the artists were really well placed. 
It was a safe place, it was a closed space – people could not just enter the space, 
they had to ring the bell. Of course, that is more on a concrete level, but in a broader 
sense De Appel wanted to offer to the artist a really free mental space. So “you can 
do whatever you like within our institution.” Of course, that is the principle. The 
practice was sometimes different. There is one example in the book that was really 
quite different. It was the work of a German artist. So, there are two, sometimes 
conflicting principles: one, the responsibility for your public, for your visitors; and two, 
the responsibility towards the artist; you want to give him all the possibilities to 
develop things the way he would like to do it. 
LN: Yes, but was it communicated in advance what people wanted to do? 
MM: Of course, the artists were invited by the institution, De Appel, and then there 
was a discussion between the artist and the curator, or the director. We cannot know 
what those discussions were, so it is more second-hand information, but what I do 
know is that there was really, as I said, a discussion between them because there 
was always the need to find a kind of compromise between those two principles. So, 
even if artists said “I don’t want to know anything about what I am going to do,” De 
Appel would accept that, but the moment that De Appel got the impression that it 
would be very harmful for the visitors the discussion would continue. And there is one 
example in which that happened – that De Appel did not accept what the artist 
intended to do. 
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LN: The kidnapping? 
MM: Yes, kidnapping. Of course, it is a very exceptional example, but, on the other 
hand, it is very illuminating because the artist noticed that he was not able to 
convince De Appel of his project, and the only possibility to realize it was really to 
suggest that he had accepted the limits they had drawn, and then to kidnap the staff 
in order to do his original plan, but that was really an exception. In all the other cases 
there was a kind of negotiation between the staff and the artist, in which De Appel, on 
the one hand, wanted to realize the principle about information in relation to the 
viewers, but also give the artist the room he needed, literally and in a metaphorical 
sense, for his project. So, there was always an announcement of the performance, 
but the content of the announcement was, of course, the result of the discussion 
between the artist, the director and the staff. 
De Appel was really quite convincing, I think, towards the artist, that it was really 
necessary to inform the public beforehand, but also to have documentation about the 
work afterwards. They had a photographer who was almost always present and 
made photos and documentation. De Appel, already in the very early stages, was 
aware that for that time frame it was important to make moving images, and that film 
was not the most suitable medium anymore but that video was, because you can turn 
it on, work in daylight, and you can make a recording from the moment the 
performance starts until the end. That is of course not possible with a film. So, they 
got money from the Prins Bernhard Cultuurfonds to buy a Sony camera and they 
taught themselves how to work with it; although not always, a lot of the performances 
were recorded on video. So, they thought that there is not just one way of recording, 
documenting. Photos are important, videos are important, and then, later on, they 
also asked a number of people – art critics and such – to make a written report of the 
performance, a written description. 
That is obviously a very clear choice to not choose just one medium but to think 
about the combination of different media for the recording of the performance, 
because that generation – especially the European performance art generation – was 
not so eager to repeat performances. The idea of “once only” was part of the whole 
concept of performance art in Europe, in contrast to American performance artists, 
who were also working more in a theatrical context. In theory, you can have 
sometimes hundreds of performances of one theater play; although, of course, every 
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performance is slightly different. In that way you can have a large audience who have 
all seen that specific Hamlet performance. 
They always asked the performer if he was accepting to do it at another time, to not 
do it once only. 
LN: And did artist do performances twice at De Appel? 
MM: There are some examples when the artist did it another time. But, in general, 
you could say that this generation of European artists had some difficulties with doing 
it another time. 
LN: What about the relation to the video documentation? Did De Appel ask the 
artists…? 
MM: To give permission? Yes. 
LN: To give permission to the photographer. Did they work together? Did the artist 
inform the photographer in advance what was going to happen? Did the artist select 
[photographs to be published] afterwards? 
MM: I don’t think so but I am not sure. Oscar van Alphen was the photographer … He 
is not alive anymore, otherwise we could have asked him. I don’t know if he got 
information beforehand about the performance. 
LN: Was he free to move, for example? 
MM: He was free to move, yes. He was free to move, that is for sure. 
LN: This is also something that could be disturbing for the artist. 
MM: Yes, yes. 
LN: And some artists don’t like the documentation, so… 
MM: When I say “he was free to move” it is from the perspective of De Appel. But, of 
course, if an artist said “I don’t want a photographer,” or “I don’t want the 
photographer to use the flash light” or whatever else … Then they had to accept that. 




MM: To the photographer, but there are a few examples in which it was quite 
important. They were not the examples of Oscar van Alphen as the photographer, but 
of Gina Pane, who brought her own photographer with her. She was already quite an 
important artist before she became a performance artist. She worked with a gallery in 
France. The drawings she made in relation to her performance, and also the photos 
she let her own photographer make of the performance, were considered artworks in 
a way. At least, they were considered to be commercial objects. 
LN: And in this case the photographer of De Appel would not be allowed to take 
pictures? 
MM: No, he would not be allowed to make additional photographs. But that really is 
quite an exception. 
LN: And apart from that, did every artist agree to give the photographer of De Appel 
the rights of the pictures? Would De Appel pay the photographer? 
MM: Yes. 
LN: But still the rights belonged to him? 
MM: Yes, the negatives are still with the photographer. The negatives were not 
bought by De Appel, but when I was working on this book there weren’t any problems 
with using his photos, because the photos are owned by De Appel. But there is 
another photographer who worked on commission – not as the photographer of De 
Appel – and he always wanted to be paid twice for his photos. He was paid in the 
past, but he also wanted to be paid when the photos were used again. I was really 
angry about him because in the beginning he said something like: “I was already 
paid, so you don’t have to pay so much; if you want just fifty photos I’ll make a good 
price,” and then the moment we said: “yes, we need all of those photos,” the price 
became higher and higher. But, anyway, the mentality of Oscar van Alphen was a 
different case, he was really different. He of course considered himself as an artist 
photographer, but what he did for De Appel was considered by himself to be a tool – 
an instrument – for the artist and the institute to document the performance. So, it 
was a very different attitude. 
LN: Hmm, interesting, and what about the video documentation? Who did it? 
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MM: The De Appel staff themselves. 
LN: So, it was different people? 
MM: In the beginning it was always Wies Smals, the director, and when Josine van 
Droffelaar became a member of staff – she came from the Stedelijk Museum – she 
had quite a lot of experience working with video already and she did it quite a number 
of times. 
LN: And what about the authorship of these documentations? 
MM: It belonged to De Appel. 
LN: They owned it? 
MM: Yes, they own it and later on there were different institutions concerning video 
art. One was founded by an artist, René Coelho. Video was still a difficult topic for De 
Appel; as I said, the artist felt the necessity to have an institution like De Appel for 
their development, but De Appel from the beginning had the feeling that video art 
needed a different institution, so then they founded a new institution: Time Based 
Arts. So, in the Netherlands there were two institutions – well, there were more 
institutions but in Amsterdam there were at least two institutions – MonteVideo and 
Time Based Arts. Those two institutions became a combination, a fusion of both, and 
that is the Nederlands Instituut voor Mediakunst. It was an archive, it was a research 
institute, it was a production house and an exhibition space in the Netherlands until a 
couple of years ago. Because of the cuts it was necessary to close that building, the 
institution. So, it was really a big institution with different divisions, and in the 
collection of that institution there were different smaller collections, and one of those 
collections was the collection of the videotapes of De Appel. So, it was the Dutch 
institution for video art. It was a collection of the Lijnbaan Centre in Rotterdam – De 
Appel, Time Based Art – of the videos themselves, et cetera. 
LN: And these documentations, they were part of the video art collection? But it was 
a document, so the author in that case is Wies Smals or…? 
MM: Wies Smals was, of course, the director of the video. 
LN: Was it cut, or was it just as it was recorded? 
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MM: It was recorded mostly from the beginning to the end, but later on there were 
cuts made. 
LN: And who did this? 
MM: I think … I’m not sure. Gina Pane, Discours mou et mat, that performance was 
recorded by De Appel, and as I said she worked with her own photographer but not 
with her own videographer. So, that was done by De Appel, and it could be that the 
cuts were done by, or not done by the artist but on the initiative of the artist, that’s 
possible, but I’m not sure … 
LN: But there is no authorization from the artist? If the rights belong to De Appel, the 
artist never authorized the material, I guess … 
MM: Yes, I guess, but I’m not sure. I think I could mention a few names who may 
know this … 
LN: Maybe I can write down these names afterwards. Let’s move onto the next topic: 
publishing and publications. Could you say a few words about this? 
MM: Yes, there were a number of regular publications in art journals, and also in 
Dutch newspapers. This was not too difficult for the De Appel, on the one hand, 
because the close circle around De Appel – the people who were really interested in 
things going on in De Appel – consisted of people who were art historians or art 
critics. A number of them were regularly publishing in the Dutch art journals and 
newspapers. For example, Antje van Graevenitz and Paul Hefting. So, they had 
direct access to the main art journals and newspapers in the Netherlands and, as you 
said you read the book, maybe you have seen that I published small photos in the 
book of covers of a very important Dutch art journal, financed by a number of 
contemporary art museums in the Netherlands, called Museumjournaal. Until 1980 to 
1981, most of the covers bore photos related to things in De Appel or things that had 
been organized by De Appel, or the same artists that had presented in De Appel. 
Anyway, there was a connection between the covers of the Museumjournaal – most 
of the covers – and De Appel. The reason was the editor-in-chief of the 
Museumjournaal was also a member of the board of De Appel, so there was really 
that close connection. 
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So, those were the huge platforms in the art world that they had access to. Besides 
that, there was a small art journal, an initiative of an artist, art critic and translator – it 
was one of the artists doing performances in De Appel, who was also an art critic and 
an English person who did a lot of translations and who also translated this book – 
Michael Gibbs. De Appel gave a commission to that art critic to publish written 
reports of the performances in that journal, Artzien, that was the title of the journal. 
So, that was a kind of channel for De Appel to make recordings – written recordings 
of the public. So, of course, it is a different way of looking for a platform, because 
there were those connections, these personal relations between De Appel and those 
important art journals. Still, of course, the art critics had their own responsibility of 
what to write, and how to look at the performance, et cetera. In general, they were 
quite positive, as you can imagine, but it was still their responsibility. But Artzien, as I 
said, commissioned by De Appel, so that was a different story. 
LN: And when did the idea come up to build an archive? 
MM: From the start. 
LN: If it was from the beginning was it connected to the idea that performances 
require a bigger need to have an archive. 
MM: As I said, it was the feeling of being responsible. For the future, you have a 
historical responsibility. You are a part of things that have a historical meaning, so 
that was really quite important. Also, there were, of course, a number of artists 
involved at De Appel who felt the same need to let future generations be informed 
about performance art. Marina Abramović is the main example. What she is doing 
now – or rather, lately in the last couple of years – you could, of course, say that it 
makes her even more famous, but you can be quite critical about the glamorous side 
of it. I think that her motives are really much related to her feeling of being 
responsible for the survival and maybe even the future of performance art. She as a 
performance artist and performance art as something that is not exceptional, not to 
only to be placed in the 70s and in the 90s, but as an art form with its own 
possibilities and its own meanings and it owns effects and affects, it has a history, it 
has a future – and she as a key figure in performance art, she as Marina Abramović, 
feels that responsibility. She does reenactments as a form of giving performance an 
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afterlife. She will find a situation for performance art – what she is working on right 
now – she does workshops, she teaches, et cetera. 
LN: Back to De Appel, it has now changed the whole area of this understanding, and 
also Abramović was a key figure in changing this understanding. I am interested in 
what was there from the beginning. How did Wies Smals, or the board of De Appel, 
how did they conceive the connection between archiving, documenting and the 
performances? 
MM: Yes, of course they were aware of the “once-only” character of performance art 
as being part of its contents – an important part of its content. But as I said, there was 
that relation to art history; not only Wies Smals but also members of the board were 
art historians and art critics at the same time. It was also a period that was quite 
important in the development of educational practices in the world. Art teachers were 
very active in public debate; there were interesting conferences, there were side-
programs in art schools, there were lectures, et cetera. So, it was really – and there 
were remains still of this echo of 1968 – the feeling of responsibility that what you are 
doing should be accessible to anyone. That political attitude was very much alive in 
this generation. Besides that, Wies Smals worked in the library of the Stedelijk 
Museum, so she was really used to collecting, to documenting, to archiving, et 
cetera. It was so obvious for them. She asked me in the beginning of De Appel … I 
was a student still at that time … I said she studied art history for a moment, not so 
very long as she had not the right diploma and she could not have official access to 
the university, but just because she was motivated she was accepted to follow a few 
lectures at the university. She could not read very well, nor write very well, and so 
she asked me as just a good student to be an advisor for publications that could be 
relevant for the library of De Appel. Not only books, but also art journals, international 
art journals. I remember that, for example, a Canadian art journal, Parachute was 
advised by me to collect for the archive. A number of other things I was advising on. 
So, she was really eager to be up to date in a way. Also in more theoretical aspects. 
LN: But she was not into theory? 
MM: She was not into theory because she was dyslexic; she was not really able to 
read all those things. But she still was really eager to give other people the 
140 
 
opportunity to give suggestions as to what to collect. Of course, that’s possible at the 
same time. 
LN: Yes, interesting! 
MM: Even if you’re not capable yourself, you can be convinced of the necessity of 
building an archive. 
LN: Interesting … And was there a clash? Because this educational trajectory and 
everything that has to do with documenting and archiving, this is certainly a clash 
with the myth of performance art. I wonder if that was ever discussed. 
MM: Yes, I think that on the one hand, De Appel did not really build the myth in a way 
intentionally because, as I said, they wanted to give as much information as possible 
as permitted by the artist. But, on the other hand, if you were going to that building, 
De Appel, you will see that there are really small spaces, so the public was also a 
very small public, and even if a performance happened twice there were not more 
than eighty people who could actually attend the performance. But, of course, a lot of 
people who weren’t actually there talked about it, and then a second-life developed 
after the performance – of all the stories and of all the telling about experiencing, et 
cetera, and a lot of performances had no clear content. It was based upon 
experience and of feeling – maybe even shivering and whatever else, you know – it 
was not something that you could only look at from a rational perspective. People felt 
the identification, the empathy, et cetera. So, if you want to make that clear to an 
audience that was not there, it is very difficult to avoid a kind of growing of myth, as 
you can imagine. Of course, De Appel, when they asked art critics to write that 
written report, there were number of descriptions and facts, et cetera. 
LN: How long were these reports? 
MM: It depends, what was published in Art Scene was maybe about six hundred 
words, something like that. Not more than four hundred to six hundred words. But 
there was another art critic who also wrote the monograph about Ben d’Armagnac. 
LN: What is the name? 
MM: Louwrien Wijers. She is still alive, you could go and see her. She does not live 
in Amsterdam, she lives quite far away, but often she is here. What she did was, on 
141 
 
the one hand, make a lot of interviews with artists – not only performance artists … 
well, Joseph Beuys was also a performance artist – but with people like Joseph 
Beuys. She knew him very well and she was also one of the very close friends of Ben 
d’Armagnac and, as I said, she wrote a monograph about him. She made a lot of 
interviews with those artists, in which she gave the artist a platform to say whatever 
he liked. They were not really critical interviews; it was more a way of giving the floor 
to the artist. 
LN: And were those interviews published? 
MM: Yes, they were published. They were made into collections, those interviews. 
But they were distributed also just by making prints of them. We have now all kinds of 
methods of printing on demand, and although it was technically different back then it 
was a kind of print on demand. 
LN: Was it copied? 
MM: Yes, copied and distributed; those texts were of the interviews and text with 
descriptions. Though she was quite a holistic figure, and she still is a holistic figure, 
they were really descriptions and not so much interpretations. She was very informed 
with hardly any distance to the art. 
LN: Okay. The last relation I am interested in is the relation between the exhibition 
space and the performance space. I read in your book that when an artist would be 
invited to De Appel he or she had both floors, and on one floor there was the 
exhibition and on the other floor there was the performance. 
MM: That was possible. In fact they were three different spaces: there was the office 
part of the building, and the office part of the building was divided into three, you 
could say. So, you had the desk when you entered, then you had a square table in 
the back. 
LN: Ah, yes, there is a picture. 
MM: Yes, and there were also the shelves and all the documentations, the library 
LN: And also the tapes? 
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MM: Yes, the tapes and a video monitor so you could also watch recordings or 
videotapes of the artists. So, that was the second part of that room, and then you had 
the wall – one large wall – and there was always an exhibition, but then that was an 
exhibition of documentation materials. So, for example, reviews in newspapers or art 
journals of performances the artist did before, or the working material of the artist – in 
any way, information, just information, context information. Then the artist could use 
the performance space to do the performance, but some artists also used the 
exhibition space to do performances. Some artists did not use the exhibition space at 
all and did only performance. There was always that possibility to make use of 
different spaces. 
LN: And did those two spaces have a different lighting system? 
MM: They were quite different because the exhibition space had a very close ceiling; 
it was a very rectangular space, with only one or two doors for access and there were 
windows on one side. Usually the windows just let in daylight. The performance 
space had the balcony; it was a kind of cellar. On the ground floor, the measure of 
the ground floor was about the same as the height of the room. You had the floor and 
a kind of balcony inside the room, so there was a kind of balcony. You could watch 
also from the balcony down to the performance floor. There were windows, but they 
were almost always closed, so there was no daylight. It was a white space but they 
were bricks were painted white; it was not the walls of a museum, it was not that 
clean, white space of a museum, it was brick. 
LN: That was why it was not so good to exhibit there? 
MM: So, you could enter by just one door, or you could go by a few steps to that 
balcony, that balcony, and watch down, but that was an exception that people 
watched from that position. That space, that balcony, was used as a sleeping 
bedroom, so the artist could stay there. So, it was more the private space of the artist 
usually. 
LN: So, sometimes it was open to the public and sometimes it was not? 
MM: Sometimes it was open, and sometimes it was allowed for the photographer to 
go and make pictures from above. That was possible. So, there was no daylight, 
there was just one door to gain access to it. So, it was also possible to prevent 
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people from entering up until a certain moment, like in a theater in a way and unlike 
the gallery space. In that way it is a little bit comparable to a theater, but for the rest it 
was not really a black box, although there was no daylight. I think most people did 
not compare it with a theater, but they also did not compare it with a museum or an 
exhibition space. It was really a warehouse and it was turned into a performance 
space. So, it had its own identity in a way, you could say. 
LN: Okay, and when a performance happened in the performance space and in the 
other space the artist had decided to make an exhibition, after the opening and after 
the performance evening would the exhibition stay? And would the other space, the 
performance space, be closed? 
MM: No, not always. 
LN: So there would be left the traces? 
MM: Yes. 
LN: And the other exhibition? 
MM: Yes, I could give a few examples of artists who did a performance and left the 
traces as a kind of installation, you could say. Of course, those traces were traces 
back to the performance. 
LN: Could you mention a few examples? I remember the wet floor … 
MM: Yes, the wet floor, but I am thinking about these sound environments, maybe? 
The performance/installations of Sef Peeters and Servie Jansen would be other 
examples. 
LN: So, this installations was produced during the performance, one could say? 
MM: Yes, and partly before the performance. There is another example that I am 
thinking about. This is an example of what you could call an environmental 
installation, for which the artist, Marco Bagnoli, used the whole building, so it went 
through the whole building. He denied the specific characters of the rooms. 
LN: Okay, then I start with my first general question. I will read it, otherwise it will be 
too confusing: to work with performance for me precisely means to cope with the 
paradox of performance as live-art stated by Philip Auslander. It means that it has to 
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be ephemeral in order to be a performance, but it also has to be recorded to be a 
performance, which creates a paradoxical situation. It also means to cope with its 
ontology – I refer here to Peggy Phelan – and also with exploring and questioning 
those preconceived things with performance, and I was wondering how artists 
conceived of performance before its ontology was defined as live. Would you say that 
historically the artists’ understanding of performance positioned it as an authentic, 
unique live experience? Which, for me, kind of burdens performance till today at least 
performance in a visual context. Or do you think that it is more the other way around, 
that this live experience and authentic moment was ascribed later to the 
performances and also from “outside”? 
MM: My opinion is that you could say that until maybe about 1973, and then I am 
only talking in the European performance tradition. Of course there were artists doing 
performances in Europe, like Der Wiener Aktionismus, and those Actionists had no 
idea of what you are describing, of the “once-only-ness” and the ephemerality, and 
that particular kind of conceptualization of performance art. They had an elaborate 
score. 
LN: The Viennese especially? Or do you have other examples? 
MM: Yes, and Carolee Schneeman is also a good example. Of course she is an 
American artist, but she worked quite a lot in Europe, in France and in England 
especially. You could say that the generation of the 60s, that they came with 
something completely different compared with theater plays, but I don’t want to see 
this as the birth of the real performance art, in that sense. In the sense of the “once-
only-ness,” the being ephemeral, et cetera. 
LN: So this came later? 
MM: This came later, yes. 
LN: When? 
MM: An important turning point is about 1972 to 1973, I think. There was that 
exhibition in Luzern, Transformer; the artists who were there all dealt with their 
personal – and personal in the largest sense: sexual identity and the idea of 
transforming one’s identity, the in-between-ness of gender, et cetera. When Wies 
Smals became informed about these developments and these type of artists who 
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realized it and who were an important representative of this kind of new development, 
she immediately saw that this was really quite different from the art so far. So, it had 
everything to do with vulnerability, identity, intimacy, et cetera. Of course, the 
Viennese artists were always looking for a large audience. They had different motives 
for what they did, it had to do with the memory of the Second World War, it had to do 
with Georges Bataille’s transgressive and abject conceptions, and with Antonin 
Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty; it had to do with Viennese Expressionism. It had all kinds 
of cultural backgrounds, and, of course, Artaud was a soldier during the First World 
War. They had also their personal histories, but I think their personal histories were 
less important than their cultural knowledge and the cultural messages that they felt 
important to communicate. They really looked for a large audience. 
LN: They prepared, but then they pretended that it was spontaneous, for example. 
This tension interests me. 
MM: Yes, it was not spontaneous. Of course, it was also, in the case of Hermann 
Nitsch, based on the principle of a ritual. The ritual is, of course, based upon 
repetition: repetition within one performance and repetition of one performance to 
another performance. So, yes, repetition and ritual is something you can teach your 
audience – your audience learns quite quickly to see a kind of pattern in a 
performance – and in the actions of Otto Mühl and Hermann Nitsch there is a kind of 
pattern. 
LN: The ritualistic aspect? 
MM: Yes, the ritualistic aspect. In the case of performances, for example, by Marina 
Abramović, there are two main concepts therein – and also in the book – the fact that 
how long a performance will last and when a performance will end are uncertain 
features of the performance and these are important features of the performance. 
LN: For her? 
MM: For her, but also for the audience. 
LN: But this concept of unfixed duration doesn’t belong to all the early performances, 
right? I guess some artists had fix duration … or not? 
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MM: Yes, it could also work the other way around. For example, I mentioned a 
Hungarian artist in the book, Tibor Hajas, and he wanted his performance in Warsaw 
to last forty minutes, but he lost so much energy during the performance he was not 
able to end the performance in the way he had planned to. That was something out 
of control. Marina Abramović planned to be out of control. 
LN: But still it is a plan. 
MM: Yes, still it is a plan, there are rules. But the implications of those rules are that 
the audience is in an insecure and unsure position. Of course, you can have a lot of 
confidence in the artist and think they will manage to fulfill their plan – or you have no 
confidence in the artist, that is something an audience can have – but it was still 
completely different from a theater play, in which you know there will be a break at 
half nine in the evening. There is still that big difference. 
LN: But, when would you say that this authentic was only live-experience, which also 
has to do with it being a kind of myth – not only true – at what time was this ascribed, 
attached or connected to the notion of performance? Now you have said that the 
really early performances in the 60s did not have those things. That they would be 
either ritualistic or there would be other examples of just actions – doing something in 
public space would be an example – one could do it again, it doesn’t matter for the 
action itself. For example Valie Export’s Tapp und Tastkino or the action that she 
made with Peter Weibel as a dog, it is not part of the concept that it is once only, and 
it’s not that important I would say. It’s an action, and for the ritual … 
MM: I still think that Peggy Phelan is very important for this … 
LN: Ah, you think so late? 
MM: Yes, it was very late. As I said, that people who were not attending the 
performance were getting the idea themselves or via the people who told them about 
the performance and who were actually present during the performance, they really 
missed something that could not be replaced. That element was already very present 
during the first years of De Appel. But it was not really made part of a theory, or part 
of conception at that time. I would just look at myself: I lived in Arnhem during that 
time, I was not yet working in Amsterdam – the first years I was a student, later on I 
had a job in Utrecht – so, I was not able to attend all the performances, especially 
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when they were on Thursday evening, for example. The weekend was a different 
case, but on the Thursdays I missed quite a number of performances, but every week 
I went to De Appel to see the recording. So, for me, I still had the feeling that the 
recording was enough, was useful, that I could imagine how the performance was to 
be experienced yourself, that you could use your imagination to bridge the gap 
between the video recording and the actual performance. 
LN: Do you think this has to do with the fact that you watched it right one week after 
… 
MM: One day after sometimes! 
LN: … and also in the same space? Because if I would go now … for me it would not 
be so close. 
MM: No … and there were still people there; for example, there would be Wies Smals 
who could tell me a lot about the performance. Of course, that was a different case, 
but still, if at that moment the staff of De Appel or the people around De Appel had 
really worked on the mythologization of the performance art, like Peggy Phelan did 
later on, I probably would have behaved a bit differently, I think. 
LN: You would not watch the documentation? 
MM: Maybe not … 
LN: Because you had the feeling that you had missed it and it was not worth seeing? 
MM: Or maybe I would have decided to see all the performances whenever possible. 
LN: Interesting, I think it’s also interesting that you watched the document but still you 
were quite close to the performance. From the point of ontology, we would say the 
medium is always the same. The recording itself doesn’t change, so it doesn’t matter 
when you watch it. But actually, it matters, because the performance seems to live 
longer within the space also because of the memory of people, because of traces, of 
people around, of those things. 
MM: Yes, yes. 
LN: Okay, yes, good. So, then, the second question is again, a mixture of statement 
and question: in theater before the post-dramatic period, the written text – the drama 
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– was the preceding and also remained the unchanged original of each performed 
piece. And, I guess, but this is also a question to you, the denial that there was no 
script or score for early performances had to do with the fact that artists wanted to 
differentiate their work from then theater performances. I was wondering why artists 
didn’t say “well, we are building new relations to text and theater,” but they just said 
that there is no text, which is a bit … there’s always text, a concept. Everything that 
we know and spoke about today, context is text. Could you tell a little bit about how 
this opposition between text and performance came about? Do you think it’s the 
same answer with Peggy Phelan? 
MM: No, no. Marina Abramović first made statements about this from a very early 
date. 
LN: From when? 
MM: I think 1974 or something like that. 
LN: Okay, and what kind of statement? 
MM: So, the “anti-theater” attitude … 
LN: That this has to do with the relation to text, of performance to text? 
MM: To texts, because it’s an obstacle when you want to keep the performance as 
real as possible. The theater, as you said, has a text, and the text is performed and it 
is brought into a different reality, it is not reality itself, the actors are of course acting. 
There are fake elements. 
LN: Of course, there are differentiations, but I’m interested in the point between text 
and performance, in that relation. I was wondering when this division came about and 
why artists needed to claim that there is no text. Now we know that they drew before, 
they wrote down, they did know in advance what they were going to do. These are all 
scripts. These are all texts. So, I was wondering when and why artists need to deny 
that there is a text. 
MM: I think it has everything to do with how texts are an obstacle, or at least 
diminishes the level of experience of the performance, whether that be the physical 
experience, the visual experience of the performance. For example, Benjamin 
Buchloh had a very different context and sense about artists in the 90s. They really 
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wanted to hit – those artists in the 90s – they wanted to hit the viewer between the 
eyes, so that means to not give the viewer the opportunity to distance himself from 
what is happening, to confront the viewer directly with what is happening in time and 
place. 
LN: But this is also a concept: this is my text, when I am a performer, then this is my 
text, my concept, is to hit between your eyes. This is my score. The performance – 
how I do it and how this is then experienced live – I don’t know because I have never 
rehearsed it before and it may change depending on what space we are in – if we are 
in a bigger space then maybe it will be a bigger distance – this is really a unique 
moment. But what I don’t understand is where this division comes from. 
MM: Because, as I said, if you have that information and you have a score … For 
example, if you’re a theater critic, you read Shakespeare’s text and you have seen 
director A make a performance out of that text, and director B is doing it in a different 
way. Then, when you watch that second performance of Hamlet, for example, you 
are comparing the performance with the other performance and with the text. 
LN: But then I could say that I do this score only once, then it is the same. Or I could 
not hide the score, or say that there was concept. I do know what I am doing. Also, 
when an artist paints a painting, the artist does not say: “I have no idea who did this 
painting,” but in performance it is “it just came out of me and I don’t know.” 
MM: But that’s not the problem. Of course, it is possible that an artist makes some 
notes, some drawings and has some plans, but what kind of information do you want 
your audience to have beforehand? What kind of information prevents your audience 
from having the kind of experience you want them to have? That, I think, in the case 
of Marina and Ulay, for example, is a really important issue; as they were really 
working for months and months, there is no actual rehearsal for the performance, but 
there is such a training in a mental and physical sense, they really made as much 
effort as a theater actor. Only, they don’t want themselves to rehearse it, they want to 
maintain something of a spontaneous act. The presupposition of that is that they 
think that the audience will have a different feeling when there is no rehearsal than if 
there had been. 
LN: Okay, do you think that the relations that live-performance has to its 
documentations, or performative acts to their medializations, do you think this relation 
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has changed since the early performance works? When we talk now about 
performance documentations we already talk about a genre, and I was wondering 
how artists did deal with it before it was coined as such, before it was called 
performance documentation. I don’t ask if it became more or less … I am interested 
in how the awareness changed the medium or the way it was dealt with it. 
MM: In the beginning you had a feeling that in the 90s a lot had changed, and I think 
that we should be aware of the influence, for example, of the internet. We have 
become used to communicating in quite different ways since the internet is there. It is 
not only the direct application of the internet, but the idea that there is no longer 
something like the “real place” and other places, because the internet is everywhere. 
So, everything is everywhere present in a way. Of course, it is a fiction, but that is 
also the implicit method of the internet – that all the information you can get is 
everywhere. I think also it has two reactions: on the one hand, the revival of 
performance art has everything to do with that, that there was a kind of longing of a 
time in which there were those experiences – those real and once only experiences, 
that things still matter – while now, since the internet, everything can be changed for 
something else, you know. There are no things anymore that have intrinsically more 
value than anything else. So, that reaction, that response to the longing for real 
experience, is one reaction to the age of the internet, but the normal effects of 
communication since internet is that we don’t take care so much about the quality of 
information and the way we get the information, the medium of information. 
LN: Do you mean by “information” the documents? 
MM: Yes, the documentation. So for example if a student at the university or 
secondary school writes a thesis or paper he collects information from books and 
from the internet till the moment where he thinks I have enough information. The 
quantity of the information ranges much more than it did before. So, in the past, 
people were probably more developing themselves in small environments and 
surroundings, this was an obvious choice and a choice they made because these are 
the kind of ideas they wanted to identify with – they wanted to belong to that group of 
people that have those kind of opinions and viewpoints. Then you of course add 
information, but at the same time you value that information, so it’s more information 
that is selected by criteria – was more often selected, rather – by quality rather than 
quantity. I think that’s quite important. 
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LN: So, do you think there is a lot of performance documentation today, or too much? 
MM: I don’t say too much, I think more that people at a certain moment have the idea 
of … Well, you are interested in comparison between different documentation media, 
so “comparison” means a qualitative way of looking at the intrinsic qualities certain 
ways of documentation have – what can I attain with one medium in comparison to 
another? – but I think in general people are satisfied as long as they get information. 
What kind of medium doesn’t matter so much, but the quantity of the information to 
get a certain picture, and to maybe have enough, have a certain amount of material 
to communicate about that subject. So, the experience is not so important anymore 
as the information level you need to situate something and to maybe communicate 
with others about it. 
LN: But when we talked about De Appel, you said that there would more or less 
always be the camera and I guess it would be in the middle of the room, or…? So 
there seems to be an awareness of the document, but it doesn’t seem that much 
reflected or talked about how this looks, who makes it, how it is made, who owns the 
rights, where it is shown afterwards – all these questions that we have today as 
young artists working with different media. I was wondering about this awareness, 
these kind of things … I thought that in the 90s it might have changed because in the 
90s performance became broadly exhibited and performance documents were being 
sold. So, yes, I think the relation between performance changed in this moment of 
talking about it and looking at it through these mediums. 
MM: At that time, up until 1983, I am quite sure, that the more commercial – I call it 
commercial marketing – aspects of documentation were really not an issue or topic of 
De Appel. So, we were discussing their feeling of responsibility towards the future, 
towards history, that’s an important issue, but that’s something of the long-term. On 
the short-term, they used those video tapes to go to art schools – mainly to art 
schools but also university – and to tell students about performance art and to show 
them that videotape so that they can get an idea, or clue, as to what performance art 
was or is. 
LN: And it was not yet an issue that what we see we see through the medium, which 
means that this also immediately changes … 
MM: The video is the most transparent medium we have right now. 
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LN: This is what I thought, that this relation in the beginning was kind of natural or 
unreflected, it was done, in the doing, in the practice. Now, and maybe since the 90s 
there is a kind of ontology concept … 
MM: There was a certain reflection, because otherwise De Appel would have not 
asked people to write the written report. They had an idea that video recordings may 
not be the ideal … It was new and it’s better than film, but still of course they had the 
idea that you could not miss a written report of a performance. 
LN: I remember you write in the introduction that, in your opinion, a performance 
should not be repeated. Is this right? And I guess you said so, because the context 
cannot be repeated? I don’t recall the argument entirely. 
MM: Yes, I mean it in a semiotic way. Every performance has its own meaning, so in 
a semiotic way a performance can be repeated but every repetition is not the same 
as it was the day before. There is always a difference. Only the difference, or the 
focus, the emphasis within performance art when a performance is repeated is still … 
the character or the level of repetition, and the … how is called it? …the measure, to 
how far it or what extent it is a repetition … 
LN: Yes, I understand. 
MM: … is dependent upon the artist himself, and to his capacities. 
LN: Also by the performance itself, because by my performance I can put this … 
move an object one meter, and then it is quite easy to repeat it. I can come tomorrow 
and I can do this more or less the same. But when we try to repeat the entire 
conservation tomorrow it would be a bit much … 
MM: Yes, but at the same time you realize that in a performance a performance artist 
can make the decision not really to repeat the performance, to make changes. Not 
only because he feels different than the day before, but because he had another 
intuition or a different conceptualization of the performance. 
LN: But isn’t it then another performance? 
MM: If it is, of course, a repetition. People first start with that idea, and then maybe 
they have information and they notice that it is different from the day before or later 
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on they recognize that it is different from the day before. Nobody cares, in a way. 
Nobody goes to the artist and says “please give me my money back.” 
LN: Yes, because the performance has no value anyway – only the document. The 
document you can only sell once. 
MM: But also because you are aware that you don’t pay for the repetition. You pay 
for the performance. 
LN: I don’t understand the difference. 
MM: When you go to the theater play. 
LN: I pay today ten euros and tomorrow I will also pay ten euros. 
MM: Yes, you will pay ten euros tomorrow. But when the actors decide during the 
break: “we will not continue after the break” … then people will say: “give me my 
money back.” But still, if a performance artist promised to do the performance again, 
but changes the content of his performance instantly … 
LN: Yes, instantly, but when I change the concept of the work I also have to change 
the title usually, because then it is a different work. 
MM: But still I think it is possible that artists make the decision to do it, halfway 
through a performance to come to a different ending or whatever else. Not only 
because they are physically incapable of doing the same thing, or they have a 
different emotion, a different charisma, maybe also because they just don’t want to … 
don’t want to again that very emotional element, that pathetic element, it was too 
pathetic. 
LN: A little bit of censorship? 
MM: Yes, a little bit of censorship. But I think that is the autonomy of the visual arts, 
that tradition especially of performance art, makes it so that people will accept those 
changes and won’t say that they want their money back. 
LN: So, you would say that performance has no autonomy in the sense that a picture 
does? When I have a picture I can exhibit it twice and no one will say: “hey, that’s 
another context.” Context always matters and makes a difference – where I exhibit 
the picture: in my flat, in your bedroom, or at the Stedelijk museum – but everyone 
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will say that this picture is of Lilo Nein and it is autonomous and she can exhibit it 
here and there but the picture is always the same. 
MM: Michael Fried, for example, says that every good picture has its meaning and its 
importance and its significance wherever it is exposed, wherever it is shown. 
LN: This is the autonomy of an artwork. 
MM: Yes, but of course there are a lot of artists who have a different view, because 
we think that context matters. 
LN: But I just wonder when we compare this now to performance, everyone would 
say: “you did this performance in the bedroom of Marga van Mechelen, so this is the 
performance, you cannot do it in Stedelijk museum now.” I wonder if performance 
from the beginning was against this autonomy, or is it more dependent on the 
context, or would you say it is not autonomous anyway … or can it be different? 
MM: I think that is more the autonomy of the artist. Not of the artwork but the artist, 
that it is accepted of a performance artist that he, on the one hand, has his own 
ordeal. There is a kind of vow there: I want to reach this, I want to attain this goal, I 
promise you that I want to attain that goal, I promise it to myself, it is a chance for me 
to get there, to achieve that goal. But if an artist does not succeed, like for example 
Tibor Hajas, who wanted to hang on the ceiling for forty minutes but was not able to 
do it more than twenty minutes, I did not go to him and say I want my money back. 
When I go to a circus and an acrobat is not able to do any performance then I would 
go to them and say I want my money back. That’s the difference. Of course a circus 
is an acrobat theater in a way. I mention that example because these things are 
connected more to performance art than to traditional theater. But still, when you go 
and see an acrobat, you have confidence that he will survive, you know that it is a 
kind of ritual, he’s done it twenty or thirty times before and there has been a lot of 
repetition. But still, the fact that you are really concentrated when you watch the 
acrobat is because there is still a lot of risk. But, as I said, when an accident happens 
during that act, you accept that; there is still an element of risk in circus, yet when the 
acrobat really doesn’t succeed in any act you want your money back because that is 
not part of the deal. I think your audience has a really different attitude as a 




LN: Do you think this still is, or do you only talk about this period? 
MM: As I said, there has been a reaction, especially in the 90s, of artists and of the 
audience also, who long for that old performance art. Here in the Netherlands there is 
a performance artist who founded a foundation … I don’t know the exact title of the 
foundation … it is something like Performance No Tech. What she wants is to 
organize performance – and she is doing performance herself as well – she wants to 
organize performances of performance artists who do not use technology, props – a 
little bit of props, but not very dominant props or technology in the performance art – 
who stay close to their own physical possibilities and limits. That is her idea and that 
you could say is quite romantic in a way; it is romantic because it goes back to that 
earlier idea of performance art. So, there are those kinds of performance artists, and 
at the same time in the 90s you had a number of reenactments. Often the 
reenactments, certainly in the beginning, were a kind of “ironization” the performance 
art, making it ironic, to play with it. 
LN: Do you mean reenactments by the artists themselves? 
MM: No, these were by other artists. Although, I must say that the reenactments by 
Yoko Ono of her performances were not as serious as her old performances. I would 
not say that there was a lot of irony or cynicism in her reenactments … more neutral 
… a more neutral way of doing the reenactments. 
There are a number of younger generation performance artists who actually play with 
the old concepts: sometimes literal reenactments, or almost literal reenactments, but 
sometimes also with a play on the crucial themes of performance art, and sometimes 
also with different layers. One example was a performance artist who had cream –not 
cream that you use for mixing things – and she took her arm until about here into that 
cream and clotted the cream until it was really clotted cream. Of course, that is really 
funny to see someone doing that for an hour, making clotted cream out of it. But 
there was a moment also when the audience would realize how much pain it would 
cause, so people felt pity towards her at a certain moment, and she was very anxious 
to realize her goal. She was not laughing at the public, saying: “see me doing this.” At 
the beginning there was a kind of laughter for a moment, and then there came a 
moment of identification for the pain. So, this is a typical example of the 90s and how 
they worked with traditions of performance art. 
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Then you had the twins who did performances – they are anorexic, these twins, 
Liesbeth and Angélique Raeven – they did a performance in which they used the 
Bologna performance of Marina and Ulay, in which Marina and Ulay stood opposite 
each other naked and everyone who wanted to enter the art gallery had to go pass 
the body and touch either the male or female body. The twins were also standing in 
the same position although they were not naked, of course, but you could see that 
they were anorexic, you could still feel their bones if you passed them, but of course 
that is quite an experience. As soon as you passed them, you did not notice but your 
own weight was projected full screen for the whole audience. The artists they had 
hardly any weight – forty-five or forty-two kilos – and then you had to go between 
them and then you would see your own weight projected. That is funny to have again 
those different emotions, and I think that is quite typical for a lot of performance 
artists that started to do performances again in the 90s. On the one hand, really 
aware that you want to reach a real emotion, but then on the other hand being aware 
of the fact that you have distance to that history [the 1970s] and that spectacle look 
of the history. 
LN: And, also, wanting to create that emotion is also a concept or is also an artwork. 
Also, the performance ontology came up at the end of the 90s. Maybe you can say 
the last little bit about this? What is your feeling and what is this term, or how its claim 
changed the way of how we look at performance art today. 
MM: Quite a number of people are asking me, for example, a radio program asked 
me: can you deliver a performance artist who we can talk about, a performance artist 
who is doing still such awful things, something like that, you know. There still is a kind 
of image of performance art that is still related to all those very risky performance 
artists of the 70s, especially Marina Abramović. I must say, that on the one hand I am 
also responsible for that when I teach about abjection and transgression and I take 
as examples of the 60s and 70s the Viennese Actionists, Marina Abramović, Carolee 
Schneemann, Ana Mendieta, et cetera. Then you confirm that picture of performance 
art, and in confirming that picture you also confirm that there is also something like an 
ontology of performance art. Then on the other hand – and this is also my response – 
when people ask me to deliver a performance artist and ask are there any 
performance artists left, I tell them that there are hardly any exhibitions nowadays in 
which there are no performance artists present in the exhibition itself, during the 
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opening of the exhibition, in the course of the exhibition, et cetera. It is so integrated 
in everything, but that does not imply that those performances have the same 
character as the performances of the 70s. They are very different, the variety of 
subjects within performance art nowadays. I think because it is so normal now, that is 
perhaps the reason why people are looking for performance art now. Because they 
are looking for the 70s art, the 70s performance art and they are not aware that it is 
actually everything and is very visible in a way. 
I think that’s … I cannot imagine it will be over within a couple of years, performance 
art. I don’t think so … Also because there is a completely another argument for it, the 
same argument as for installation art: art is a global art and artists are travelling from 
one place to another, and most art that is going on in contemporary art is shown in 
contemporary exhibitions; for example, the Biennales all over the world, exhibitions 
that are bound to a certain location and time period, where artists are going to and 
they are there and they don’t have anything with them. They go to a shop and they 
buy their stuff and they make their installation, and after their exhibition it goes as 
rubbish, it goes away, and they travel by plane or whatever else and go to the next 
biennale and make a different thing, or make the same thing. So, today, installations 
are also ephemeral, the main part is ephemeral. The same thing happens with 
performance. Performance also belongs to that global art world. That is also a reason 
why I don’t think performance will be over in a couple of years. 
LN: And then the museums started to buy the written stuff, they collect now all the 





Interview with Renate Bertlmann 
The following text is the edited version of a recorded interview with the Austrian artist 
Renate Bertlmann about the relation of live performance and photography in 
Bertlmann’s work in the 70ties and 80ties. The interview was conducted in Vienna in 
August 2014 in German Language. 
Lilo Nein: We might take a photograph of The Pregnant Bride in the Wheelchair (Die 
schwangere Braut im Rollstuhl) from 1978, which I found during my research, as the 
starting point of our conversation. When I saw this picture, I was sure that I had seen 
it before and that it documented a live performance. The only irritating thing was that 
there was no audience in this one. I asked myself whether the photo had been taken 
from a different perspective, whether it had been deliberately framed without the 
audience. Or had the audience simply been airbrushed out? Later on, I found two 
photographs on your website, each part of a different series: one of the bride with an 
audience – documenting a performance – and one of the bride without an audience, 
a studio photograph. Both pictures are indeed quite similar, but it becomes clear 
within the series that each image has a different status with regard to your artistic 
practice. A performance took place in both cases – a performance that was captured 
on camera, so we have an action and a materialized view of this action – and yet one 
of them is a staged photograph and the other is a live performance documented by 
someone else.  
What is the relationship between photographic and performative practice in your art? 
Renate Bertlmann: It’s a complex relationship, because these media interlock in 
many different ways, and these interrelationships change in the course of time. I 
consider my staged photographs performances as well. They’re studio performances. 
I made them mostly in the 1970s and the live performances afterwards, in the late 
1970s, early 1980s. 
I did my first studio performance in 1969, entitled Transformations (Verwandlungen). 
In this work, I used different clothes and utensils that belonged to my mother and 
posed for the camera with them. The reason I did this was that my mother forced me 
to wear certain clothes as a child. She told me which clothes to buy or sewed clothes 
for me, which I then had to wear: from nightgowns all the way to costumes. In this 
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photo series, I reflect this situation and try to interpret it ironically. For me, this was an 
action, as they used to call it in the 70s, an action before the camera. It gave me joy 
to act this out; this action was primarily about the feelings I had when I did this private 
little fashion show. The material output of my action – that is to say, the photographs 
– was not that important to me. The medium of photography has always 
accompanied me; I grew up with it and took it for granted. The camera has always 
been the extension of my arm. I used it like a pencil or a brush. My uncle was very 
artistic; already as a young man he had taken photographs. He gave me my first 
camera and helped me develop my first photographs as a child in the bathroom. Our 
bathroom was a witch’s kitchen ... I have always also explored my objects 
photographically, circling them, so to speak, to see what I was doing there or to 
unlock a level of meaning that I had not been conscious of. I was able to analyze all 
this with photography. Of course I also photographed my performances in order not 
to lose the moment entirely. But these pictures were never about the photography, 
and always about the reflection of what I was doing. In the pictures, I saw what I was 
doing then and there, and what these actions were transporting. 
LN: Could an attending audience have taken over this function of the outside look? 
Would performing this action have been thinkable before an audience? 
RB: No, an audience could never have given me this outside look. The camera is 
more objective; it merely produces a statement of fact. If I ask ten people from the 
audience how they perceived my action, each person would make a different 
statement.  
LN: Ten different camera angles would also make ten different statements about the 
action. 
RB: Yes, that’s true. But the camera does not judge me. It shows what I am doing in 
that instant. While the camera is also a weapon, it basically does not do anything to 
me. I was incredibly vulnerable in those moments, but nobody was there who could 
have hurt me. The intimate space of the studio has given me the opportunity to 
perform this action. I was able to move around freely, to truly expose myself.  
LN: How has your relationship between photography and performative action 
developed in the following years?  
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RB: From 1969 to 1974, I only used photography for documentary purposes. I used 
the photographs from my series of Transformations for collages. Additionally, I made 
quite a few objects or parts of objects at that time. In 1974 I made a worm that I used 
for an object as late as 1980. I used this worm to improvise in my second studio 
performance. I just wrapped it around my neck and twisted it. That was when the 
photo series Skinnings (Häutungen) was created. One might say that my 
performances evolved from my object-making activities. I always acted with my own 
objects as well as with ready-mades. I collected a large number of sex toys, mostly 
dildos. I also made photo series with them later; Chanson d’Amour was one of them, 
for instance. There are many cross-references between the objects, photographs, 
and performances: The double-headed dildo with the vibrating handle – a ready-
made I played with in this studio performance – was reused in a live performance 
Sling Shot Action. In 1976, I made Tender Pantomimes (Zärtliche Pantomime) in the 
studio. That was a very intimate work in which I sat on the floor, at times with legs 
spread-eagled. I had pacifier-fingers on my hands and a mask-object on my face or 
between my legs that was also made of self-cast latex pacifier objects. I processed 
these latex objects into other objects and also reused them in the live performances 
later on. 
LN: What is the main thing you had in mind in these studio performances: 
improvising with your body and its impulses or the photographic image that was to be 
created in that instant? 
RB: Both. I had no strict stage direction, no instructions to myself, but I had carefully 
selected the objects beforehand. Performing in the moment, I let myself be inspired 
by the objects. It was a kind of spontaneous action that was guided and led by the 
choice of objects. 
LN: How would one picture this situation in which the photography does not interrupt 
or disturb the playful exploration process? 
RB: Well, it didn’t, because the act of taking photographs corresponds with my 
personal work rhythm. I’m a very fast worker; I just go with the flow of the shutter 
button’s click. Then it goes, pow-pow-pow, click-click-click! As soon as I think about 
the process, it’s over for me. Of course, I knew what I was doing there, why I was 
doing it, and what I wanted to express. I was very clear and open about what I 
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wanted to do from the get-go. But in the process, I use a lot of intuition; instants when 
“reason” crept into my process were very rare. What’s remarkable about this is that 
there was no photographic waste in these works: every photo worked, always! One 
time, a photo inexplicably turned out to be out of focus, but apart from that, every 
image worked, also the framing. Even in the Renée or René (Renée ou René) series 
from 1977, in which I am posing in menswear in front of a table. I always went back 
and forth to the camera to click the release button, and without making a mark on the 
floor, I always returned to the correct spot. 
When I was doing the Renée or René series, I never thought about exhibiting the 
photographs, because topics like masturbation, seduction, and rape are so intimate. I 
could only do this series at home. Afterwards, I left the output at home for two years 
as contact prints, looking at them with a magnifying glass. When I had enough of 
them, I decided to have them all enlarged to life size.  
LN: There were five performances from 1977 to 1982. How did you go from intimate 
acting for the camera to a direct confrontation with the audience? 
RB: I had become more courageous, and I wanted to confront the audience, see 
their reactions. The difference to a camera, among other things, is that you can feel 
the atmosphere in the room, the contact with the audience. My contact with the 
audience has slowly intensified. For my first performance, Defloration in 14 Stations 
(Deflorazione in 14 Stazioni), I acted behind a wall and all the audience could see 
were my hands. Somehow that wasn’t enough for me, though, and I tried to actively 
involve the audience more in subsequent performances. In hindsight, I was quite 
pushy in doing that. I had conceived the performances in such a way that the 
audience had to participate. In The Pregnant Bride in the Wheelchair I had a big belly 
and sat in a wheelchair, which had a sign attached that read, “Please push” (“Bitte 
schieben”). When nobody from the audience pushed me, the baby in my belly began 
to scream so loud until somebody pushed me. The baby in my belly was a 
loudspeaker … I had a cassette recorder by my side, which I turned on whenever I 
needed. People weren’t able to take the screaming very long. In this performance, I 
used many different objects I had developed in my three-dimensional practice: 
attached to the cassette recorder was a rope that I laid around the room, building an 
arena for myself. The rope was wrapped in umbilical cords made of cast latex. And I 
always wore parts of my objects: a pacifier mask, a pacifier crown, pacifier hands. 
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In the performance The Pregnant Bride with the Collection Bag (Die schwangere 
Braut mit dem Klingelbeutel) at the Kunsthalle Düsseldorf in 1978, I used a collection 
bag in the shape of a huge condom – which again was a latex object I had cast 
myself – to collect money from the audience for the Relic of St. Erectus (Reliquie des 
Hl. Erectus ). St. Erectus was mounted to the wall, a collection box mounted beneath 
it. I kept going through the crowd, importunately collecting their money, which I then 
put in the collection box. In return, I gave the donors a small devotional picture of St. 
Erectus. When people did not donate, the baby in my belly started screaming at the 
top of its lungs.  
The performance Let’s Dance Together had me tied to a wheelchair. I tried to free 
myself, which wasn’t easy, because I had made sure the rope was really tight, and I 
kept trying until someone from the audience had mercy and helped me. In the Sling 
Shot Action at Franklin Furnace in New York in 1980, I forced the audience to dance 
with me and a doll. This element of interaction was very important in my live 
performances; it played a central role in these works. 
LN: Have your live performances also caused you to reflect on the objects or to 
perceive them differently, like the photographs have done for your studio 
performances? 
RB: Yes, that’s exactly what happened. One example was the pacifier crown the 
Pregnant Bride wore instead of a flower crown, which caused different associations 
with headgear through my acting in the performance. It led to my large photo object 
When Will the Theologians Finally Tell Us Something About Tenderness… (Wann 
werden uns die Theologen endlich etwas von Zärtlichkeit erzählen ...), where the 
pacifier crown became Jesus’s crown of thorns … This association was triggered by 
my acting with the object in the performance.  
LN: How did you go about documenting your live performances? Had you planned or 
conceptualized the recording process beforehand? 
RB: All my live performances were photographed, each and every one of them. My 
most faithful photographer is my husband Reinhold Bertlmann. He was always there; 
I could really depend on him. He is a good photographer, and he likes taking 
pictures. I didn’t have to explain much to him, because he knew my work inside and 
out. I have had some bad experiences with other photographers: either the photos 
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weren’t very good and didn’t show what I wanted them to show, or they were 
underexposed, or the photographer was so busy watching what was going on that he 
or she forgot to take pictures altogether. If it wasn’t for my husband, I wouldn’t have 
all that many records of my performances today.  
LN: Have these documents changed in significance for you over the years? What is 
their value to you today? Was it important to you that these pictures showed 
someone else’s perspective on your work? 
RB: Though there are many great shots, the value of these photographs is not so 
much artistic as it is nostalgic: they remind me of how I did what I did back then, and 
how the performances played out. Beyond that, these photographs have a functional 
significance: you can exhibit them and use them for catalogues, publications, and so 
on. In the exhibition Aktionistinnen (Female Actionists) at Forum Frohner in Krems 
back in 2014, I showed one photograph of each performance that someone else 
took. One of the photographers was Margot Pilz, who took some great pictures of the 
performance The Pregnant Bride in the Wheelchair at the Galerie Modern Art in 
Vienna. She is an artist herself, and of course I list her as the photographer. The 
handwriting of the person who took the picture is all over the image. You just have to 
accept that. 
LN: You have described photography as the medium in which you reflect on and 
document of your performances. Both functions become relevant after the 
performance. Have you ever used photography before a performance, like sheet 
music? 
RB: At the beginning, you asked me about the The Pregnant Bride in the Wheelchair, 
pointing out that it is mentioned twice on my website. If you don’t have all the 
information, you won’t know which of the two is the studio performance and which the 
live performance. I have, in fact, made studio performances and taken photographs 
before and after live performances. Beforehand it wasn’t always necessary, but 
sometimes I practiced or tried certain parts at home to see how it would go and what 
I actually wanted to do. Afterwards, I repeated the performances in the studio to get a 
little more out of them or to understand something that hadn’t been clear or coherent 
to me initially, something I hadn’t been aware of. I circled my performances with 




The literature that is incorporated in the bibliography includes the literature that was 
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